"The past weighs so heavily upon the present and the future that these last two domains of time hardly have meaning apart from it."
— John Lewis Gaddis. The Landscape of History (2002)
It is tradition to look back on the year at the end of December, to take stock of where we were, and where we are now. In part, this is an attempt to put what seems like a volatile and ever-changing world into some sort of order, to search for patterns, to make sense of the past. But the main reason isn't to indulge in backcasting — it is to look into the future, to see how the trends and events of the past 12 months fit into broader temporal patterns, and how these may give us insight into the flow of future history.
Building a list of the top three, five, or whatever number of events or trends of a specific time period is fraught with subjectivism. Top by what measurement and to whom? Are the events static moments, snapshots in time that can be compared, or are they part of a flow, constantly evolving in how we see them based on what came before and what came after? This is a key challenge for historians, and each of us, in some sense, is a historian. We look backward to try to find the causes and drivers of trends and events, and we use these observations and analogies to anticipate the future.
For our 2025 year-end review, we focused not on isolated events, but on broader patterns and trends. Individual events matter, particularly to those closest to them, but on a global scale, they are pebbles thrown into the pond. It is the cumulative effect — the combination of ripples from many events — that shapes the greater dynamics we seek to understand. Internally, we compiled regional and even country-specific lists of significant events from the past year. Some remained largely contained within their local or regional geography (e.g., developments in the Myanmar conflict), while others rippled out beyond the region (e.g., the Israel-Hamas conflict expanding to U.S. airstrikes on Iran). However, the most notable findings were trends that transcended regions, where similar patterns emerged across different parts of the world, reflecting more systemic dynamics.
Before going into this year's list, it is worth briefly reviewing our top five trends from 2024:
1. A Loss of Western Leadership
2. Israel, Iran, Turkey and the Reshaping of the Middle East
3. Reframing the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
4. Lingering COVID-19 Economic Hangover
5. Weakening of International Cooperation
Given the way the past affects the present and the future, it is no surprise that many of these trends set the stage for what ultimately emerged in 2025. The loss of Western leadership and the weakening of international cooperation, which are closely intertwined, continued to dominate geopolitical dynamics in 2025. The COVID-19 economic hangover has faded, but we saw in 2025 that China ultimately reframed its own economic expectations around a more modest outlook on the back of weak domestic consumption and shifting world economic patterns. The Russia-Ukraine conflict remains unresolved, and earlier threats of a shift to a nuclear conflict appear to have been part of political posturing as dialogue continued in fits and starts. Finally, the shifting patterns in the Middle East remain a key indicator of a transitioning world system, as we will see in this year's list. In the broader context, each of these 2024 trends fits within the return of the world to a more historically traditional multi-polar system, which remains a central theme in our 2025 review.
Our 2025 list once again tries to identify the largest ripples, the dynamics where dispersed events reflect deeper issues, or where a single collection of events is having a global impact. We acknowledge that this selection won't satisfy everyone, and may overlook some developments and combine others. But from a global perspective, we believe that these five showcase the most significant geopolitical developments from the past year and will have long-lasting impacts.
5. The Revival of Non-State Power
The nation-state remains the primary unit of geopolitical analysis; however, in places where middle powers are facing internal political challenges, and at a time when large powers are reshaping their global perspectives, non-state actors are filling the vacuum. West Africa has seen an expansion of jihadist activity across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin, which has also spilled into Nigeria. Al Qaeda- and Islamic State-affiliated groups are expanding their reach and recruitment, crossing national and ethnic boundaries. In South Asia, continued attacks by the Afghanistan-based Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan into Pakistan finally led to significant counterstrikes by Pakistan, expanding the conflict between the two nominal partners. In Syria, the Islamic State continues to exploit gaps in control as the new government tries to stabilize its rule and authority. Several Islamic State-inspired attacks also took place across the Western world, including the January attack in New Orleans and the December Sydney attack.
Another non-state pattern this year has been the rise in so-called Gen Z protests. Following the 2022 Sri Lanka and 2024 Bangladesh uprisings, which led to the collapse of their respective governments, we have seen a surge of similar youth-led protest movements, mostly in South Asia and Africa. In Nepal and Madagascar, Gen Z protests have been credited in part with the overthrow of existing governments. In countries as diverse as Bulgaria, Mongolia, Timor Leste, Paraguay and Morocco, Gen Z protests against corruption, nepotism and government spending priorities have caused disruptions, security crackdowns and, in some cases, policy changes. Like the Arab Spring a decade and a half ago, there appears to be both a structural issue (generational economic opportunity) and an inspirational issue at play, though there is little to no formal coordination across Gen Z movements in different countries, and often little coordination within them.
