Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will worsen the three countries' economic outlook, especially if it is accompanied by an exit from the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which would likely fuel the expansion of jihadist activity in the Sahel. On Jan. 28, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso issued a joint statement announcing their exit ''without delay'' from ECOWAS, thereafter issuing a formal notice of departure on Jan. 29. The three junta-led countries stated that their decision was motivated by ECOWAS' imposition of coup-related economic sanctions against them, the bloc's failure to provide assistance in tackling the growing jihadist insurgency in the Sahel, and for ''betraying its ideals'' and being ''under influence of foreign powers'' — namely France. But while the three countries have signaled their ambition to leave the regional bloc with immediate effect, ECOWAS' charter stipulates that departing countries legally remain members of the bloc for 12 months following their notification of departure. As such, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso will be entitled to continue enjoying the benefits of ECOWAS membership through the end of January 2025, with their respective juntas due to negotiate the terms of their departure on a bilateral basis with single ECOWAS countries. 

The three countries' decision to leave ECOWAS comes in response to political and economic sanctions from the bloc amid delays in organizing post-coup elections. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have all faced a series of successful military coups in recent years, which prompted ECOWAS to suspend the three countries from the bloc and impose heavy economic sanctions on Mali and Niger. While ECOWAS lifted its sanctions on Mali in July 2022, Niger remains under economic sanctions amid the junta's continued refusal to shorten its proposed three-year transition period before elections can be held in the country. ECOWAS' economic and political sanctions, together with its threat to intervene militarily in Niger in the summer of 2023 to reinstate deposed president Mohammed Bazoum, resulted in a surge of anti-ECOWAS sentiment in all three countries. Exiting the organization is thus a way for Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's military governments to capitalize on this sentiment to strengthen their legitimacy and consolidate power as they struggle to stem rapidly expanding jihadist activity across the Sahel. The three countries' departure from the bloc also showcases their juntas' increasingly ideologically-driven decision-making, as well as their desire to distance themselves from their predecessors' traditional partners and stress their countries' geopolitical repositioning despite the economic costs this may entail. 

• ECOWAS first imposed economic sanctions against Mali in January 2022 after the junta announced it was postponing scheduled elections by up to five years. The sanctions notably included the closure of other ECOWAS members' borders with Mali, the freezing of Malian state assets held in ECOWAS commercial banks, and the suspension of all non-essential financial transactions with Mali. These sanctions were lifted in July 2022 after the junta pledged to hold presidential elections in February 2024, and were not reimposed when the junta indefinitely delayed elections in September 2023 — even though Mali's voting rights within ECOWAS have remained suspended since the May 2021 coup. 
• ECOWAS suspended Burkina Faso from the bloc following the country's January 2022 coup, but did not impose sanctions as its then-junta agreed to hold legislative and presidential elections by July 2024. This remained the case following current junta leader Ibrahim Traore's October 2022 coup, as he initially confirmed his commitment to the transition timeline. 
• Following Niger's July 2023 coup, ECOWAS swiftly imposed severe economic sanctions on the country, including border closures and bans on commercial flights, as well as freezes on financial transactions, national assets and aid flows. 

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso will likely prioritize reaching deals with countries that aren't members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), but their juntas' increasingly ideologically-driven decision-making raises questions over the three countries' continued membership in the UEMOA. While certain ECOWAS member states may look to convince the three juntas to reverse their decision to exit the bloc, this appears unlikely short of major concessions from ECOWAS regarding Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's return to civilian leadership, which also currently appear unlikely. As such, the focus of negotiations is set to rapidly shift toward the military-led countries' future relations with ECOWAS members following their formal departure. The three countries' landlocked status means they will continue to rely on trade with coastal West African states to access global markets, which except for Mauritania, are all ECOWAS members. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso remain members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known by its French acronym UEMOA), which provides for the free flow of goods. This means the three departing countries will likely focus on reaching bilateral agreements with ECOWAS members that are not part of the UEMOA, such as Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria. In parallel, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso will likely look to reinforce economic cooperation between each other through the Alliance of Sahelian States format. However, their juntas' heavy reliance on Pan-Africanist and anti-French narratives to solidify their legitimacy suggests that talk of economic cooperation will likely rapidly shift toward discussions over the continued use of the West African CFA Franc and the adoption of a new currency, which could involve a departure from the UEMOA. While no such announcement has yet been made, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's exit from ECOWAS demonstrates that the three ruling juntas are willing to act upon their anti-imperialist rhetoric. 

