The United States' policy in the Asia-Pacific is set to grow more assertive once Donald Trump returns to the White House on Jan. 20. Where outgoing President Joe Biden prioritized alliance building in the region, Trump is likely to take a stance in which immediate tangible gains for the United States will take precedence, possibly at the direct expense of other countries, and not only against rivals like China but against long-time allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines as well as more newly cultivated relationships with the likes of Indonesia and Vietnam. Trump is likely to further spike U.S.-China trade tensions, the downstream effects of which risk straining key regional partnerships, particularly in the context of trade ties, while Trump will take a less multilateral approach to U.S. regional interests and expect greater defense burdens from U.S. allies. Together, these factors suggest the Trump administration's relationship with the Asia-Pacific region will be marked by volatility that will test the economic, political and security gains made under Biden.
A Look Back at Biden's Initiatives
When Biden assumed office in January 2021, he inherited a relationship with the Asia-Pacific region in which Washington's ties with several regional countries had weakened, particularly in trade contexts due to the Trump administration's withdrawal from multilateral agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and contentious trade policies with allies like Japan and South Korea. However, U.S. partnerships with key countries like India and Australia saw strategic achievements, largely driven by shared concerns over China's growing economic clout and military buildup. The Trump administration's confrontational stance toward China reshaped the regional landscape, leaving Biden with both strained alliances and opportunities to build multilateral engagements and strengthen security frameworks driven by shared concerns.
Biden prioritized reinforcing relationships where ties had been damaged, such as with Japan, and South Korea, while also maintaining many Trump-era trade restrictions on China. His administration continued cooperation with Australia and India, while taking advantage of a political shift in the Philippines that saw Manila pivot back to the United States in 2022. Biden also sought to deepen partnerships with non-allies in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia and Vietnam, reaching comprehensive strategic partnerships with both countries in 2023. The Biden administration's achievements in this regard are many, and all told, Washington significantly strengthened the U.S.-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region largely by prioritizing mutually reinforcing relationships with allies as well as facilitating closer ties among U.S. allies; Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines all entered into reinforcing defense partnerships among themselves during Biden's term.
In the Philippines, Biden's efforts focused on reinvigorating and then expanding the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, a deal left dormant until 2022. The United States and the Philippines announced in February 2023 that they would add four new military sites to the existing (though not yet actualized) five under the agreement, including strategic locations in Palawan, which faces South China Sea hotspots, as well as in northern Luzon, located fewer than 200 miles (about 322 kilometers) from Taiwan. This expansion was backed by a $100 million U.S. military aid package, which included funding for infrastructure upgrades at these bases. The Biden administration framed the move as a critical deterrent to Chinese actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and although the EDCA's expansion angered Beijing, China has done little to counter the developments effectively.
The U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral partnership also achieved unprecedented advancements during the Camp David summit in August 2023. For the first time, the three nations formalized commitments to real-time intelligence sharing, regular joint military drills and a trilateral hotline for crisis communication. This diplomatic breakthrough was likewise historic in Japan-South Korea ties, which have struggled amid lingering grievances from World War II. This framework was vital for putting up a strong front amid North Korea's escalating missile tests, (up 30% in 2023 compared with 2022), countering China's assertiveness in the East China Sea and offering a counter-alliance to growing Russian-Chinese military collaboration in the waters around Japan.
The roughly $368 billion AUKUS agreement that the United States reached with the United Kingdom and Australia in September 2021 represents one of Biden's most significant defense initiatives. The pact commits to helping Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines by 2030 and emphasizes advanced technology sharing (including undersea capabilities, artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons and cyber capabilities), in an effort to counter China's military modernization and its assertive regional maritime activities in the region, particularly in the context of growing Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands, which has historically been Australia's sphere of influence.
Also under Biden, the U.S. Navy increased its "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea by 40% between 2020 and 2024, supported by expanded U.S. access to Philippine bases under the EDCA. This has seen U.S. naval vessels operate near Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, areas claimed by China but deemed international waters by a 2016 Hague ruling.
On the economic front, in May 2022, the Biden administration launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, or IPEF, with 14 members, including Australia, Japan, India and Vietnam. Unlike traditional trade deals, the IPEF focused on four pillars: supply chain resilience, clean energy, digital trade and anti-corruption.
The Biden administration has also undertaken several initiatives to support Southeast Asian countries in semiconductors and emerging technologies. Through the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, the State Department allocated $200 million to foster technology ecosystems in countries like Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Biden's CHIPS and Science Act, enacted to enhance U.S. semiconductor competitiveness, also promotes international partnerships for resilient supply chains. In March 2024, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo led a trade mission to the Philippines, where she announced over $1 billion in investments for digital upskilling and artificial intelligence training, impacting over 30 million Filipinos.