Both the reexpansion of Islamist militancy and the surge in generational protests reflect gaps in governance and economic opportunity, dynamics that are unlikely to be resolved quickly, particularly in areas where demographic growth remains robust. Finally, we saw an expansion of large corporations using their leverage and influence to reframe government policies, particularly in the technology space amid rising AI competition between the United States and China. While not at the same level of action as militants or Gen Z protests, the role of large technology and information companies is often a mix of corporate and political, both domestically and internationally.
4. The Return of War as a Means of Politics
The end of the Cold War ushered in an optimistic period where economic relations were supposed to overcome national differences, leading to a "flat" world. Even when this was seen as clearly false (the 1990s saw plenty of national-level violent conflict), it was an accepted ideal of the international system. In particular, changes in national borders were to be resolved by diplomatic or economic means, not by warfare and conquest. The pattern was "enforced" by the United States and European countries, which sought to intervene in conflicts or dissuade them through economic levers. But this ideal now appears to be slipping, as the larger powers either step back from trying to directly intervene to stem conflict, or offer tacit (or active) support for such actions. Even when outside powers sought to calm local conflicts through dialogue or threats of economic sanctions, the engagement was often transitory, as were the effects. Russia's re-invasion of Ukraine and Israel's expansion of its war focus beyond Gaza in recent years, and the lack of active counters by traditional interventionist powers, have eroded the political strictures around using force to manage neighbors. And this erosion only accelerated in 2025.
In the Middle East, Israel expanded its target set to Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and (with the help of the United States) Iran, not to mention the Israeli air strike on Qatar. In South Asia, Pakistan has sparred with both India (in a significant expansion of their traditional tit-for-tat responses) and Afghanistan. In Southeast Asia, Thailand and Cambodia have engaged in several rounds of border clashes (leading to the collapse of the Thai government); meanwhile, the ongoing war in Myanmar continued to create challenges for neighboring countries, which often sought to manage the conflict by working with both the military government and ethnic rebel groups. In Africa, fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo expanded as Rwandan-backed militants took more territory, while internal conflict in and around the Horn of Africa continued to draw in foreign involvement, particularly from the Gulf States and Egypt. In Europe, Russian operations in Ukraine spilled across the borders, testing European and NATO resolve. And in the Caribbean, the United States has declared war on fentanyl, attacking alleged drug-trafficking boats, seizing sanctioned tankers carrying Venezuelan oil and threatening physical attacks in Venezuela to oust the current government — with the CIA apparently conducting its first drone strike on a port used by narcotraffickers in late December.
As we noted last year, the continued erosion of international norms and cooperation is leaving countries to pursue their own paths to manage interests and competition. And without the threat of major sanctions or military intervention by the big powers, we expect a further expansion of localized conflict as a more common tool.
3. Trade and Tariff Rollercoaster
The first half of 2025 was shaped by a wave of tariffs from the United States, imposed across the globe. But perhaps more significant than the total tariff load was the intentional uncertainty over just what tariffs would be applied, when and to whom, how long they would last, whether they would be enforced, and what space there was to negotiate a better deal. Overall, it was the uncertainty more than the tariffs themselves that shaped the behavior of countries and the plans of international businesses. Often, traditional U.S. allies took the brunt of U.S. economic actions, while China used its own economic heft to play tough, leading both Washington and Beijing to threaten significant actions, only to eventually demure. The randomness of tariff application was evident on occasions such as U.S. threats and incentives to stem the flare-up between Cambodia and Thailand, and unfulfilled threats to increase tariffs on Canada due to a television commercial.
While the application of tariffs has been at times haphazard, and the final legality of many remains unresolved, one impact has been the drive for countries around the world to seek to buffer themselves against the overwhelming heft of U.S. economic power. Long-delayed bilateral and minilateral trade agreements have suddenly sprung back to life, with countries finding ways to overcome politically sensitive sectoral interests in order to build a network of trade arrangements that in part replace reliance on slipping global norms and provide alternative pathways to mitigate U.S.-driven shocks. At times, countries were able to negotiate deals directly with the United States to ensure their interests, offering promises of investments or access to strategic materials, but many of these deals have been only thinly outlined frameworks. More frequently, we have seen a surge in countries seeking to finalize stalled trade arrangements with their neighbors or with regional blocs. These are less robust than the expansive trade arrangements from the 1990s and early 2000s, but they make up for that in flexibility and speed.
