In 2024, a series of presidential and parliamentary elections will determine the political direction of countries accounting for roughly 40% of the world's population and about half of its GDP. While each of these elections will be different, many of them will see nationalist parties perform strongly thanks to a rhetoric that seeks to mitigate (and in some cases reverse) the effects of globalization. Some of these parties and leaders promote protectionism to shield domestic industries from foreign competition, others are critical of international organizations that they perceive as undermining national sovereignty, and many present immigration as a threat to national identity, security and job opportunities for their country's native populations.
Considering the combined economic weight of the countries holding votes this year and the underlying socio-economic trends behind the anti-globalization sentiments, a question comes to mind: how will these elections impact the evolution of globalization in the short-to-medium term?
Accelerated Globalization?
To answer this question, let's first explore the possibility that, despite current socio-political trends, globalization actually accelerates considerably over the next 5-10 years. In this scenario, the world would experience a strong commitment to global cooperation and interconnectedness, with countries working together to address shared challenges such as climate change, potential pandemics, poverty and inequality. To achieve these goals, governments would agree to strengthen international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, so that they become more effective. In addition, barriers to trade and investment would be lowered around the world while increased investment in physical and digital infrastructure would enhance global connectivity. The world's extensive and diversified supply chains would also face little to no risks of disruption because of government decisions. At the political level, there would be a widespread consensus (both in the West and in the so-called Global South) about the benefits of globalization for economic development and societal progress, relegating anti-globalist voices to the fringes of politics and academia.
It's easy to see why this scenario is implausible, at least during the second half of this decade. To begin with, it would require a significant decrease in global trade disputes, geopolitical competition and territorial conflicts, which appears unlikely amid the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and boiling flashpoints such as Taiwan — all of which will continue to shape global politics for years to come. The domestic political component is equally important, as the rise of nationalism in most parts of the world (which is connected to issues such as economic discontent, growing inequality and political polarization, none of which show signs of abating) represents a significant obstacle to this scenario as well. If, as expected, some of the elections around the world in 2024 yield leaders that promote protectionist and nationalist policies, it will become harder for globalization enthusiasts to advance their causes in the second half of this decade and probably even beyond that.
Profound De-Globalization?
Now that we have considered a scenario of accelerated and widespread globalization, let's think about the opposite extreme: a scenario of profound de-globalization. Here, international connections and interdependence between countries would decline severely. The world's largest economies would all be governed by administrations that prioritize national interests over global cooperation, even if it comes at the expense of economic growth, innovation and investment. Protectionist trade policies (such as tariffs and trade barriers) would become much stronger and much more widespread, drastically reducing the free flow of goods and services across borders. Countries would also become highly intolerant of migration, significantly reducing the movement of people and talent across nations. In this world, concerns about the link between technology and national security would result in a severe technological decoupling, where nations develop separate technological ecosystems and where global interoperability is severely impaired.
While in recent years the world has seen early glimpses of these trends, a scenario of profound de-globalization remains improbable in the short-to-medium term. To begin with, global trade has ebbed and flowed over the past decade, but despite the allure of protectionist rhetoric and policies, it has actually grown almost every year in volume (with the notable exception of the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020). And while trade agreements are becoming increasingly rare, they still happen. In fact, most countries are currently seeking to diversify and de-risk their supply chains, which involves reaching deals with more reliable partners, not severing ties with the external world. Moreover, some of the most critical technologies of the 21st century involve global supply chains that are not easy or cheap to replace domestically. Making cutting-edge semiconductors, for example, requires the concerted efforts of companies in the United States, Europe and Asia-Pacific that companies and governments will not be able to fully replace at least over the next decade.
Fragmented Globalization
The more plausible scenario in the coming years lies somewhere in between these two extreme options. In fact, globalization will continue, but it will also become more fragmented. Globalization is unlikely to follow a linear progression toward either acceleration or reversal, and a hybrid scenario seems more plausible given the current economic and political trends. International trade may lose momentum as an aggregate, but it will remain intense in many parts of the world, while technology will continue to create opportunities for international integration. However, major powers, most notably the United States and China, will accelerate the pursuit of their own spheres of influence, while countries in the Global South (ranging from Brazil to India) will push to create international institutions and cooperation frameworks that run parallel to those dominated by the West. This will lead to the progressive emergence of separate technological ecosystems, financial networks and cooperation agreements. Bilateralism and protectionism will become more prevalent than multilateralism and liberalization, as countries and businesses prioritize self-sufficiency and seek to de-risk their supply chains. Against this backdrop, reshoring, nearshoring and ''friend-shoring'' will become more prevalent as a strategy for companies and governments to reduce supply chain-related risks.
