Syria's entry into the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition will bolster the country's reconstruction and increase pressure on the jihadist group, but Syria's Western outreach will risk alienating hard-liners in the transitional government and could eventually help revitalize the Islamic State if popular expectations are not met. On Nov. 10-12, Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa made his first official visit to Washington, where he held meetings at the White House with U.S. President Donald Trump and senior national security officials. During the visit, the two sides announced that Syria would join the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State, marking the first formal security cooperation agreement between Damascus and Washington since the terror group emerged during Syria's civil war in the early 2010s. The announcement included plans for a joint coordination mechanism focused on intelligence sharing and operations against Islamic State cells in the Syrian desert and along the Euphrates Valley. U.S. officials also stated that limited humanitarian and early-recovery exemptions to certain sanctions would be introduced as part of the agreement. Finally, the U.S. State Department announced another 180-day suspension of most of the Caesar Act sanctions on Syria "to provide the Syrian people with the opportunity for lasting peace and prosperity," while calling for "concrete actions by the Syrian government to turn the page on the past and work towards peace in the region." However, risks to the country's stability persist, as recently demonstrated on Nov. 14 when unidentified assailants launched two Katyusha rockets from the outskirts of Damascus toward the capital city. One rocket struck the Al Mazzeh neighborhood in western Damascus (which is primarily inhabited by the Alawite minority, possibly suggesting a Sunni group was behind the attack), while the other hit the road leading to the Presidential Palace.

• The U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State is an international alliance of 90 countries and organizations coordinating military and intelligence operations to dismantle Islamic State networks and prevent their resurgence across Iraq and Syria.
• Before al-Sharaa visited Washington, Syrian security forces arrested dozens of Islamic State operatives and foiled several attack plots in a nationwide security operation.
• The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act is a U.S. law that imposed sweeping sanctions on Syria's former regime led by President Bashar al Assad, its security apparatus and, via secondary sanctions, any person or entity assisting them. The United States' move to lift these sanctions, driven by its diplomatic re-engagement and steps toward normalizing relations with Syria's new authorities, could unlock major investment and rebuilding opportunities for the war-torn country. However, other U.S. sanctions on Syria remain in place, specifically those related to transactions with Iran and Russia, as well as those involving sensitive military and technological goods.

Al-Sharaa's trip to Washington and its outcomes align with his ongoing push to expedite Syria's unification and secure the removal of remaining international sanctions that continue to impede the country's recovery. The past year has seen Syria go from being a pillar of Iran's Axis of Resistance to progressively becoming a U.S. regional partner. Since the collapse of al Assad's regime in December 2024, the United States has supported efforts to stabilize and unify Syria by re-establishing diplomatic relations and supporting the interim government's efforts to combat the Islamic State. Washington has also granted some sanctions relief to attract the foreign investment needed for reconstruction. This has allowed regional partners such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to provide financial, technical and material assistance aimed at bolstering the al-Sharaa government's domestic legitimacy and improving the provision of public services. However, many private companies have remained hesitant to engage in Syria due to lingering legal and financial risks, not least from the Caesar Act remaining in place. Additionally, the United States has helped mediate diplomatic efforts between Syria and various international and local actors, including Israel, Turkey and the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has led the fight against the Islamic State. However, the SDF continues to resist integrating into the Syrian state, prioritizing autonomy and distrusting al-Sharaa's government due to past violence by government forces and militias against minorities, including the Druze during a brief conflict in June, and against the Alawites months earlier.

