In 2024, four of the world's largest countries and territories will hold elections that will shape global affairs during the second half of the decade. In March, Russia is scheduled to hold a presidential election to appoint its leader until 2030. Between April and May, India will hold general elections to appoint the government and parliament that will lead the country until 2029. In June, the European Union will hold bloc-wide elections to appoint members of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 period, which will also result in a new European Commission. Finally, the United States will hold legislative and presidential elections for the 2025-2028 period. Combined, these elections will cover a population of roughly 2.3 billion people and a GDP of approximately $42 trillion, and their results will set the tone for global interactions into the 2030s.
Different Elections With a Common Feature
These elections will be very different. A point could be made that what will happen in Russia should not be considered an election at all, as there is virtually zero chance of an opposition figure winning the presidency. The Indian election is a mammoth affair that will mobilize hundreds of millions of voters over several weeks across territories of considerable cultural and religious differences. The European Parliament vote is a strange beast, as voters are supposed to elect representatives for a supranational legislature but more often than not use the election to reward or punish their national governments and vote with an eye on domestic affairs. Finally, the U.S. election will happen at a time of extraordinary ideological polarization and high levels of mistrust in democratic institutions.
But despite their heterogeneity, these elections will have a common feature: nationalist populism will play a significant role in all of them. Broadly speaking, this ideology (which has shaped global politics for over a century) tends to promote a strong sense of patriotism, present other countries as enemies, pursue protectionist trade policies and criticize globalization. Nationalist-populist leaders tend to polarize societies along ideological, ethnic or cultural lines, threaten the rights of minorities and promote traditional cultural and social values. Many of them also centralize power and limit institutional checks on their authority while questioning the credibility of media outlets and restricting freedom of expression.
Russia is the most obvious example of this ideology. While President Vladimir Putin has yet to announce his intention to run again (and the vote may be delayed because of the ongoing war in Ukraine), the election will not be free or competitive and Putin or someone of his choice will win with little to no real opposition. But as Russians increasingly feel the social and economic impacts of the war, the Kremlin's centralization of power and severe restrictions on press freedoms and opposition activities will deepen, as will the promotion of traditional social values and the criticism of Western liberal influence. Perhaps more importantly for the future of global affairs, the election will not alter Moscow's assertive nationalism and its push to defend Russia's role as a global power, which means that the chances of the Kremlin ending its invasion of Ukraine are extremely low.
Ideological continuity is also likely in India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are expected to remain in power. Modi's first two terms (he became prime minister in 2014 and was re-elected in 2019) are full of contrasts. He tried to promote India as a manufacturing hub and encourage domestic and foreign investment, as well as improve the country's digital infrastructure and expand internet connectivity across its vast territory. He also launched a comprehensive tax reform to streamline the taxation system and regulatory reforms to promote entrepreneurship and start-ups. However, he did this while also promoting a strong nationalist rhetoric with a particular focus on Hindu culture. This proved problematic in a country as ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse as India and led to a significant increase in tensions, especially with the large Muslim minority. These tensions will escalate in the lead-up to the election, as the BJP doubles down on its Hindu nationalism to mobilize voters, and would probably endure if Modi secures a third mandate.
The EU election will take place simultaneously in 27 countries and will result in a fragmented European Parliament where a coalition of two or more parties will be needed to pass legislation and approve the members of the next European Commission. Still, the elections will take place against the backdrop of persistently high inflation and low economic growth. Polls suggest that far-right parties will perform well while centrist and green parties will lose ground. The rise of the far-right may force conservative parties across the continent to move to the right to remain competitive, resulting in a generalized shift to more right-wing positions across the European Union. The main impact of this process will be on policy, as a more climate-skeptic European Parliament would push to slow the bloc's energy transition while also promoting protectionist measures to defend European manufacturing and agricultural producers.
Finally, the last major election of 2024 may be the most consequential of the four. The vote is more than a year away, which means that the result is still uncertain. But should the Republican Party win the presidency and control of Congress, the U.S. government would likely focus on the reduction of regulations across various industries (and a relaxation of environmental policies) in an effort to promote economic activity. The rivalry with China would continue, as would the use of tariffs and quotas against foreign goods to protect American manufacturing (which was one of the most economically disruptive policies during former President Donald Trump's administration that for the most part continued under Biden), though under a new Republican administration, these policies may become more aggressive and broader. Notably, some of the contenders in the Republican primaries are arguing that the United States should reduce its support for Ukraine, which could severely weaken Kyiv's ability to continue fighting if one of them becomes president.
