The Feb. 28 Oval Office argument between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump underscored the latter's resolve to coerce Ukraine to accept Russia's terms for a ceasefire in order to restore U.S. relations with Moscow and pass on management of the war to Europe. The argument also followed a Feb. 18 meeting between U.S. and Russian delegations in Saudi Arabia, where the two sides agreed to form high-level teams for peace talks, restore diplomatic staffing and, notably, pursue closer bilateral relations and economic cooperation.
Together, these developments raise questions about the strategic calculations driving the Trump administration to pursue reengagement with Moscow and what the restoration of Russia's international standing could look like.
A Change of Course
The Trump administration's decision to pursue political and economic normalization with Russia is likely primarily driven by a determination that the previous course was unsustainable and its strategic assumptions regarding the urgency of redirecting resources to counter China. Former U.S. President Joe Biden sought to deal a strategic defeat to Russia and put Ukraine in the best possible position for peace negotiations, and thereby send a strong message deterring future invasions. But the Biden administration's support was insufficient to achieve that outcome, and its efforts to diplomatically and economically isolate Russia were largely unsuccessful. The Trump administration, by contrast, has decided to engage with Russia, believing this will help it negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and undermine Russia-China relations. In addition to the Feb. 18 talks in Saudi Arabia, this has manifested as a reluctance to increase pressure on Russia through additional sanctions or military support packages for Ukraine.
During a Feb. 13 meeting with his NATO counterparts, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that the Trump administration's new policies of limiting support to Ukraine were a ''recognition of hard power realities on the ground,'' which have not been developing in Ukraine's favor since at least the summer of 2023, when it became clear that Ukraine's chances of winning the war on the battlefield would only fall over time due to insufficient Western support and escalation concerns. Of primary concern is Ukraine's manpower shortage, which is reaching critical levels amid mounting signs that the country's mobilization measures are not keeping pace with Russia's and are also becoming increasingly socially and economically contentious — something Vice President J.D. Vance mentioned during the Feb. 28 argument with Zelensky.
Ukraine's waning chances of a victory appear to be driving the Trump administration to perceive its leverage as so low that any strong measures to support Ukraine and pressure Russia at this time could lead Moscow to draw out talks, delaying a settlement to when Kyiv's leverage could be even lower. This is supported by Trump's recent statements that Russia ''has the cards'' in peace talks, while Ukraine ''doesn't have any cards, but they play it tough.''
Russia, meanwhile, believes the Trump administration will end most military support to Ukraine, blaming Kyiv if negotiations fail and leaving the Europeans to respond. European states could struggle to rapidly mobilize an adequate response, enabling the war to continue on even less favorable terms for the West, before Ukraine and its European backers eventually return to the negotiating table to accept Russian demands.
In this context, the Trump administration's widening of talks to include restoring Russia's international standing is part of its negotiation strategy. Narrow talks only about Ukraine would put the United States in a weak position. However, broader talks that also include the normalization of U.S.-Russia ties and the future of European security architecture would enable the United States to use its economic heft and security presence in Europe — neither of which can be undermined by Russia continuing the war — as negotiating leverage, in order to get Russia to soften its demands and agree to a ceasefire.
Still, there is lingering skepticism among Western officials and analysts about whether Russian President Vladimir Putin would agree to a lasting peace deal, when he could instead sign a ceasefire amid confidence Ukraine will remain a basket case vulnerable to political upheaval or renewed invasion in the years ahead. Moscow could maintain maximalist demands that prevent the enactment of a final settlement, or merely go through the motions to see what concessions the Trump administration is willing to offer before ultimately rejecting or violating a peace deal over claims that the West's proposed security guarantees for Ukraine are unacceptable.
