The incoming Trump administration will likely adopt a more zero-sum approach to countering Chinese influence in sub-Saharan Africa that could find some success with close U.S. partners and resource-rich countries but will risk backfiring with many African states, which could in turn enable China to reinforce its influence on the continent. Since U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's victory in the Nov. 5 election, most African leaders have extended their congratulations and expressed their intent to continue strengthening bilateral ties with the incoming administration. However, these diplomatic overtures come amid broader concerns in many African capitals about Trump's return to the White House, as African leaders brace for renewed unpredictability in their relations with the United States. Moreover, Trump's first term was characterized by a deprioritization of U.S. outreach to Africa, derogatory comments by Trump regarding African countries, as well as a more transactional approach focused on countering Chinese and Russian influence on the continent rather than economic development and climate adaptation, which are higher priorities for most African countries. 

Compared to the Biden administration, the Trump administration will likely put a greater emphasis on countering Chinese influence in more strategic African countries and will likely sustain efforts to develop new critical mineral supply chains, even though this could involve a reduced focus on minerals needed for the energy transition. Trump's national security team's hawkish views about China mean the United States will likely take a more zero-sum approach to countering Chinese influence in Africa than during President Joe Biden's time in office. This will likely materialize with the United States making economic and defense cooperation more conditional on African countries curbing cooperation with Beijing. The U.S. administration is unlikely to adopt a cohesive policy vis-a-vis the continent and rather favor a case-by-case approach that emphasizes the need for key partners like Kenya, as well as strategically significant countries such as South Africa and Angola, to curb their ties with Beijing. Conversely, Washington's emphasis on China will likely be lessened in Western Africa and Somalia due to the United States' prioritization of counter-terrorism operations in these regions. Moreover, the Trump administration will likely sustain the Biden administration's efforts to develop critical mineral supply chains with little to no involvement of Chinese entities due to concerns that their current preeminence over critical mineral supply chains could enable Beijing to impose economic costs on the U.S. economy in the future. This suggests that the United States is likely to remain broadly committed to Biden's flagship Lobito Corridor, which aims to connect Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo's regions rich in cobalt and copper deposits to the port of Lobito in Angola, even though the new administration could review parts of the initiative to ensure that U.S. companies are more strongly involved in the project and enjoy preferential terms. Nonetheless, Trump's skepticism of the energy transition suggests that his administration could ease the United States' emphasis on "green" minerals, such as copper, and instead increase its focus on those critical for the U.S. defense industry, such as rare earth elements and titanium. 

• While Chinese entities control only an estimated 8% of Africa's total mining output, China retains a dominant position regarding global critical mineral supply chains, exemplified by its production of approximately 80% of the world's graphite and 60% of rare earth elements. Moreover, China plays a critical role in the processing of critical minerals, producing around 60% of lithium chemical, 70% of refined cobalt and 40% of refined copper. 
• Trump's decision to sign Executive Order 13817 in 2017, which stresses the importance of reliable access to critical minerals for U.S. economic and national security, showcases the importance of critical minerals for the incoming administration.

In practice, the Trump administration will likely attempt to curb the growth of non-dollar trade between African countries and outside powers, as well as discourage the adoption of Chinese technologies by leveraging U.S. economic and military power. Disputes over bilateral trade are likely to be less prominent in the Trump administration's approach to Africa when compared to China or the European Union, given the modest size of U.S.-Africa trade. However, Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose 100% tariffs on countries that advance alternatives to the U.S. dollar. While the United States appears unlikely to take a proactive approach to dissuade African countries and companies from using local currencies for regional trade, Trump's threats suggest that his administration will pressure African states to refrain from expanding non-dollar payments for trade with countries beyond Africa, such as China and Russia. In addition, the United States will likely launch fresh efforts to dissuade African countries from expanding their use of Chinese technologies in sectors such as telecommunications and cloud computing. To that end, the Trump administration will likely leverage U.S. aid as well as the planned expiry of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA, in September 2025 to pressure African countries into meeting its demands. This may result in African countries refusing to meet the Trump administration's demands being excluded from AGOA if it is renewed or with countries meeting U.S. demands being prioritized for enhanced investment partnerships if AGOA is not extended. Moreover, the Trump administration could approve the delivery of more advanced U.S. military equipment to African countries that are meeting U.S. demands as Trump seeks to strengthen the U.S. defense industry via transactional deals. However, the United States could also decide to curtail intelligence sharing with countries that refuse to remove Chinese technologies from their critical telecommunications infrastructure over concerns that such equipment could enable China to gain access to sensitive intelligence.

