Strategic Risks and Political Hurdles for a U.S. Ground War in Iran

(Sasan / Middle East Images / AFP via Getty Images)

Smoke and flames rise at the site of airstrikes on an oil depot in Tehran, Iran, on March 7, 2026.

In an extended conflict with Iran, the United States could escalate by deploying ground forces ranging from limited commando raids to a full-scale invasion. But while small special operations missions are the most viable option, larger incursions or regime-change operations would face severe logistical, political and strategic risks and remain unlikely without a major shift in regional and U.S. domestic support. With the air war unlikely to result in a decisive victory for either side, the United States has threatened to further escalate with ground operations inside Iran, as President Donald Trump has repeatedly said he does not want to take any options off the table. A ground operation could run the gamut, from a limited commando raid with narrow and specific objectives with a few dozen forces, to an incursion with hundreds of thousands of soldiers and limited regional diplomatic buy-in, to a full-scale invasion to topple the regime, which would require hundreds of thousands of troops and the support of most Gulf Arab states.

On March 11, Trump told Axios that Iran had "practically nothing" left to strike. But the previous day, U.S. Democratic Senator Chris Blumenthal said that the United States seemed to be "on a path toward deploying American troops on the ground in Iran," citing the White House's expansive objectives in the country.
U.S. officials told The New York Times that the Trump administration has already discussed, but not greenlit, commando operations inside Iran.
Air wars have a poor record of forcing regime or even policy change. The recurrent U.S. airstrikes on Iraq in the 1990s failed to convince Saddam Hussein to publicly abandon his weapons of mass destruction program. Similarly, the huge Allied air raids on Germany and Japan during World War II failed to force surrender; in Japan's case, only the use of atomic bombs achieved this outcome.

The simplest political and logistical option for the United States would be conducting commando raids inside of Iran, either to secure nuclear materials, conduct further assassinations, degrade further military industrial infrastructure associated with the missile and drone program, and/or to arm and organize the Iranian opposition. U.S. commando forces in the form of the Navy SEALs, Delta Force and Green Berets would be relatively easy to organize and deploy to the Middle East, as it would not require months of buildup or extensive logistical supply chains. These forces could also be deployed from U.S. aircraft carriers rather than from nearby countries. With the United States and Israel having established air superiority over Iran, American commando troops could be inserted by air along Iran's porous borders or coast. From there, these forces would be able to operate with relative freedom, given Iran's established track record of failing to intercept Israel's Mossad teams. But while organizing and inserting commando troops would be relatively straightforward, the specific mission assigned would ultimately dictate the risks and potential benefits of the deployment. Securing nuclear materials in Iran, such as the up to 200 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium reportedly buried around Isfahan, would require either extracting the uranium or diluting it — a time-consuming process that would leave American troops exposed to potential IRGC counter-attacks in the interim. Alternatively, targeting secretive nuclear research sites would be less risky because troops would not have to remain on site for as long, but the impact of such operations would also be less certain, as seen in previous U.S./Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Assassinations of top Iranian military leadership would not necessarily expose commandos to the same kinds of risks as attempting to infiltrate nuclear sites. However, given Iran's network-based approach to its military leadership and the redundancies within its chains of command, such targeted killings would be unlikely to significantly impact Iran's ability to continue launching regional drone and missile strikes. Commandos might also help target or carry out sabotage operations against the military-industrial complex that supports missile and drone strikes, thereby degrading Iran's ability to produce and replace such systems. But, once again, such strikes on their own would not necessarily be decisive due to Iran's diffuse military-industrial complex. Finally, U.S. commandos might also participate in missions to organize or lead opposition forces within Iran, such as Kurdish forces and/or domestic Iranian groups in major cities. But this would be a slow process and subject to significant pushback by the IRGC. Regardless of the specific goal, any deployment of commandos inside Iran would run the risk of elite units being killed or captured, a military setback that would be a severe political blow to President Trump's war support.

The White House typically enjoys a high degree of freedom in special operations missions, with Congress rarely seeking to impose constraints, while missions are often too secretive or limited to provoke public backlash. During his first term in 2019, Trump sent Navy SEALs into North Korea on a covert surveillance mission ahead of his visit to the country, in an incident that killed North Korean fishermen who accidentally encountered them. The incident took years to come to light and did not result in a major political scandal.
The Trump administration is reportedly exploring options that minimize the risk of U.S. commandos being killed or captured, aware that the failed 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran — Operation Desert Claw — contributed to then-President Jimmy Carter's electoral defeat later that year. Nevertheless, following its recent successful extraction of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro, the White House likely believes it has overcome some of the obstacles encountered during the Desert Claw mission.
Israel's recent ground operations in nearby Lebanon have also faced constraints, with Israeli commandos forced to retreat from Hezbollah territory under fire in eastern Bekaa as they searched for the grave of a long-dead Israeli fighter pilot.