The Impact on the Second Half of the 2020s
The protagonism of nationalism-populism in the 2024 elections will have multiple repercussions. To begin with, it means that protectionist tendencies will remain strong. This will result in continued disruption risks for global trade, as the multiplication of tariffs, trade barriers and regulatory restrictions on foreign investments threaten economic exchanges between countries, while subsidies for domestic industries are likely to continue rising. This risk would be particularly high in the United States if Trump secures another term, as his administration relied heavily on tariffs and other trade mechanisms between 2017 and 2020. Other Republican presidents may take a more nuanced approach to tariffs, keeping the existing ones in place and negotiating limited concessions to some Western allies. But a widespread lowering of U.S. tariffs is improbable. The risk of protectionism will also be high in the European Union, where a more nationalist European Parliament and European Commission are likely to defend robust subsidies for farmers and factories across the bloc and tight screening for investment from countries like China. In both Europe and the United States, protectionism will coexist with a push to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, which will result in initiatives to produce goods and services domestically while also diversifying suppliers, especially away from ''problematic'' countries like China or Russia.
Strong nationalist-populist tendencies could also weaken the Western consensus on some key global issues, such as support for Ukraine. A Republican U.S. government could reduce economic and military support for Ukraine, while war fatigue among increasingly domestically focused Western European countries could have a similar effect on EU policy. Meanwhile, Russia's deepening nationalism and authoritarianism after the 2024 election means that the room for Moscow to offer concessions to Kyiv to end the war will further contract. Given this combination of factors, a formal peace deal is unlikely, which means Ukraine may eventually have no choice but to accept some informal settlement with Russia that ends the active fighting but also involves de facto conceding significant parts of its territory, as Ukraine would simply run out of men, money and weapons to regain the territories it lost since the invasion.
In addition, the constant use of an ''us vs. them'' rhetoric that portrays foreign countries as enemies rather than competitors will likely keep a high risk of strained diplomatic relations and potential conflict. The U.S.-China competition is the most obvious case, as the technological, economic and military rivalry between the two giants is set to continue and possibly intensify as authorities in the White House and Beijing prioritize national and economic security concerns over de-escalation. Moreover, Taiwan will hold a presidential election in January — another crucial ballot in 2024 with nationalist overtones — that will likely result in a victory by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The months leading to the Taiwanese election have already seen an increase in Chinese military pressure on Taiwan (notably in the shape of military drills close to the island), and the possibility of de-escalation between Beijing and Taipei would be particularly low if the DPP remains in power. This would, in turn, test the U.S. commitment to protecting Taiwan against Chinese aggression and may motivate countries from Japan to South Korea to deepen their already strong military ties with the United States.
At the national level, the ''us vs. them'' rhetoric portends a pervasively high risk of domestic conflict and sporadic episodes of violence during the second half of the decade, as governments are perceived to prioritize some sectors of society over others. This violence could erupt because of religious issues, as would be the case in India if it elects another BJP government; racial issues and immigration, as is the case in many European countries where anti-immigration and xenophobic political parties will remain popular in the foreseeable future; or ideological or racial issues, as is the case in the United States where political polarization creates the constant risk of far-right and -left violence, while unpredictable events like police violence against minorities or controversial legal decisions could trigger large protests.
Even without conflict or violence, nationalism and populism will continue fragmenting the global arena, especially as non-Western countries question Western-led international organizations. The ongoing push by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to expand the group's membership and find alternatives to forums like the G-7 or the role of the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency will only increase during the second half of the decade, as ''country first'' policies coexist with a continued mistrust for globalization under Western terms. This process will not always happen along a traditional ''West vs. non-West'' divide, as middle powers around the world (ranging from India and Brazil to Turkey and Saudi Arabia) will constantly adjust their foreign relations to maximize their economic, political and security benefits without fully committing to a particular camp (whether it is the U.S.-China rivalry or the Russia-NATO conflict). This will propel forward a more fluid and multipolar global environment.
Climate change policy could be one of the main casualties of this global fragmentation, as countries increasingly prioritize short-term, domestic political calculations (on issues such as industrialization or the protection of agricultural producers) over international cooperation. Even in a highly cooperative entity like the European Union, nationalist-populist political parties are demanding national solutions to national climate change issues and questioning the imposition of EU-level policies from bureaucrats in Brussels. At the global level, the multiplication of these views bodes ill for international cooperation on climate change. Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions over new energy technologies (such as Chinese electric vehicles, which have become increasingly popular in Europe) will lead to stronger calls for protectionism as countries seek to reduce technology-related security risks and/or protect their domestic industries.
Looking Ahead
Recent experiences of nationalism-populism have given us several insights into what the world could look like in the coming years. The first is that this ideology often makes domestic and foreign policy decisions less predictable or even erratic, as was the case with the Trump presidency in the United States. The second is that nationalism-populism could result in drastic political change with long-lasting repercussions, as was the case with the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom. The third is that even if nationalist-populist forces don't win elections, their popularity often forces moderate leaders to adopt some elements of their national-populist agenda to remain competitive, as has been the case across Europe in recent years. And the fourth and final insight is that nationalist-populist leaders may refuse to accept defeat and their supporters may protest election results, as was the case after both Trump and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro lost re-election, contributing to very high (albeit short-lived) political uncertainty and security risks.
Next year's key elections may not all result in the victory of nationalist-populist leaders. But nationalist populism will nonetheless play a central role in each of the four ballots, which means the ideology and its policy repercussions will still heavily shape domestic and global politics in the second half of the decade.