• In 2023, trade with countries in sub-Saharan Africa represented less than 2% of the total U.S. trade in goods. Nigeria and South Africa accounted for the bulk of the estimated $10 billion U.S. trade deficit with the region. The United States had a trade surplus with over 20 countries on the continent. 
• While the Trump administration could also seek to impose targeted tariffs on African countries, the length of the regulatory process to impose tariffs — which would likely require an investigation under Sec. 301 of the U.S. Trade Act 1974 — and Trump's prioritization of trade matters with China, the European Union and Mexico mean that targeted tariffs are unlikely to be imposed on African countries during the administration's first year in office. However, African countries could still face U.S. tariffs should Trump deliver on his threat to impose a 10-20% global tariff on imports to the United States. 
• AGOA provides African exporters with duty-free access to around 1,800 categories of goods. A bipartisan bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate in April to extend AGOA beyond 2025, and Republican Congressman John James introduced a bill to reauthorize AGOA through 2037 in the House of Representatives on Dec. 11. However, Trump could pressure U.S. lawmakers into removing certain goods from the legislation's duty-free provision, such as those for the automobile sector. Moreover, Trump could decide to pressure Republican lawmakers to prevent the legislation from being renewed should he seek to shift trade agreements with African countries to a bilateral level. 

The Trump administration may secure agreements with critical mineral-rich nations and key U.S. allies that boost investment and defense ties, but relations with Kenya could face challenges over the financing of Nairobi's security force deployment to Haiti. The Trump administration's outreach to Africa is likely to prioritize engagements with critical mineral-rich countries, to which it could be willing to forward greater economic incentives when compared to most other countries on the continent given their strategic importance. This could pave the way for transactional deals whereby U.S. mining companies gain preferential access to critical mineral deposits in exchange for fresh investment pledges or deliveries of more advanced U.S. military equipment. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a top contender to strike such agreements, given the country's large mineral reserves as well as Kinshasa's ambitions to reduce the dominance of Chinese companies over its mining sector. Southern African countries will also be well positioned to secure such agreements with the Trump administration, given the region's vast and diverse mineral reserves. As for close U.S. partners such as Kenya and coastal West African countries, the administration will likely seek to leverage their reliance on U.S. defense cooperation to meet its policy objectives. This means that the Biden administration's plans to expand U.S. military infrastructure in Cote d'Ivoire and Benin could become contingent on both countries expanding purchases of U.S. military equipment or bearing a greater share of the cost of the infrastructure's construction and maintenance. As for Kenya, the United States will likely pressure Nairobi to curb ties with Beijing, although Trump could also request that it take a more proactive role in leading counter-terrorism efforts in neighboring Somalia. Given the growing threat posed by al Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in West Africa, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin will likely meet at least some of the administration's demands in order to secure closer defense cooperation with the United States. While Kenya may prove willing to pause a further expansion of ties with China, its bilateral relations with the United States will face a higher risk of friction given the possibility that the Trump administration suspends U.S. funding to Nairobi's deployment of security forces to Haiti.

• Trump's return to the White House also raises the likelihood that the United States will formally recognize the independence of Somalia's breakaway region of Somaliland. Such a move enjoys strong support among some Republican Party members and could enable the U.S. to strengthen its ability to monitor and target the Yemen-based Houthis while easing the U.S. reliance on Djibouti, where China has a naval base. Still, this push could stall should Trump make it conditional on Somaliland recognizing Israel, which would prove politically costly for the Somalilander leadership. 

The Trump administration's more zero-sum approach to curbing China's influence in Africa will risk backfiring, as reduced U.S. aid and loss of duty-free access to the U.S. market could push countries subject to economic coercion to deepen economic ties with Beijing, in turn offering China an opportunity to strengthen its influence on the continent. U.S. attempts to coerce African countries to reduce ties with China will be constrained by deep-seated resentment on the continent about foreign powers' instrumentalization of Africa during the colonial and Cold War eras, and African leaders will, in most cases, look to not side too closely with the United States over concerns this could trigger an anti-Western backlash domestically. Moreover, the United States remains a smaller trade and infrastructure partner for most African countries than China. Taken together, this suggests that many African countries will likely refuse to fully meet the Trump administration's demands, even though most will likely prove willing to make some concessions to keep cordial ties with the United States. Nonetheless, the U.S. administration is likely to follow through with threats to reduce aid and curb access to the U.S. market with a select number of countries in the first half of Trump's term that could grow through the end of his presidency as Washington seeks to expand economic costs for African states which fail to meet its demands vis-a-vis China. Together with the Trump administration's unwillingness to support ambitious climate finance targets, this portends growing friction in U.S. relations with several African countries, such as Tanzania and Djibouti, during Trump's term. Countries subject to coercive U.S. measures will be inclined to expand economic cooperation with outside powers to make up for the costs imposed by the Trump administration. In turn, this will provide an opportunity for China to strengthen its relations with these countries, many of which will likely accept such proposals given the size of China's domestic market for their exporters and Beijing's strong preexisting ties with most countries on the continent. Chinese entities could notably expand trade financing initiatives to secure new markets for Chinese exporters subject to growing challenges to export their goods to the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union, especially in the renewable energy and electric vehicle sectors. 

• As of 2023, U.S. trade in goods with Africa was around four times smaller than China's trade with the continent, standing at $68.6 billion against $283 billion for China. 
• Efforts by the Trump administration to limit Chinese technology use in Africa face significant challenges due to its already extensive adoption across the continent. As a case in point, an estimated 70% of Africa's telecommunications infrastructure has been built by Chinese telecommunications company Huawei, making it highly costly for African countries to remove the company from their telecommunications sector.