• The UEMOA is a customs and currency union that regroups Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo. However, the use of the West African CFA franc as the UEMOA's currency is widely controversial, as many perceive it as a tool for France to retain economic control over the region. 
• On Jan. 31, Malian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdoulaye Diop stressed that Mali intended to remain a member of the UEMOA. But Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traore said the same day that Burkina Faso would ''probably'' look to cease using the West African CFA franc in the medium term.
• In September 2023, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formed the Alliance of Sahelian States. The organization is a security treaty in which the three countries agree to support each other in the event of a rebellion or external aggression, but the alliance could be expanded to the field of economic cooperation. 

The adverse economic impact caused by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's departure from ECOWAS would be limited in a scenario where the three countries remain within the UEMOA. The UEMOA provides similar benefits to those of ECOWAS, including freedom of movement, a common external tariff, and restrictions against the imposition of customs duties and quotas between member states. Given the UEMOA's provisions on the free movement of goods, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's decision to remain within the monetary union would significantly mitigate the economic disruptions caused by their departure from ECOWAS — especially given that their main access routes to the Atlantic Ocean run through UEMOA countries. Nonetheless, their exit from ECOWAS is still set to lower investor confidence in all three countries and result in surging tariffs on trade with non-UEMOA countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, in the absence of bilateral agreements. As such, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's withdrawal from the West African bloc will likely heighten inflation in all three countries and further deter foreign investors, albeit to a lesser extent than if they were to also leave the UEMOA. 

• If Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso remain in the UEMOA, it would also raise questions over whether UEMOA or ECOWAS has primacy in shaping regional trade, given that both groupings involve a common external tariff. Indeed, countries that remain members of both ECOWAS and the UEMOA would need to determine whether the ECOWAS common external tariff should be levied against the three junta-led countries, which would risk breaching the UEMOA treaty. 

But should they decide to also exit the UEMOA, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso would likely face much harsher economic turmoil that would risk fueling the expansion of jihadist activity in the Sahel. The increasingly ideologically-led decision-making of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's juntas means their departure from ECOWAS could be accompanied by an exit from the UEMOA in the medium term. Given that the three countries' main trade partners within ECOWAS are also UEMOA members, this decision would thus come at a much higher cost than a simple exit from ECOWAS. The three landlocked countries would notably face much higher import costs. Surging inflation would be compounded by the Alliance of Sahelian States' exit from the West African CFA franc area, and the new currency would likely face significant volatility given the three countries' limited financial reserves and low investor confidence. Furthermore, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's departure from the UEMOA would complicate their access to financial markets and likely result in higher interest rates, further deteriorating their economic outlook. This scenario would thus portend a steep deterioration in living standards in all three countries, which would likely fuel the recruitment campaigns of al Qaeda affiliate Jamaat Nasr Al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and enable both groups to expand their operations closer to the three Sahelian states' capital cities. In addition, exiting the UEMOA would risk further heightening tensions with the union's remaining members over the continued presence of Malian, Burkinabe and Nigerien diasporas within their borders. This would notably risk roiling Burkina Faso's relations with Cote d'Ivoire, where the migration of Burkinabe nationals has been a source of political controversy for decades.

• In a third scenario, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso could decide to exit the West African CFA franc zone while remaining within the UEMOA. This would see the three countries' new currency face significant volatility, but would not involve higher tariffs with other UEMOA countries.