"History and geography together help substantially to mould the attitudes and policies of nations, even though these may be subject too to sudden and unpredictable changes."
— W. Gordon East. The Geography Behind History (1965)
Geopolitical analysis is rooted in the flow of history — in understanding how the past shapes the present and future and how the past is interpreted to shape ideas and policies. These two dynamics do not always align, as interpretation of the past comes through many different lenses. Thus, on the one hand, it is tempting to talk of 2024 as a momentous year, one of unprecedented change, disruption and uncertainty. On the other hand, it is but a moment in the broader flow of history, one that reflects not the immediacy of the events that punctuated the artificial calendar year but rather one that highlights the evolution of the international system — a system constantly in flux and, despite competing ideologies, never moving toward a predicated or preferred end state.
As we entered 2024, our attention was on the numerous elections set for the year, from the United States to Russia, South Africa to South Korea, India to Brazil and Mexico to Indonesia. Whatever the broader patterns of history, 2024 was ripe for change driven by local social dynamics. At the same time, we entered the year with several active military crises — the Russia-Ukraine war continued, Israel's response to the October 2023 Hamas attack threatened to spill out into a regional war and fighting in Myanmar threatened territorial integrity in Southeast Asia. Finally, the economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic had yet to manifest, adding to the social and political pressures on countries around the world. 2024 promised to be tumultuous.
Looking back, it is hard to determine which events were the most geopolitically impactful. The Syrian regime of Bashar Assad collapsed in a matter of days in December. The erstwhile democratic South Korea saw President Yoon Suk Yeol, stymied by an opposition parliament, declare martial law, only to revoke it six hours later and then face impeachment. Houthi missile and drone attacks reshaped global shipping routes. Russia used a MIRV warhead (armed with conventional munitions) in an attack on Ukraine. China held live-fire drills simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Israel killed Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah and engaged in a limited but escalating exchange of fire with Iran. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States as France saw its position in West Africa erode. North Korea deployed combat troops to Russia. Things that in the past would have drawn protracted attention barely seemed to register this year — Sinn Fein, for the first time, won the U.K. general elections in Northern Ireland, the ANC lost its parliamentary majority in South Africa for the first time since the end of apartheid, and Manila ratified a visiting forces agreement with Tokyo, paving the way for Japanese troops in the Philippines.
If we must rank the geopolitically impactful events of the past year, we will have to acknowledge that many are intertwined and few are discrete occurrences. Most reflect a further reshaping of the world order, revealing the realities of a multipolar world. In this context, change and adaptation are the norm, local dynamics take precedence over international ones, and the norms established over the last 70 years — and reinforced in the previous 25 — face a very uncertain future in 2025 and beyond.
5. Weakening of International Cooperation
The past year saw multiple developments confirming that the space for global collaboration is narrowing. The COP29 summit ended with a three-fold increase in climate financing for developing countries, but this was far short of what many had hoped for. The final communique also failed to strengthen (or even repeat) the COP28 commitment to "transition away from fossil fuels," a notable reversal. International cooperation on climate change is facing increasing challenges from national-level reassessments of energy and economic policies, as well as the growing acceptance of the link between economic security and national security. The ICC faced an even more robust rejection this year, with Russian President Vladimir Putin traveling to ICC member Mongolia in September despite an ICC arrest warrant and several countries criticizing the warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, including the United States (albeit not an ICC member). 2024 also saw a continuation of moves by countries and regional blocs to implement protectionist and national content requirement measures, further eroding global norms on free trade and market access. Finally, the United Nations' response to security crises worldwide was relatively weak and ineffective as the international body has been unable to adapt to the growing rifts among the permanent Security Council members and participation in new peacekeeping and conflict mediation efforts flags. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's withdrawal from ECOWAS also showcases how even regional cooperation can face new challenges. ASEAN remains hampered by the ongoing conflict in Myanmar (and Chinese influence campaigns), the European Union is softening some of its more extreme liberal goals in order to maintain internal cohesion, and the incoming Trump administration has threatened 25% tariffs on its North American neighbors, Canada and Mexico. As we move forward, we expect further erosion of older institutions, numerous more diminutive and tactical arrangements emerging, and some broadening of newer collaborations (such as the now misnomered BRICS).
4. Lingering COVID-19 Economic Hangover
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic being long past, the post-COVID economic recovery did not fully manifest, as countries continued to struggle with inflation and constrained economic growth. Even in places like the United States, where the broader economic recovery is well underway, societies focused more on lingering issues than on broader successes — a sentiment reflected in nearly all elections throughout the year, which largely rejected the status quo. In the United States, popular frustration with inflation (itself a product in part of the massive fiscal stimulus to revive the post-pandemic economy) played a decisive role in the reelection of former President Donald Trump, whose reelection has already begun shaping behaviors (or at least posturing) in countries around the world seeking to apply lessons learned from his first term. China, in particular, continued to see a slow economic recovery. Despite Western expectations (or perhaps desires), Beijing refused to deploy a stimulus "bazooka," preferring instead to continue apace with internal economic reform despite social pain. In China, economic reform and slower growth rates were paralleled by increasingly tight controls over information and an expanding crackdown on corruption that has even begun nabbing President Xi Jinping's appointees and allies. Around the world, economic realities shaped everything from energy and climate policies (as noted above) to options for military expenditures to domestic labor and retirement policies. By the end of the year, lingering inflation in the United States led the Fed to slow the pace and scope of anticipated rate cuts, portending additional friction for countries with high levels of dollar-denominated debt.
