Editor's note: This assessment is the third installment of a series we originally published one year ago that explored whether Ukraine or Russia was more capable of emerging victorious from a protracted war. The first part, which dissected the argument that time was on Kyiv's side, can be found here; the second, which examined Russia's preparedness for a prolonged conflict, can be found here.
In August 2022, we interrogated the arguments for and against time being on Kyiv's side and on Moscow's side in the war in Ukraine. With Ukraine's long-anticipated counteroffensive currently stalling, the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius behind us, and Kyiv's peace plan set to be discussed in Saudi Arabia later this week, now is a good opportunity to update the narratives we laid out a year ago.
Why Ukraine's Position Is Slipping
Kyiv's position on the battlefield has improved significantly over the past year, with Ukrainian forces taking back the right bank of the Dnieper River and most of the Kharkiv region. But these gains were largely anticipated amid the Kremlin's delay of an inevitable partial military mobilization (which we predicted months in advance) and Ukraine's growing support from the West. Furthermore, as expected, the territories Ukraine recaptured did not deal a decisive blow to the Russian military, nor did they deal a political blow to the Kremlin capable of ending the war, which has been Kyiv's primary goal in its effort to avoid a grueling years-long war or decades-long frozen conflict.
But compared with when we published the first installment of this series, Ukraine's chances of successfully repelling Russia's invasion have significantly fallen. This is due in part to Kyiv's failure to critically undermine political stability and war support inside Russia. Over the past year, Ukraine has supported raids by anti-Putin forces into Russian territory and has also launched increasingly frequent drone strikes against targets in Moscow and elsewhere across Russia. The Ukrainian military intelligence service also attempted to fuel factionalism in the Russian military as well, via the paramilitary Wagner Group's feud with the Russian Defense Ministry. These efforts, however, have failed to trigger clear social trends in Ukraine's favor inside Russia, let alone broader instability. This is because in order for such activities to undermine support for the Kremlin, they need to occur in tandem with Moscow losing the critical territory of the war — namely, the land bridge to Crimea in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. But Ukraine's chances of retaking that land bridge appear increasingly slim amid the West's continued hesitance to provide greater military support and security guarantees. This reality is reflected by Moscow's growing confidence that it can hold along current battle lines, with Russian officials and propaganda outlets labeling recent drone strikes on Russia as ''acts of desperation'' directly related to the ''failure'' of Ukraine's counteroffensive.
The situation Kyiv now finds itself in is thus largely a result of Western leaders' lack of political will for stronger support since our last assessment. Indeed, over the past year, fears of escalating the conflict and exacerbating the economic fallout have deterred Ukraine's Western allies from making the tough political decisions likely needed to tilt the long-term balance of power on and off the battlefield in Ukraine's favor. U.S. and European leaders have, for example, failed to take extraordinary measures to speed military production capacity expansion for artillery ammunition and other key systems in time for Ukraine's summer offensive (instead largely relying on standard processes to place orders). Apart from some breakthroughs in the kinds of equipment they're willing to send Kyiv, Western governments also haven't provided Ukraine with large quantities of long-range strike weapons, modern aircraft and air defense systems, nor have they provided sufficient political, military and financial guarantees of Ukraine's security that would have enabled Kyiv to confidently commit more forces to its counteroffensive, rather than having to preserve them for the long haul.
Ukraine's ability to continue the war is dependent on the fickle political will of other states — predominantly the United States and a host of NATO countries. Russia's ability to continue the war, by contrast, is largely dependent on its own political will, which is unlikely to change under President Vladimir Putin or even a successor.
In theory, Western arms production can outproduce Russia in key systems and precision munitions. But while Ukraine's Western allies are now steadily ramping up military production, so is Russia. And Russian forces are also becoming more entrenched and laying more mines across Ukraine, which increasingly risk turning the conflict into a war of attrition — the exact scenario that Kyiv has desperately been trying to avoid, as such a war would be much harder to win and cost many more Ukrainian lives. This is because a battle of attrition would revolve around Ukraine having to forcefully retake its territory through combat, instead of politically destabilizing the Kremlin to the point where Russia is forced to retreat.
Russia is, to an extent, reliant on China for electronics and other goods needed to keep its military equipped (and its economy afloat, more broadly). But foreign action is unlikely to slow Russia's domestic military production enough that it can no longer effectively maintain its invasion in Ukraine, as Moscow can promote a high proportion of its production directly to the war. Ukraine, by contrast, is fully dependent on ammunition supplies from the West to defend itself against Russia's much larger military. This means that if Western nations significantly curtail their arms shipments (to, for example, replenish their own increasingly low stockpiles) Ukraine would quickly be forced into negotiations with Russia — likely in a matter of weeks or even days, depending on how sudden and steep the reduction is. To mitigate this risk, Ukraine has begun producing some arms domestically over the past year. Western arms producers have also opened facilities in Ukraine, though it will be many months before such facilities are fully operational, and once they are, they'll only slightly reduce Kyiv's dependence on foreign arms and ammunition.