Beyond Ukraine, there are likely other topics of interest driving the White House to pursue this new approach to Russia. One of the largest is probably arms control — especially with the New START treaty, the United States' last major nuclear arms treaty with Russia, expiring in February 2026. The Trump administration will likely seek a replacement of the treaty that brings China into the strategic arms control regime and avoids an arms race that would undermine the Trump administration's efforts to cut the U.S. deficit and reduce government spending. Cooperation with Russia would probably also be aimed at improving U.S. influence in strategically important regions like the Arctic, fulfilling a Trump administration priority to disrupt growing Russia-China cooperation there.
There are likely domestic political factors as well. Trump promised American voters a rapid end to the war and reduced support to Ukraine, while many members of his coalition are ideologically sympathetic to Moscow as an opponent of liberal establishments in Western countries, seeing Russia as a bulwark of conservative nationalism.
However, the most fundamental driver for the Trump administration's efforts to end the war is its strategic intent to refocus U.S. foreign policy on countering China economically and militarily in the Indo-Pacific, including by redirecting financial and military resources from Europe.
The 'Reverse Kissinger' Makes an Appearance
With countering Beijing being the Trump administration's top priority, the prospect of a steady restoration of Moscow's standing with the West is fundamentally an iteration of the so-called ''Reverse Kissinger'' diplomatic play. The strategy is named after then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's famed trips to China in 1971, during which he exploited and formalized a long pre-existing rift between the Soviet Union and China in order to improve relations with the latter at the former's expense. As U.S. relations with Russia have steadily worsened in recent decades precisely as Washington faces a growing threat from China, American leaders and geopolitical strategists have long dreamed of a similar maneuver that splits the United States' top two geopolitical rivals, but this time by triangulating closer to Russia instead of China — hence the name ''Reverse Kissinger.''
In fact, arguably every U.S. president since Russia's independence (Biden included) has entered office believing, for strategic purposes, he could ''reset'' and improve relations with Moscow. But each one failed to do so, and instead wound up leaving U.S.-Russia relations in an even worse state.This is because American presidents have calculated that the coming decades will likely see only greater U.S.-China competition, in which the United States should prioritize isolating China, including by helping Moscow gain space from Beijing. But while Trump will likely have initial and fleeting success in improving relations with Russia, this will mostly be because relations cannot get much worse.
Pre-War Hints of Rapprochement
In the months leading up to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Biden sought ''to park'' bilateral relations with Moscow by establishing a strategic stability dialogue during a June 2021 meeting with Putin. At the meeting, Biden described Russia as a ''great power'' to assuage Moscow's insecurity about being treated as a junior partner to China. But Russia saw this as a sign of Washington's vulnerability and declining power in an increasingly multipolar world. The Kremlin subsequently calculated that the United States, regardless of which party held the presidency, would likely eventually come back to the idea of ''resetting'' relations with Russia for the same strategic reasons. The Kremlin's confidence in this assessment likely reassured Putin when he gave the order to invade Ukraine in February 2022, as he knew it was almost inevitable the next U.S. administration would pursue detente with Moscow, meaning any initial U.S. retaliation would be short-lived and therefore unable to break Moscow's resolve.
What Would Restored U.S.-Russia Ties Look Like?
The Trump administration's talk of using ''major economic development transactions'' with Russia to restore relations fits within the framework of the ''reverse Kissinger'' strategy, using resource deals with Russia to block China's access to those resources while simultaneously strengthening Russia's bargaining position against Beijing. In doing so, the approach seeks to diminish the value and reliability of China's strategic partnership with Russia, ultimately weakening their alliance. The China-Russia relationship is based on their rapidly growing bilateral trade turnover since 2022, increasingly frequent bilateral military drills in areas sensitive to the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, and growing diplomatic alignment on anti-U.S. activities at the United Nations and organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
U.S.-Russia trade, by contrast, has historically been insignificant, which has, in turn, allowed relations to deteriorate with little risk to either country's economy. This is why the Trump administration sees increased economic cooperation as key to establishing a future relationship with Russia.