In this world, technology and national security will be deeply intertwined, and the impacts of fragmented globalization will be most intense in high-tech industries that are simultaneously politically sensitive, economically crucial and militarily strategic. The race for technological dominance (primarily between the largest global powers, but also between middle powers) will intensify in sectors such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and advanced manufacturing, all of which governments will perceive as essential for their national security. This also means that data itself — and especially data flows across borders — will face increasing pressures toward fragmentation. Because of this, the global technology landscape could become increasingly fragmented as global technology standards increasingly diverge amid efforts by the United States and China to undermine each other's technological development and shape these technologies according to their own preferences, values and strategic interests. Against this backdrop, governments and companies will increasingly be forced to choose sides, adapt their business models and comply with divergent regulations.
Connected to this phenomenon, global institutions will continue to decline in relevance, as cooperation between countries becomes increasingly difficult. While issues such as climate change will remain at the forefront of many governments' agendas, global collaboration may become harder in an increasingly fragmented world. This does not mean that international cooperation will end, as some multilateral organizations could become more active if their global counterparts fail to deliver results. In the same way that the United States sought to build its own multilateral cooperation structures during the Cold War, China will likely increase its support for parallel entities (from development banks to security forums) to both undermine U.S. influence and increase its own.
Opportunities for Emerging Economies
This world will create opportunities for the countries that learn to navigate the turbulent waters of fragmenting globalization, and particularly the increasing rivalry between the United States and China. Vietnam is a great example of this, as the country is attracting investment from companies, especially in the electronics industry, that are relocating some production from China out of fear of both rising labor costs and the growing rivalry with the United States. Vietnam is doing this while also pursuing a very crafty foreign policy: in September 2023 the country upgraded its relationship with the United States to that of a ''Comprehensive Strategic Partnership''; two months later, Vietnam and China announced 37 deals (including on diplomatic ties, railways and telecommunications) during Chinese President Xi Jinping's first visit to Hanoi in six years.
Mexico offers another example, as the country has recently seen an increase in greenfield investment from Chinese companies that want to use the Latin American state (which has a free trade agreement with the United States) to preserve access to the U.S. market at a time of rising trade tensions between Washington and Beijing. Like Vietnam, Mexico is also pursuing a balanced foreign policy: during a meeting in late November, President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and Xi Jinping described the Mexico-China relationship as ''mutually beneficial,'' and the Chinese government published a statement saying that Beijing was willing to ''promote bilateral relations to a higher level.'' Notably, this happened as Mexico became the world's main exporter of goods to the United States in 2023, relegating China to the second position for the first time in a decade and a half.
Both Vietnam and Mexico illustrate how globalization is more shifting than declining: even though headline data shows that U.S. imports from both countries have been increasing, Chinese companies have been among the most aggressive in investing in Vietnam and Mexico, and Chinese products make up large shares of the goods exported from the two countries to the United States.
Vietnam and Mexico's strategy is not new; during the Cold War, for example, many countries sought a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the growing competition between Washington and Beijing against the backdrop of an increasingly fragmented globalization will pressure governments to adapt their foreign policies accordingly. Seizing on the opportunity to operate as a middleman between the United States and China will be as important as keeping cordial diplomatic ties with both. The challenge for these countries is that this strategy will work so long as geopolitical tensions remain manageable. There may come a time when these countries are forced to pick a side or else risk a conflict with their more proximate power. Moreover, this strategy is not without risks in an increasingly protectionistic world. For example, during a potential second term, former U.S. President Donald Trump could push to renegotiate some of the conditions of the trade deal with Mexico and/or impose higher tariffs on Vietnamese goods to reduce his country's trade deficit with both countries.
There will also be opportunities in parallel to the U.S.-China rivalry. In recent months, European states have been reaching out to countries from Chile to Australia as a part of their push to increase and diversify their supplies of critical raw materials. The ongoing war in Ukraine has also created new opportunities for countries like Algeria and Qatar to increase their exports of natural gas amid Europe's efforts to reduce its reliance on Russian energy supplies. Trade and supply diversification and de-risking, particularly for strategic sectors, will remain central elements of a world of fragmented globalization.
The elections around the world in 2024 will shape the global political landscape for at least the second half of the decade, and nationalist and anti-globalization ideologies will influence many of the outcomes. While this will not result in a profound process of de-globalization, it will certainly not contribute to accelerated globalization. More likely, it will lead to heightened geopolitical competition and trade and technological fragmentation that will impact political and economic relations between countries. This scenario of fragmented globalization will present challenges for international cooperation and multinational companies, with bilateralism (or ''minilateralism'') and protectionism becoming more prevalent. However, opportunities will arise for those countries (and businesses) that adeptly navigate the complexities of a fragmented globalization and maximize its economic benefits.