Additionally, the above legislation and high-level diplomatic engagement incentivize private sector players to shift production out of China and invest in Southeast Asia. U.S. chipmaker Intel has alone committed significant investments, including $7 billion in Malaysia to expand semiconductor operations. Vietnam has emerged as a significant destination for global technology investments as well, particularly in semiconductors and emerging technologies, attracting nearly $12 billion in foreign-invested semiconductor and AI projects during Biden's term, including from Intel, Amkor Technology, Nvidia and Google. These developments underscore Vietnam's rising importance in global technology supply chains and as a U.S. "friend-shoring" partner that, for now, presents a less risky manufacturing location than China, with Vietnam's semiconductor market growth projected to reach $7 billion by 2028. While Southeast Asian countries' profiles were already ascendant as attractive investment destinations, additional nudging by the Biden administration highlights a strategic focus on strengthening collaboration with the region to advance shared technological growth and supply chain resilience while offering a credible alternative to Chinese investment and economic dominance, soft power avenues that are critical for U.S. competitiveness given Washington's inability to outspend China on infrastructure or outcompete it in low-end manufacturing.
Finally, the Biden administration established a trend of slowly narrowing the gap between China's trade with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, and U.S. trade with the bloc, which stood at $400 billion and $300 billion in 2023, respectively. While it will take long-term focus to close this gap entirely, U.S. trade policy in the region has positioned Washington as a far more critical player in the regional economic ecosystem than it was before Biden took office, driven by increased demand for high-value and high-tech goods, as well as strategic industries that align with long-term geopolitical goals. These drivers imply substantial staying power for growing U.S.-ASEAN trade.
Challenges to U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific
Despite Biden's significant advances in the Asia-Pacific, his administration faced several constraints over the past four years. The IPEF, for example, lacked binding trade commitments and market access, which regional leaders, particularly those in ASEAN, viewed as insufficient compared with China's Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, which the IPEF is intended to counter, at least partially. Additionally, Washington pledged only $40 billion in investments in the IPEF's initial phase, far less than China's $1 trillion in global investments under the BRI. As a result, and amid a low likelihood of reaching bilateral free trade agreements, U.S.-ASEAN trade will remain limited, though ongoing investments in critical industries as well as digital trade under the IPEF will sustain incremental increases.
Meanwhile, many of the Biden administration's drivers to deepen regional trade relations are tied to defense considerations and longstanding tensions in the Taiwan Strait that continued to rise sharply during Biden's four-year term. For example, China conducted six military exercises around Taiwan in 2023 and several in 2024. Last year's iterations included land, sea, air and rocket forces operating near Taiwan's Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos, as well as the main island of Taiwan, and drills practicing blockades of the main island and persistent overflights and sorties by Chinese military aircraft. Additionally, from Dec. 9-11, China conducted a significant naval operation near Taiwan involving over 90 warships and dozens of aircraft. This was reported as the largest Chinese naval exercise in decades. These exercises included simulated blockades of the island, providing a window into Beijing's military strategy against Taiwan.
Additionally, the Biden administration avoided high-profile summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, focusing instead on strengthening regional defenses. While backchannel discussions in 2023 explored potential openings for limited denuclearization talks, no breakthrough was achieved. Even so, Biden's administration maintained that complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea remained a core objective. Continued North Korean missile launches — 27 tests in 2023 alone — highlighted the potential for a renewed crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
At the same time, despite the United States in 2023 upgrading relations with Vietnam and Indonesia to those countries highest levels short of an alliance, ASEAN members, with the exception of the Philippines, resisted aligning too closely with Washington's initiatives due to shared diplomatic doctrine on nonalignment, economic dependence on China and a focus on regional consensus over great power rivalry. ASEAN fears that taking sides in the U.S.-China rivalry would imperil the region and risk armed conflict in its territory over which the bloc would have little control, a substantial structural constraint to deeper alignment with the United States.
A Look Forward at Trump's Second Term
Trump will inherit a stronger U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific during his second term. However, many of the structural constraints that beleaguered Biden's regional policy remain in place, including an increasingly aggressive China, an intransigent North Korea and middle powers' desire to stay out of great power competition. As a result, Trump's more assertive security and economic policies will introduce unique risks and opportunities.
Perhaps most impactfully, Trump will likely reignite the U.S.-China trade war. Republican support in Congress will likely enable him to implement tariffs across a variety of critical sectors and even non-strategic ones, possibly including a $100 billion tariff expansion on Chinese goods. Such a move would disrupt global trade flows and prompt diversification toward third countries like Vietnam and India, thereby accelerating decoupling from Chinese supply chains across the board.