The most important factor to determine Ukraine's chances of winning the war is the evolution of negotiations with the United States. Kyiv will face a major test in this area when Ukrainian officials meet with U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan on the sidelines of an Aug. 5-6 summit in Saudi Arabia. Kyiv claims it will hold its first formal consultations with the United States and possibly others on the concrete realization of the ''specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements'' G-7 members pledged to Ukraine at the recent NATO summit. Such negotiations with G-7 countries and other states will be critical for Kyiv, as forming stronger bilateral security arrangements is likely the only way Ukraine can deter Russia from continuing the war or reigniting it at a time of its choosing.
Political will in the West may slide further against Ukraine in the months and years ahead — especially if previously fringe Eurosceptic and pro-Russian political parties continue to gain popularity across Europe, and if Republicans in the United States (which have been more skeptical toward supporting Ukraine and escalating the war) retake the White House in 2024.
To protect itself against these changing political winds, Ukraine will also need to quickly ''lock in'' as much support as possible via ''Israel-style'' pledges, which would see the West preemptively budget military support for Ukraine in larger, multi-year increments (similar to how the United States authorizes military support for Israel).
Peace Plans Ripen, But Substantive Talks Remain Elusive
Over the past year, a flurry of new ''peace initiatives'' have either been formally proposed or informally discussed in the public sphere. But there has been little progress made toward holding more substantive talks on bringing an end to Russia's war in Ukraine.
In early July, reports emerged that a group of former senior U.S. national security officials held secret ''track 2'' or ''track 1.5'' talks with Russians who are allegedly close to the Kremlin. Otherwise, however, there remains no evidence that the United States is conducting substantive backchannel negotiations with Russia about the war in Ukraine. But that hasn't kept Russian officials from fueling the narrative that such talks could soon commence as an extension of their other contacts with U.S. officials — presumably because Moscow thinks the very possibility of the United States engaging in negotiations would increase tensions between Washington and Kyiv while signaling to the Western public that the U.S. government is broaching talks out of fear that its position would only slip as time goes on. Russian foreign intelligence (SVR) chief Sergei Naryshkin, for example, has eagerly disclosed contacts with his CIA counterpart William Burns, mostly recently on July 12, and claimed they also discussed ''what to do with Ukraine.''
Against this backdrop, the diplomatic initiative that Saudi Arabia will host later this week is poised to be the most important ''peace discussion'' on Ukraine yet when evaluating the contours and viability of any eventual negotiation. Representatives from as many as 30 countries are slated to attend, including numerous Global South nations that Russia had hoped would be partners in challenging U.S. influence in the years to come (such as India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt and Mexico). Discussions will focus on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's 10-point peace plan, which is premised on restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and reaffirming that integrity according to the U.N. Charter through a withdrawal of Russian forces and subsequent restoration of Ukraine's state borders with Russia. The meeting is reportedly intended to culminate in a more resultative peace summit later this year where global leaders would then commit to shared principles for resolving the conflict.
The summit could be key in gauging the eventual outcome of the war in Ukraine, as if the countries in attendance (including the aforementioned Global South nations) broadly affirm an end to the war along principles closer to Zelensky's peace plan, it could help frame any future peace talks between Russia and Ukraine to Kyiv's advantage. This would be extremely notable by constituting a new level of diplomatic isolation for Russia compared with the largely perfunctory U.N. votes reaffirming Ukraine's territorial integrity. Such unexpectedly broad international pressure would also help raise the diplomatic price on Moscow for resisting any kind of cease-fire, thus minimizing the prospect of Putin continuing the war for years to prevent Ukraine's reconstruction and utterly demolishing its people and economy.
In addition, any statements of principles by foreign powers would clearly indicate that Russia's desire to continue its war and annex more Ukrainian territory was more costly and less attractive than the Kremlin had expected. Moscow is intimately familiar with the issues related to the isolation of unrecognized territories following its annexation of Crimea in 2014. And when it launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia likely hoped to achieve some partial normalization of some or all of its seized Ukrainian territories among partners. If countries at the upcoming Saudi summit affirm an end to the war along Ukraine's terms, it could make Russia's goal of cementing greater acceptance of its annexations appear as remote as ever, which would become a line of criticism against the Kremlin at home and likely have negative long-term political effects for Moscow.