• On Nov. 17, Saudi Arabia delivered the first tranche of its crude oil grant to Syria when a tanker carrying approximately 650,000 barrels docked at the port of Baniyas. The shipment marks the initial part of a 1.65-million-barrel grant signed on Sept. 11 between the Saudi Fund for Development and Syria's Ministry of Energy aimed at reviving Syrian refineries.
• On July 24, Saudi Arabia announced investment deals worth $6.4 billion with Syria, including $2.93 billion earmarked for real estate and infrastructure and around $1.07 billion for telecommunications/IT sectors, as part of agreements signed by 47 Saudi companies at a Damascus investment forum. At the time, al-Sharaa stated that "many investments are being finalised" with Saudi backing as the kingdom deepens its economic involvement in Syria's post-war recovery, reflecting an accelerating reengagement from Riyadh.
• Since the collapse of the al Assad regime, Israel — whose forces now occupy part of southern Syria — has repeatedly launched airstrikes at Syrian military and government positions, despite negotiations on a security agreement on their shared borders. Attacks escalated during the June conflict in the southern province of Suwayda, during which Israel struck the Syrian Ministry of Defense and the vicinity of the Presidential Palace in defense of the Druze and as a message to the Syrian transitional government against deploying security forces in the southern provinces.

The U.S. decision to temporarily suspend Caesar Act sanctions will bolster international confidence in Syria's path toward full sanctions relief, opening the door for limited reconstruction funding and Gulf investment, though this process will be slow and face myriad challenges. Suspending the Caesar Act will give the United States time to assess Syria's compliance before completing the full rollback, which requires congressional approval, especially as there are still U.S. lawmakers concerned over al-Sharaa and his allies' former links to al Qaeda. Syria's joining of the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition and its recent crackdown on Islamic State cells will also further help gain the trust of the United States and European countries, encouraging them to continue lifting sanctions. To this end, the Caesar Act's suspension will encourage more investment into Syria, especially from Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which have hesitated to finalize large investments and funding due to some U.S. sanctions remaining in place despite the waivers. But while this influx of capital will accelerate Syria's economic recovery, the process will remain slow due to numerous challenges following the nearly 14-year civil war. These include the scale of physical destruction in the country, the degradation of key industries like agriculture and manufacturing, the collapse of the formal financial system and the ongoing risk of renewed significant violence.

• A mission from the International Monetary Fund visited Damascus from Nov. 10-13 and concluded that Syria's economy is showing "early signs of recovery" and improved prospects, citing higher investor sentiment, gradual reintegration with regional and global markets and the return of over one million refugees. The mission also agreed with Syrian authorities on a technical assistance program focused on fiscal, monetary and financial-sector capacity building.
• The World Bank has assessed that the cost of rebuilding Syria will be around $216 billion, given the scale of destruction across infrastructure, housing and other sectors. However, the bank has described this as a "conservative best estimate" and noted that costs could be as high as $345 billion.

Joining the anti-Islamic State coalition will anger hard-liners within the Syrian government and security apparatus, risking factionalism and intra-government divisions that could result in violence and undermine al-Sharaa's rule over the long term. Hard-liners within the security and judicial apparatus have already begun to voice their concerns and anger toward al-Sharaa's decision to join the anti-Islamic State coalition, criticizing his decision to coordinate with Western forces. While they currently lack the strength to challenge the transitional government, these hard-liners will likely exploit reconstruction projects, aid flows and local networks to expand their influence over time, presenting themselves as defenders of traditional Islamist and nationalist causes while outwardly supporting al-Sharaa. However, al-Sharaa's continued Western coordination, ongoing fight against jihadists in Syria and hard-liners within his government, and the potential for a security pact with Israel (as the two have been in talks for months over a security agreement on their shared borders) will likely embolden hard-liners over the longer term. This would elevate the risk of localized clashes and a fracture within Syria's transitional authorities, undermining al-Sharaa's consolidation of power.

• The perpetrators behind the Nov. 14 Katyusha rocket attack on Damascus remain unidentified, with some attributing it to the Islamic State. However, the timing of the strike (occurring shortly after al-Sharaa's trip to Washington) and the target (the Syrian capital) have also fueled speculation that it was an act of internal signaling by those unhappy with the transitional government's recent policy shifts. 
• Hard-line factions within Syria's transitional authorities are primarily concentrated within the security apparatus, exemplified by the 84th division of foreign jihadist fighters. But they also exist within the government, holding positions such as in the Ministry of Justice. These hard-liners continue to advocate for confrontation (or at least not collaboration) with the West, especially amid al-Sharaa's tilt toward more pro-Western policies and the West's failure to deter Israeli military action against Palestinians in Gaza.