3. Reframing the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
No single event defined the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict this year, as multiple developments drew significant attention. In early August, Ukraine invaded the Kursk region of Russia (the first invasion of Russia proper since World War II). In October, North Korea deployed thousands of troops to the same region, fulfilling its commitment to a newly expanded Russia-North Korea defense agreement. In November, the United States expanded the allowable range of weapons supplied to Ukraine for use in strikes further inside Russia, and shortly thereafter, Russia used a conventionally armed MIRV IRBM, the first such wartime use of what has thus far been a nuclear weapons technology. This both highlighted Moscow's assertion that Western efforts to expand the war could lead to Russia's employment of nuclear weapons and showcased a rising threat from the active employment of weapons that can be configured for nuclear or conventional warheads. The latter is significant as it makes responses even more complicated. If a weapon system is "only" nuclear or conventional, then a response to a launch will largely remain reciprocal (conventional for conventional, nuclear for nuclear). But if it is unclear whether a launch carries a nuclear or conventional warhead, then it may be necessary to assume it is nuclear and respond in kind. Russia's action was not the first challenge to nuclear response postures — the United States has submarine-launched missiles that may carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, and China's growing arsenal may also rely in part on this ambiguity. Thus, the combination of the re-emergence of IRBMs, of dual-use missile systems and of China's rapid nuclear expansion significantly reshapes nuclear deterrence and doctrine in the major nuclear powers. This also changes the perceptions of conventional deterrence, driving discussions in Europe of the need for a unified European nuclear posture in parallel to the cooperation with the United States, and may reinforce perceptions in smaller countries of the need for their own nuclear deterrence capabilities, particularly as North Korea grows more assertive, the Syrian regime has collapsed, and Israel has significantly weakened Iran's geostrategic position. Returning to Ukraine, the evolving battlefield dynamics reveal slower progress by both sides and a growing expectation that the new year could bring steps toward a temporary ceasefire. This may lead to a reduction in active combat, even if the core issue of territorial disputes remains unresolved.
2. Israel, Iran, Turkey and the Reshaping of the Middle East
As with the conflict in Ukraine, numerous overlapping dynamics led to a major reshaping of the security and political environment in the Levant and beyond. Israel and Iran both broke "red lines" in reciprocal strikes on one another's territories. Israel expanded its military operations well beyond Gaza into the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria, killing key Hezbollah figures, building a new Lebanese buffer zone and degrading Syrian military stockpiles. Despite waning popular support, the Israeli wartime cabinet managed to stay in power while largely ignoring calls for restraint and appeasing the far right. Israel's regional hawkishness appears to have born fruit: Hamas stepped away from demanding Israel leave Gaza, Hezbollah was degraded and pushed from the border, and Iran, though still warning it will strike Israel in the future, was unable to stop recurrent Israeli attacks on its air defenses and missile program in its homeland. The sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria further strengthened Israel's position, at least in the near term, and together with the erosion of Hamas and Hezbollah positions, led to a rapid decline in Iran's position regionally. As Israel seeks to capitalize on Iranian constraints, Turkey is steadily expanding its regional influence, building on its successes in past years in the Caucasus and now extending them into Syria. The last few years have seen a significant reshaping of the uneasy balance between Iran, Turkey and Russia, where their respective spheres of influence intersect, highlighting the way in which the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict have all impacted the prioritization and capabilities of Moscow and Tehran, providing opportunities for Ankara. Though we do not expect to see a rapid resumption of normalization talks between Gulf Arab states and Israel, the shifting balance of power does suggest that quiet cooperation is likely. The next focal area may well be Iraq, where the United States is preparing for the withdrawal of troops, and Iran will want to consolidate its position further in anticipation of any future re-expansion of its influence and non-state reach.
1. A Loss of Western Leadership
Perhaps the most geopolitically significant event of the year was not a single event but a series of elections, crises and missteps that left the traditional Western world without a clear center of gravity or core leadership — all at a time of significant international change. The French and German governments are both weak and fragmented, the U.S. government is about to transition to the second Trump administration (with a focus on national self-interest over internationalist interests), and allied governments in Canada, Japan and South Korea, among others, are all facing internal challenges. There is little that defines a common set of goals or ideals for the erstwhile West, adding to the erosion of global norms and the reshaping of the tools and tenor of international relations. At the same time, there is no counter-pole forming in the "East," as China is dealing with its own internal economic issues, Russia is seeing its peripheral influence wane, and the smaller partners (Iran and North Korea) are largely positioning for their own self-interest, while BRICS remains largely incoherent. The ongoing return to a global multipolar system is characterized at this phase by competition and misalignment within potential blocs, whether in economic and trade priorities, defense and security priorities, or technology dynamics. The rejection of the status quo in Western elections, changing social dynamics and intensified political polarization all contribute to expectations for shorter-term and more volatile policy initiatives that will only infrequently see alignment across traditional ideological and regulatory partners. As we have seen this year, this opens the space for middle powers to reassert themselves, seize the gaps between and among the larger powers and gain advantage through multi-alignment. The question going forward is how long it will last. Will the United States reassert global leadership or focus on more transactional short-term dynamics? Will the French or German governments regain unity and momentum, and can European attempts to unify defense and industrial policies bear fruit? Will Russia and China continue to cooperate, or are tensions between them beginning to show as Moscow loses further ground along its southern periphery? As we head into 2025, these structural issues will be top of mind.