At the same time, however, the timing of the summit could suggest that the United States and other members of the international community want peace negotiations sooner rather than later, which would indicate that time is not on Ukraine's side. This is because nearly all the floated peace plans that stand any chance of being used as a template for such talks allow Russia to keep its territorial seizures via a cease-fire, even if they don't foresee de jure recognition of the territory as Russian. A cease-fire that freezes the war along current battle lines would leave Russia in control of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Through that entrenched presence, Moscow would be able to neuter Ukraine economically and politically, and could potentially prevent Kyiv from joining the European Union or NATO as well. The Kremlin would also be able to easily frame the war as a success in the long run, thus vindicating Russian authoritarianism and Moscow's revanchist foreign policy, which Ukraine and the West would have to deal with the consequences of for decades to come.
Indeed, the fact that so many countries are coming together now to discuss the Ukraine conflict may reflect a growing desire for near-term peace negotiations. And this would bode ill for Kyiv by indicating that, amid a lack of Western progress on viable security commitments prior to its NATO membership, Ukraine may at any moment be pressured to accept a cease-fire and negotiations along current battlelines, ensuring Moscow will be able to continue framing the invasion as a major success for many years or decades to come.
Moscow's Political Challenge
Unfortunately for Kyiv and the West, any success in deepening Russia's diplomatic isolation is extremely unlikely to see Moscow accept defeat anytime soon and relinquish the territory it has seized in Ukraine. Russia's strained economy amid poor public finances and demographics will also not prompt Moscow to halt its invasion.
Assuming Russian forces cannot be decisively dislodged from the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, this leaves a change in Russia's domestic political dynamics as Kyiv's only viable hope for a victory in the years ahead. While the Kremlin's grasp on power will remain stable in the short-to-medium term, it still faces long-term political challenges that will worsen with time. Russia's institutions, ideology, and education system are still in the process of shedding their last vestiges of liberalism and any hopes for a democratic, rule-of-law-based system. The prospect of an eventual thawing and period of reform will thus continue to haunt Russia's political leaders. But for Kyiv, the problem is those challenges are not developing fast enough to threaten Moscow in the next few years. And the window for a greater political shift in Russia is arguably closing as Moscow continues to take China and Iran's lead in further cracking down on political dissent.
In the wake of the Wagner Group's uprising in late June, Moscow appears to have successfully muzzled the organization and its leader Evgeny Prigozhin. This will reduce the likelihood of another similar revolt in the near term, as there are no other organizations in Russia that have the political influence and tactical capabilities to attempt what Wagner did earlier this summer (apart from the Russian military itself, which remains extremely unlikely to launch a revolt following the recent elevation of regime loyalists). To counteract the issues raised by the mutiny, Putin has also taken new actions to effectively degrade alternative power centers, including by launching an apparent crackdown on ultranationalist dissenters. In recent weeks, Russian authorities have arrested several far-right figures who publicly advocated for more escalation in Ukraine and criticized the invasion's failure to achieve its initial goals, most notably prominent ultranationalist and war criminal Igor ''Strelkov'' Girkin. By deterring other prominent nationalists and bloggers from criticizing Putin's handling of the war, these arrests will reduce overall public opposition in Russia, which will not only make it easier for the Kremlin to claim the war is going according to plan, but will also make it less risky to hold the 2024 presidential election.
Moscow's recent efforts to further quelch dissent appear to already be having an impact, as criticism of the Kremlin and Russia's Defense Ministry has fallen dramatically since the Wagner uprising. However, Prigozhin's brief mutiny did show that Russia's political system is not impenetrable. Indeed, Russian institutions waited for top-down instructions instead of acting independently to stop the march on Moscow, which let the Wagner forces move freely and attack the Russian army with impunity in the meantime. This norm — that even obvious actions, such as putting down mutineers, must first be decided at a higher level or even by the Kremlin — will likely remain a potential weak spot in Putin's regime. However, it is mitigated by the fact that the Kremlin now has used its political capital for recriminations that will actually strengthen Putin's position compared with the previous status quo, contrary to widespread Western hopes that the mutiny could quickly see the end of Putin's regime.
The Wager mutiny also showed that dissatisfied Russian elites may, over time, become increasingly bold in their efforts to secure influence over a largely stagnant amount of financial and institutional resources inside Russia. As Putin ages and his credibility to resolve difficult questions declines, factions in the Kremlin or individual officeholders and businessmen may start believing that they can either resolve issues without first getting Putin's blessing. They may even feel emboldened to take action into their own hands and present the rest of the Kremlin with a fait accompli, similar to Prigozhin in his revolt. But this kind of resistance and infighting among Russia's elite would probably take years to play out — a prospect likely too distant for war-torn Ukraine.
Therefore, even along the potentially weakest link in Russia's long-term war against Ukraine — its domestic political stability — Moscow appears prepared to hold the line. And for this reason (and the others laid out above), time now appears to be tilting further in Russia's favor. However, hope is by no means lost for Ukraine, as Kyiv could still retake the territories needed to defeat Russia, though that victory may end up taking years to achieve.