Joining the anti-Islamic State coalition will boost Syria's ability to fight the group, likely limiting large-scale attacks in the short term, but poor economic recovery could eventually revive the Islamic State's influence. As an official partner in the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State, Damascus will now take the lead on combating the group's fighters in Syria (who strongly oppose al-Sharaa's transitional government), with the help of other coalition members like the United States, Turkey and Jordan. The United States, in particular, will likely expand intelligence sharing and possibly resume limited drone strikes to reinforce joint operations with Syrian security forces against Islamic State remnants. This comes as Washington recently halted its troop drawdown from Syria, with hundreds of American troops remaining in the country's northeast. Such expanded U.S.-Syria cooperation will likely help suppress the jihadist group's activity in the near term, pushing it further underground. Still, the Islamic State — whose cells in Syria have shown signs of an incipient resurgence in the past year — will likely maintain a presence in eastern Syria, where the terrain and vast desert corridors allow its fighters to operate despite increased pressure. While expanded security efforts by Syria and its partners against the Islamic State will initially curb the group's ability to launch larger-scale attacks, over the longer term, if reconstruction stalls, investments remain slow, Israeli airstrikes persist and economic recovery slows, public frustration could deepen and create fertile ground for Islamic State recruitment or even defections within al-Sharaa's ranks. This, in turn, could empower hard-line elements and increase the likelihood of individuals gravitating toward extremist groups like the Islamic State, raising the risks of large-scale attacks in Syria and deterring future investment.

• U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on Nov. 12 that it had advised, assisted and enabled over 22 operations in partnership with the new Syrian authorities against the Islamic State in the past month, claiming that they had significantly degraded the group's capacity to conduct attacks locally or project violence beyond the region. 
• Islamic State cells in Syria have shown signs of an incipient resurgence in the past year, exploiting security gaps during the post-Assad transition. The group has increased its attacks in eastern towns such as Aleppo, Homs and Deir Ezzor, targeting both government forces and the SDF. An Islamic State-affiliated group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, also successfully carried out a suicide bombing in January against a church in Damascus, killing dozens, in what was the first high-profile and mass-casualty attack the group has led in Syria in years. Additionally, Damascus recently publicly claimed that Islamic State cells were involved in plotting attacks targeting al-Sharaa.
• Thousands of Islamic State-linked detainees and their families are also being held in SDF camps, who could escape and quickly replenish the Islamic State's ranks. This was highlighted in September by an attempted breakout at the al-Hol camp in northeast Syria, which underscored the weak security of these facilities.

The U.S.-backed SDF will face increased political pressure to integrate into Syria's transitional security structures, as both Washington and Damascus reposition the state to lead counter-Islamic State operations, but this process will still be tenuous and liable to reverse amid deep mistrust. The Kurdish-led militia has so far been hesitant to join the transitional government due to deep mistrust of al-Sharaa and the Syrian state's long-standing failure to address SDF demands for Kurdish autonomy and cultural rights. However, with Syrian state forces now set to become the main force fighting against the Islamic State and coordinating with U.S. forces (roles previously held by the SDF), the group will face increased pressure to integrate. This will likely see SDF leaders gradually soften their stance while maintaining some key demands, such as education rights for Syrian Kurds. To facilitate this integration and appease Washington's pressure for a peaceful transition (especially concerning the SDF, a U.S. partner), al-Sharaa will likely also offer limited concessions to the militia. Together, these factors raise the prospects of the SDF's integration into Syria's security and political structures in the coming months. However, the process will remain fragile and could be disrupted by renewed violence in northeast Syria or even sectarian clashes, either of which would deter the SDF from joining the transitional government. 

• The integration of the SDF into the Syrian state's security apparatus will likely shift control of Islamic State detainee camps from the SDF to government forces. This transition period would elevate the risk of further escape attempts, mass unrest or exploitation by Islamic State networks.