Israel's airstrikes in Qatar will likely harden the stances of Iranian-backed groups, keep normalization with Saudi Arabia off the table and drive more assertive postures from other regional states. In the past few days, Qatari authorities, other countries in the region, European states and even the United States — reportedly informed of the attack only as it was taking place — all condemned Israel’s Sept. 9 airstrikes in Doha. The Israeli airstrikes in Doha did not succeed in killing the Hamas leaders Israel was targeting, though six others were killed. The incident was the first Israeli attack on a close U.S. ally in modern times. It was all the more significant given Qatar's designation as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, a status that signifies the closest security ties Washington can have with a foreign country that is not a NATO member. 

• U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to condemn the strikes and demand that Netanyahu not carry out follow-up attacks in Qatar. However, he did not suggest the United States might hold up arms, sanction or otherwise isolate Israel substantially for the attack.
• Netanyahu doubled down on his actions by warning on Sept. 11 that Qatar must either expel Hamas leaders from its territory or "bring them to justice," signaling that further Israeli action could follow if Doha does not comply. 
• The strikes were the second direct attack on Qatar this year. Iran struck the U.S. base at al-Udeid in June 2025 in retaliation for the United States joining the Israeli war against Iran by bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. That attack resulted in no casualties and came despite years of Doha's efforts to maintain positive relations with Iran.
• The United States named Qatar a major non-NATO ally in 2022. It joined Israel, Egypt and Jordan in that status, which confers special privileges in arms procurement and intelligence sharing. 

Israel's Regional Strategy Against Hamas

Since Hamas' attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has adopted an aggressive strategy involving conventional military force, covert operations and other kinetic activities against its enemies. It has carried out strikes and assassinations in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Qatar and Yemen. Israeli leaders have vowed to "eliminate" adversaries across the region rather than pursue containment, underscoring a strategy rooted in escalation and deterrence through overwhelming force.

Israel's strikes will harden the stances of Iranian-backed groups across the region, heightening the risks of political paralysis, social unrest or military confrontation with Israel in several countries. The Israeli attacks, carried out despite negotiations still taking place between Israel and Hamas for a ceasefire in Gaza, will feed the arguments of Iranian-backed groups that talks with the United States and Israel are ultimately futile and that Israel will only accept the total defeat of its rivals. This mirrors Iran's arguments after Israel's sudden attacks in June as U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations were ongoing. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen will further harden their stances. In Lebanon, Hezbollah will have evidence that its arguments against disarmament are valid. If Israel is striking regional U.S. allies and mediators, even as negotiations continue, the group can argue domestically that giving up weapons would leave Lebanon exposed to future Israeli ground incursions and aerial attacks without any means to defend itself. Already fraught disarmament discussions between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah will be further complicated, elevating the risk of political paralysis, subsequent Israeli military pressure and U.S. diplomatic and economic pressures. Anti-Hezbollah factions will in turn escalate their demands for disarmament, raising the risk of social unrest. In Iraq, Iranian-aligned militias such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq will also grow more rigid in defending their arms caches and political influence. For them, too, the Qatar strikes demonstrate the futility of negotiating with the United States, reinforcing their skepticism toward Washington's ongoing troop drawdown from Iraq — a key demand of Iranian-backed militias. This will also complicate Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani's attempts to balance between growing economic and diplomatic pressure from the United States on one side and Iran and its militias on the other side, risking more political instability and social unrest in Iraq ahead of parliamentary elections in November. Finally, for the Yemeni Houthis, the Qatar incident is a domestic and regional legitimacy boost. They will point to the strikes as evidence that Israel and the United States remain aggressors, strengthening their narrative of resistance and justifying further missile and drone campaigns against U.S. and Israeli assets in the region. This not only sustains the confrontation with Israel and attacks in the Red Sea but may also widen their appeal across the region as the vanguard of anti-Israel and anti-U.S. resistance.