U.S. investments in Russia's rare earth metals would create an economic incentive for Washington and Moscow to preserve a base in their bilateral relations. For this reason, on Feb. 24, Putin positively responded to Trump's offer for economic cooperation, saying Russia would be ready to offer the United States the opportunity to work together in critical minerals, including rare earth metals, of which China is the largest producer.
Moscow will continue advocating for stronger economic and diplomatic ties with the United States, expecting tangible benefits such as sanctions relief, a temporary halt to the war to reduce financial strain and a boost in foreign direct investment. However, more broadly, renewed engagement from Washington, Brussels and other global power centers would restore Moscow's strategic autonomy, allowing it to make independent decisions rather than serving as a dependent resource supplier and junior partner to Beijing.
However, before this cooperation can move forward significantly, a ceasefire and regulation of the Russia-Ukraine war would need to occur. For this to happen, Moscow and Washington are seeking to agree to broad terms of a peace settlement and a rough timeline for its enactment in the coming months. Once it reaches a broad understanding with the United States, Russia would agree to a ceasefire under the conditions that Washington persuades Kyiv to accept the deal, halts further military aid to Ukraine and ensures that elections in Ukraine take place shortly after the ceasefire. Details on thorny issues such as sanctions, frozen assets, security guarantees and sources of funding for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine would be in wider negotiations on a long-term settlement, the terms of which Ukraine's new government would have to accept under threat of continued war.
In the meantime, Russia's political and economic rehabilitation will begin. Western officials will likely increase the frequency of their contacts with their Russian counterparts in the coming months, while reports will indicate that multinational companies are exploring the possibility of restoring their businesses or making new investments in Russia. Some companies may reenter the Russian market once sanctions begin to be phased out following a ceasefire, though most restrictions will remain in place until a comprehensive settlement is finalized.
The end of the secondary sanctions regime enforcing sanctions on Russia with third parties will likely reduce friction in Russia's foreign trade relatively quickly and facilitate a rise in imports and exports. However, the benefits to U.S. companies are likely to be very limited. Moscow will likely place harsh conditions on companies from ''unfriendly'' Western countries seeking to return to Russia. Companies will likely have to receive permission from a government commission on foreign investment, and retail chains will have to open businesses in the Russian-occupied portions of Ukrainian territory — one of many reputational liabilities for returning companies. Many firms returning to Russia will also have to pay any outstanding fines to the Russian government.
The scale of new foreign investments in Russia will likely be severely constrained. The structural challenges in its economy — including ongoing labor shortages, inflation and high interest rates — will likely persist for years, limiting growth. However, an even greater deterrent to foreign business will be the lingering risk of government expropriations and unstable legal regimes protecting assets. Still, some major brands, consumer goods makers, automotive, tech and commodity traders could take the risk and return to the Russian market should a settlement be reached, particularly if they perceive little competition from other outsiders.
Likely Pitfalls
The possibility of improved U.S. relations could incentivize Russia to forgo escalation vis-a-vis the West in the coming years. Still, the White House's push to steadily rehabilitate Russia in the coming years comes with multiple potential pitfalls.
The first pitfall is that the approach does not account for Moscow's geopolitical imperative to exert influence along its periphery, including into Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly the Baltic region. This imperative is therefore not exclusive to Ukraine, and if the war ends, normalized U.S. ties are unlikely to keep Russia from eventually using its freed-up resources — including its massively expanded army — to try to restore its influence in key European areas near the Russian core, and secure more favorable terms in European security and commerce.
This would likely entail threatening Finland, Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) — which were all once part of the Russian empire, but are now NATO members — in the hopes of getting them to compromise in Russia's direction, particularly if the U.S. role in European security is reduced in the coming years. Such efforts would inherently risk not only destabilizing Europe and the credibility of U.S. security integration, but U.S. economic interests, as the European Union and the United States have the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship.