However, Trump will make wide use of tariffs to rectify trade gaps, especially in regard to Vietnam, which has seen a ballooning of its trade surplus with the United States since Trump left office, with the surplus now exceeding $110 billion from around $70 billion in 2021. This will strain Vietnam's export-dependent economy and likely undermine the strategic congruence and trust the two countries have built in recent years. Moreover, the Trump administration will clamp down on Chinese products rerouted to third countries to avoid tariffs, portending intense scrutiny of Vietnamese exports. This will risk demonstrating to other neutral regional countries in which Washington seeks influence, like Indonesia and Malaysia, that trade concerns can override strategic ones, disincentivizing closer defense ties.
Meanwhile, Trump's emphasis on defense burden sharing could strain relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines. During his first term, Trump demanded a 400% increase in South Korea's contribution to hosting U.S. troops, an approach he could replicate with other allies. For instance, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who has leaned heavily pro-U.S., might face demands for additional defense spending, complicating the expanded EDCA.
Conversely, Trump's transactional approach could appeal to leaders seeking direct benefits. For example, the Philippines might secure increased U.S. military aid in exchange for granting access to additional bases or expanding joint exercises like Balikatan, which involved 17,600 troops in 2024, the largest in its history. This approach thus suggests a possible bolstered U.S. military position in the region while giving the Pentagon a freer hand in terms of its spending constraints, but it could simultaneously stretch allies' defense budgets and strain diplomatic ties.
The Trump administration will likely also adopt a more overtly confrontational stance on Taiwan, approving arms sales exceeding $12 billion annually and deepening bilateral trade relations. High-profile visits by U.S. officials to Taiwan, akin to former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 trip, could provoke sharper Chinese responses, including military blockades or sanctions targeting U.S. allies.
Additionally, Trump will likely pursue new denuclearization talks with North Korea, leveraging his 2018 and 2019 summits with Kim Jong Un as precedent. Trump could frame himself as uniquely positioned to secure a breakthrough, potentially offering sanctions relief in exchange for limited nuclear concessions. However, North Korea's continued missile advancements, including intercontinental ballistic missile tests in 2023 capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, would complicate negotiations. Additionally, regional U.S. allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, would likely demand guarantees that any deal include substantive denuclearization steps, but Pyongyang — with its growing arsenal and deepening ties to Russia — will be increasingly reluctant to concede to such demands owing to its stronger position relative to the first Trump term.
Moreover, U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait could intensify under Trump, as Biden's initiatives have strengthened the United States' ability to project military power. Intensified operations could include naval drills near Chinese-claimed and -controlled islands and features like the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, also claimed in whole or in part by Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The expanded EDCA bases in the Philippines, particularly in Luzon and Palawan, would likely prove crucial to these operations.
Alongside Trump's foreign policy changes, South Korea's approach to the United States could shift significantly if the country's opposition Democratic Party returns to power following the impeachment of rival President Yoon Suk Yeol. A Democratic administration would likely prioritize inter-Korean engagement, reopening channels for dialogue with North Korea, advocating for reduced military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and diverging from the more hardline approach under Yoon's conservative government. The Democratic Party would likely also walk back recent growth in trilateral military drills with the United States and Japan. This trajectory would play into Trump's hands should he seek renewed dialogue with and sanctions relief for North Korea, though it would also imply reduced security and intelligence cooperation with Japan. However, if Trump eventually deems denuclearization talks unproductive owing to North Korea's intransigence, he would likely enhance U.S. efforts to bolster deterrence measures against Pyongyang, which would complicate defense ties with a more dovish Democratic Party-led South Korean government.
Meanwhile, in Australia, a victory for the opposition Liberal-National Coalition in September 2025 elections could see Canberra more strongly advocate for AUKUS, as the security pact's centerpiece — involving Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines — aligns with the coalition's long-standing commitment to bolstering national security and strengthening ties with key allies, namely the United States and the United Kingdom. The Liberal-National Coalition has consistently underscored the economic and technological benefits of the AUKUS, such as fostering advanced technology transfers, creating high-skilled jobs and positioning Australia as a key player in cutting-edge defense innovation. This would likely play well with the incoming Trump administration, as an Australian government led by the Liberal-National Coalition would also be likely to raise Canberra's defense spending and take on a larger defense burden in the region. However, expanding AUKUS will be less likely under the Trump administration due to its skepticism of sharing advanced technologies and multilateralism in general.
All told, a second Trump administration is poised to bring a more aggressive and transactional approach to Asia-Pacific policy, emphasizing economic decoupling from China, military posturing and bilateral deals. Balancing these dynamics with an aggressive trade policy via tariffs and renegotiated agreements suggests short-term gains for Washington in trade and security. However, this approach will risk alienating key partners that prioritize economic stability and balanced relations with both the United States and China. Over time, the likelihood of fragmentation within U.S.-led coalitions will grow under this approach, potentially providing opportunities for China to exploit divisions and reinforce its economic and diplomatic influence in the region. Washington will thus need to weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing a hardline trade policy with other regional priorities, a process likely to remain in flux throughout the region over Trump's four-year term.