One of the broader implications of a return to multipolarity in the world system is the erosion of global norms and arrangements, meaning that the trend toward smaller, less ambitious and more flexible trade agreements will continue to be the norm.
2. Reframing Regional Power Balances
At the end of 2025, the United States issued its latest National Security Strategy, reiterating its commitment to utilizing a balance of power strategy to maintain international order. At the same time, some U.S. actions appeared less like a traditional balance of power strategy and more like an acceptance of regional spheres of influence. This apparent conflict of goals and tools has contributed to a steady reshaping of regional power balances, especially when coupled with U.S. threats to leave certain regions and increased demands on local allies and partners regarding their domestic security issues. A changed set of expectations for where and how the United States will engage drives countries to act locally to ensure their own strategic interests, not content to rely on Washington (or not always concerned about whether Washington will actively engage against their interests). In short, we are seeing local dynamics take center stage, requiring countries to reassess their economic and security postures and redefine local balances of power.
In Europe, we saw this trend in the expansion of defense budgets, increased defense industrial cooperation (or at least ambitions toward that goal), and attempts to define European core interests — allowing for compromise over some of the more ideologically driven European norms of the past. In Asia, Japan in particular expanded its military cooperation and footprint regionally, with Australia also taking on a greater commitment, and even South Korea rethinking its own peninsular focus. In the Middle East, the degradation of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" has given Israel greater room to maneuver, but it is also seeing a resurgence of the role of the Gulf states and Turkey in shaping broader regional patterns, including in Africa. In Africa and Latin America, we are seeing smaller patterns of shifting collaboration or competition.
In many countries, these changes are also having social and political effects. 2025 saw further inroads by patriotic, nationalist or "right" leaning parties across the democratic world, as well as the further entrenchment of securitized governments, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where the military or military-allied politics took center stage in Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, and where similar dynamics are causing social reactions in the Philippines. Similar trends can be expected elsewhere amid the restructuring of local power balances and global norms.
1. Reshaping U.S. Priorities
While the previous trends are not necessarily the direct result of U.S. actions (tariffs aside), the sheer economic, military and political heft of the United States means that any change in Washington's priorities will have international implications. Inside the United States, the restructuring of the government, the DOGE actions and the government shutdown have reinforced a shift to a top-down prioritization of attention and initiatives. The traditional bureaucracy that provides continuity across administrations still exists, but in a less coherent and proactive form. Major tools of U.S. international engagement, from USAID to participation in key U.N. initiatives, are no longer utilized, while economic relations have shifted from incentives to coercion. The heavy focus on removing undocumented immigrants and reframing U.S. policies on immigration and citizenship will also ripple out, both in traditional pathways of migrant labor and in overall labor market and innovation competition between the United States and other countries. On a global strategic scale, President Donald Trump’s administration is refocusing on a dual region rather than global approach, preferencing the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere, and reducing attention to Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Like previous government attempts to refocus U.S. priorities, this one will remain fraught with the necessities of reality and vulnerable to events, but the initial actions are more significant than in past attempts.
Perhaps the most notable has been the build-up of military assets in the Caribbean in the second half of the year. The "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine reinforces Washington's commitment to reducing foreign power influence and involvement in Latin America, but appears to also focus on drugs and migration as key elements of national security. The U.S. military has carried out several strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats, detained oil tankers carrying Venezuelan crude, and now appears to be laying the groundwork to oust Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro (likely with an eye on turning next to Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel). Both Venezuela and Cuba are seen as the most likely areas for China and Russia (and even Iran) to assert foreign influence close to the United States. U.S. military attention to its own near abroad, and the Pentagon’s stated prioritization of the region, is watched closely from other regions, both to judge Washington's focus and any constraints in the use of military coercion.
Refocusing on U.S. internal and regional interests and prioritizing the Indo-Pacific over other global regions is not an isolated quirk of the Trump administration; Washington has sought such a turn under every president since the second term of George W. Bush. It reflects the social and economic dynamics inside the United States and the changing distribution of economic and military power globally. The United States has never been able to "manage" the world alone and has always relied on allies and partners. The difference now is that current U.S. policy appears less tolerant of its own partners and allies, demanding greater economic and military commitments from them, while downplaying traditional shared interests and ideals. This will continue the 2024 pattern of focusing on national and regional issues, rather than global, and further entrench the patterns of a multipolar system.