The Qatar strikes will deepen Arab skepticism toward Israel, with Saudi Arabia maintaining its freeze on normalization, while the United Arab Emirates is likely to move to constrain business and defense ties with Israel. Israel's attacks in Qatar underline that Washington is unwilling or unable to constrain Israeli escalations, even in regional allies where the United States has deep security and economic ties. For Israel, this will mean that the path toward broader normalization with other regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia, will remain frozen for the foreseeable future. Arab states across the spectrum — those that already normalized, those in talks and those that never engaged — will now view Israel as a heightened security liability on top of an already severe reputational one in the eyes of their domestic populations. While the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are unlikely to withdraw from the Abraham Accords outright, they will almost certainly grow more diplomatically critical of Israel, adopt a harsher tone in multilateral forums and place quiet but real restrictions on business partnerships, discouraging domestic companies from engaging with Israeli entities. This will strain economic ties that Israel has long viewed as a normalization driver. A highly impactful, though unlikely, change would be the United Arab Emirates placing port restrictions on the transit of Israeli commercial vessels. For Saudi Arabia, the attack reinforces Riyadh's reluctance to move forward on normalization. The fact that Israel missed its targets in Qatar but vowed to strike again underscores the Saudis' assessment that under the current Israeli far-right government, normalization is dead in the water. Meanwhile, the Emiratis — who normalized with Israel in part for access to Israeli defense technology — may begin quietly sidelining or reducing defense cooperation and recalibrating their diplomatic stance. Finally, these and other regional countries will also likely reassess their security partnerships with the United States. They will not fully withdraw from partnerships with the United States, given their deep economic and diplomatic ties with Washington, but they will find ways to diversify their weapons suppliers. For instance, they could source air defense systems from alternative suppliers such as Turkey, China or Russia to deter security threats without relying on U.S. protection and backing.

• Abu Dhabi has recently signaled that any formal Israeli annexation of West Bank territory would cross a political red line, threatening the durability of the Abraham Accords and compelling the United Arab Emirates to recalibrate ties. While unlikely to fully sever normalization, annexation would almost certainly prompt the United Arab Emirates to downgrade relations, adopt a sharper diplomatic tone and suspend high-profile economic or defense projects.
• Riyadh has made clear that any pathway toward normalization with Israel is contingent on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian issue. And this pathway is now even more unlikely with Israel's attacks in Qatar, its plans for Gaza's occupation and plans to annex the West Bank.
• The United Arab Emirates reportedly barred Israeli defense companies from attending a Dubai defense conference in response to Israel's strikes in Doha, citing "security concerns," though the government has not officially confirmed the ban. 

The attacks will sharpen Turkish anxieties over Israeli threats, raising risks of diplomatic and possibly military friction as Ankara fears both domestic meddling and direct threats to its assets in Syria, where overlapping footprints heighten the chance of incidental conflict. The strikes in Qatar will heighten Turkish fears about Israeli intentions both at home and in Syria, where Ankara's interests sharply diverge from Israel's. Domestically, the Turkish government will grow more focused on security. It will now not only fear Israeli intelligence meddling over Turkey's support for Hamas and the Palestinian cause, but also the prospect of Israel treating Turkish targets in Syria as fair game if they are perceived to cross red lines. Externally, the approximately 25,000 Turkish troops in Syria — already operating in a fragile environment — could face increased risk of Israeli strikes, particularly around areas in central and southern Syria where Iranian, Hezbollah or Hamas-linked operatives overlap with Turkish presence, or if Israel perceives their presence as an imminent threat to its red lines. This would create the conditions for at least a brief diplomatic and potentially even military crisis between the two states. Ankara can no longer assume Israeli restraint. It will adjust accordingly by being more assertive via heightened rhetoric, military posturing or calibrated responses designed to deter Israeli overreach. However, these risk escalation, even if unintended. As Israel becomes more risk-tolerant, the chance of Turkish positions or personnel being hit in Syria will grow.