This brings us to the larger pitfall — namely, that the approach is based on the assumption that closer ties with the United States would make Russia significantly less reliant on China and ultimately reduce Moscow's desire to cooperate with Beijing. Regardless of the Trump administration's efforts, Russia will continue to view the United States, not China, as the true impediment to increasing its geopolitical power, as well as a threat to Russian sovereignty and internal stability. Indeed, it is not Beijing but Washington that has prevented Moscow from increasing its influence in its near abroad, with governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia using their economic ties with the United States and its Western allies to balance against both Russia and China, whom they are each skeptical of becoming overly dependent on. Additionally, Russia's commercial relationships with farther-flung countries in the Global South — including those in Africa, Asia and Latin America — often put it in direct competition with the United States over arms deals and numerous exports, including hydrocarbons, agriculture, minerals and other commodities.
So while Moscow will seek to reap the benefits of normalized ties with Washington, this means it will ultimately side with Beijing on matters related to China's escalating geopolitical rivalry with the United States in the coming years. In fact, the growing U.S.-China competition will give Russia more space to exert even greater influence abroad. Moscow could even support Beijing's future efforts to use military coercion in the Indo-Pacific by creating security crises in Europe that tie down U.S. and Western forces.
Further supporting this is the strong personal bond between Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. Both leaders are very likely to remain in power for the duration of Trump's current term (and potentially well beyond), making Russia all the more unlikely to take actions that could undercut or seriously impede China's efforts to gain economic and military power against the United States in the coming years.
Broader Implications
The Trump administration's efforts to rehabilitate Russia will have the biggest implications for Europe. European governments — many of which have sought to reduce their economic reliance on Russia in recent years — will suddenly face demand from national businesses to restore previous trade and investment ties with Russia, particularly in the energy sphere, to lower costs for European consumers. As a result, commodities trade between Europe and Russia will rise, helping Moscow to at least partially restore its economic influence over the Continent. Global energy prices will also fall as the lifting of sanctions enables Russia to more easily export its oil and gas products and steadily ramp up production back toward pre-invasion levels.
The steady normalization of ties with Russia will raise questions about the expediency and cost of European governments' past and present efforts to support Ukraine amid declining U.S. support. European citizens' disenchantment with higher defense spending in the years ahead, as their governments try to offset reduced U.S. military presence, will create a ripe environment for anti-establishment populist parties on the far left and far right to keep gaining ground across the Continent. Moscow believes this political shift will ultimately result in more European countries being under the influence of parties similar to the pro-Russian governments already running countries such as Hungary and Slovakia.
But the effects of a rehabilitated Russia will be felt beyond Europe. Arguably, the most immediately impacted states will be those on Russia's southern periphery in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. These countries have seen more Russian and non-Russian trade routed through their territories since the war in Ukraine began in 2022, as part of so-called parallel or gray import schemes to dodge Western sanctions. If Russia's international isolation eases, it will harm these states' ability to continue engaging in reexports of goods to Russia, which had become a significant source of their trade growth, because there would be less urgency to redirect trade flows via routes bypassing Russia.
For the United States, the benefits of rehabilitating Russia will likely ultimately prove illusory and not worth the cost of negotiating an end to the Russia-Ukraine war from a position of weakness. The Trump administration likely believes that improving ties with Moscow will enable Russia to reduce its dependence on not only China, but also North Korea and Iran by revealing the contradictions and conflicts between these partners (amid less acute confrontation with the United States). But while Russia could, for instance, become less bold in its military support to Iran and its proxies to appease the United States, Moscow will preserve the January 2025 strategic partnership it signed with Tehran. More broadly, Russia will also continue to lead efforts by non-Western countries to build parallel international institutions.
Indeed, even the Trump administration is downplaying expectations, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying he didn't know if ''we'll ever be successful completely at peeling [Russia] off of a relationship with the Chinese'' in a Feb. 25 media interview. But the cost of the attempt will likely include acceding to a Russian victory in Ukraine, with little to show in return.