To cripple Iran's economy, the United States could launch limited incursions targeting Iranian ports or key islands. But while this would require deploying far fewer ground troops than a full invasion, it would still risk American casualties and further entangling the United States in a foreign conflict. Such limited incursions would require thousands of troops and significant air and naval support. But they would still demand far fewer ground forces than a full invasion, thus avoiding the need to secure greater public support or major additional funding from Congress. Units like the 82nd Airborne now being redeployed in the U.S or the 15th or 26th Marine Expeditionary Units, which are already attached to the carrier strike groups, could be landed on Iranian islands that are key to controlling the country's coast and oil exports, such as Kharg Island, Kish and Qeshm. In a more extreme scenario, American troops may even try to take control of a major port like Bandar Abbas or Chabahar, which are crucial to Iranian trade. In addition, some landing forces might threaten major Iranian cities to tie down large numbers of IRGC troops from operations taking place elsewhere, such as a Kurdish incursion without actually landing. But amphibious and airborne assaults are some of the most complex military operations, and the United States has not carried out an opposed landing since the Korean War in the 1950s. There are also significant risks to U.S. forces attempting such landings, as they would be exposed to drone and missile counter-attack, and if landing in a populated area, could be bogged down in an urban battle or localized insurgency. Additionally, American troops on Iranian soil would likely harden nationalist backlash within Iran and strengthen the Islamic Republic rather than weaken it, even if the U.S. military seizes an economically vital location like Kharg Island. Boots on the ground at this scale would also almost certainly escalate political backlash against the already unpopular war in the United States, further weakening Trump's domestic support. Additionally, it is uncertain how the United States would be able to successfully extricate itself from such landings if the Islamic Republic remains hostile, potentially entangling the United States in a long-term holding of foreign territory.

Seizing control of key Iranian islands would serve multiple U.S. objectives. First, it would hinder Iran's capacity to maintain its Strait of Hormuz blockade. Second, these islands could provide positions for U.S. forces to launch near-abroad strikes against the Iranian forces still attacking regional shipping. Finally, controlling the islands would enable the United States to interdict Iranian shipping to strangle trade.
U.S. forces have landed in ports before to affect political change, such as Haiti in 1994, Panama in 1989 and Beirut in 1958. But these were unopposed landings, conducted without hostile fire. The last opposed landing the United States carried out was at Incheon, in Korea, in 1950.
Kharg Island accounts for around 90% of Iran's oil exports and is widely considered economically critical for the government. But if the island is seized, Iran has threatened to escalate its attacks on Gulf Arab energy infrastructure, raising the risk of greater disruptions to global oil and gas markets. It is also unclear if Iran would allow the United States to occupy the island without attempting to destroy the infrastructure there first.

Finally, in the most extreme and unlikely scenario, the United States could launch a major ground invasion, with the aim of either weakening Iran's conventional capabilities to allow for a full-scale uprising, or seizing control of major Iranian cities to signal the end of the Islamic Republic. Launching a major ground operation in Iran would require overcoming significant logistical, political and diplomatic hurdles, though the height of these hurdles would depend on the type of mission chosen. The United States could use its conventional ground forces and their technological superiority to break up and destroy Iran's conventional military and the IRGC on the ground to allow an opposition government to take power. Such a strategy might also take place in conjunction with Kurdish incursions and commandos organizing protests and uprisings behind the front lines, similar to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in 2001, which relied heavily on local proxies to take control of the country from the Taliban. But if this plan is not seen as viable, the United States could instead consider a full-scale ground invasion similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Both of these plans would require months of military buildup in the region. Other nearby countries would also have to host these American troops and support their supply lines. It is highly unlikely that NATO allied Turkey would support such an operation, nor would Iraq, leaving the United States with the unfavorable options of major amphibious landings out of the Gulf Arab states and/or a limited incursion out of Azerbaijan. Currently, none of these potential host countries is likely to greenlight a U.S. invasion of Iran, though that may change if the war drags on for months and Iran inflicts substantial damage on them. Launching a major ground invasion of Iran would also require significant political support within the United States, likely including an act of Congress to authorize the necessary defense spending and war powers for such a large-scale mobilization. But this remains unlikely unless Iran inflicts severe economic and military harm on the United States to change popular opinion in favor of a ground war. Assuming it overcomes these many hurdles, the United States could begin the buildup of hundreds of thousands of troops and supporting forces for an invasion, likely focusing on amphibious landings along the Iranian coast with the clearest route to take control of some of Iran's major cities and oil-rich Khuzestan along the Iraqi border. Ultimately, the objective would be for either the U.S. military or its proxy allies to take control of Tehran itself, signaling the end of the Islamic Republic. Such a campaign would likely last for months or even years, especially if the United States relies on a proxy force instead of undertaking the long journey from the coast to Tehran itself. This would then bog the United States down into a long occupation of Iran that might take years, if not decades, to end, diverting U.S. military resources away from Europe and Asia and assuredly losing public support over time.

To defeat Iran's conventional military, the United States would likely need hundreds of thousands of regular Army troops, Marines and National Guard units, which would take months to deploy and train. It took over six months to assemble over 200,000 troops deployed in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, an invasion of Iran would be more complex due to the country's larger size and more difficult geography, coupled with the likely need for amphibious landings.
The U.S. Congress would need to approve a ground invasion of Iran. This is because such an extensive operation would exceed the 60-day window set by the War Powers Act for the president to take unilateral military action. Trump might ignore such a stipulation, though this could jeopardize congressional funding for the military operation and trigger a fresh political crisis between Congress and the White House.