• Hamas has maintained a political presence in Turkey for years, with senior leaders such as Saleh al-Arouri previously operating from Istanbul and others receiving treatment or refuge there. More recently, some Hamas figures were reported to have moved between Turkey and Qatar ahead of the latest Israeli strikes in Doha, underscoring Ankara's role as a key hub in Hamas' regional network.
• With Qatar suspending its mediation efforts following the Israeli strikes in Doha, Turkey may step into the void, leveraging its relations with Hamas, active regional diplomacy and desire to be seen as a broker in Middle East crises.
• Turkish authorities have repeatedly uncovered Mossad networks operating in the country. These networks reportedly spied on Palestinians, recruited locals to surveil private individuals and organizations and leaked sensitive intelligence. For example, in early 2024, Turkish security forces detained a private detective and six others for allegedly collecting information on Middle Eastern companies and individuals through tracking devices and surveillance on behalf of Mossad, in exchange for cryptocurrency payments.

Israeli escalations will likely push Jordan toward a more confrontational stance, backed by Gulf states, while Egypt, more dependent on Israeli energy and constrained by Gaza dynamics, will grow more skeptical and defensive but will not change its more practical diplomatic engagement toward Israel. Though Amman has generally acted cautiously vis-a-vis Israel, Jordan will likely adopt a more assertive posture in the coming months in support of Qatar and the broader Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), particularly if it perceives Israeli actions as crossing its red lines. These red lines could include Israel's annexation of the West Bank or further escalations with Iran that result in projectiles being fired over Jordanian airspace in both directions. Against this backdrop, the GCC bloc — especially states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, which maintain close relations with Jordan and are interested in its stability — will align with Jordan rhetorically and diplomatically. They will see Amman's stance as a bulwark against Israeli overreach, providing Jordan with financial support should reduced ties with Israel harm its trade or finances. In a worst-case contingency, such as another Israel-Iran war, Jordan could even escalate to closing its airspace, a move that would carry significant operational and symbolic consequences for Israel, given that Jordan shot down Iranian projectiles in past confrontations and allowed Israeli fighter jets to fly over it. This would not only complicate Israeli and U.S. military logistics but also mark a sharp break from Jordan's traditional balancing role. At the same time, Egypt will become more wary of Israeli actions, particularly given its dependence on Israeli energy and the movement of Hamas members in and out of Gaza. While Cairo is likely to grow more skeptical and defensive, potentially adopting a harsher tone, it lacks Jordan's comparatively greater leverage, and its response will remain more constrained.

• Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, normalizing relations and inking security and water-sharing agreements. While the treaty has held, relations between Jordan and Israel have been strained for many years, especially with regard to Israeli policies in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. Amman has frequently recalled or summoned Israeli diplomats in protest. Israel recently bolstered security measures on its borders with Jordan.
• Jordan and Israel have inked a water-for-energy agreement, backed by the United Arab Emirates, under which Israel would supply Jordan with 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water annually, while Jordan builds a 600 MW solar plant to export electricity back to Israel. This deal gives Israel leverage by making Jordan partly dependent on Israeli water supplies, allowing Israel a diplomatic and economic foothold in Jordan's critical water and energy sectors. In case of a diplomatic crisis in which Israel uses its leverage against Jordan, the GCC may step in to fill the void by offering Amman financial backing.
• Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, have at times provided Jordan with substantial financial assistance — including grants, soft loans, oil at subsidized rates, budget support and guarantees for international financing — aimed at stabilizing the economy, supporting public services and offsetting economic shocks.
• Egypt and Israel signed a landmark peace treaty in 1979, the first between Israel and an Arab state, which has largely held for over four decades. However, recent years have seen Egypt expand its military presence in the Sinai Peninsula, building up troops, airfields and logistical infrastructure in ways that Israel views as exceeding the treaty's security provisions. While Cairo frames these moves as counterterrorism and internal security measures and to prevent mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza toward Egypt, Israeli officials have recently expressed concern that the buildups risk undermining the 1979 agreement.