Though Iran is less likely to target Egypt and Turkey as part of its retaliation than other regional countries, cuts to energy exports risk forcing Cairo and Ankara to rely on more expensive imports of liquefied natural gas. Over time, persistent regional instability will likely further elevate Egypt and Turkey's concern about Israel's regional strategy. On March 4, the Turkish Defense Ministry claimed that NATO air and missile defense systems shot down an Iranian ballistic missile before it entered Turkish airspace. The incident did not result in any casualties or material damage. In a statement, the Turkish Defense Ministry cautioned that Ankara maintained the right to defend itself and called for regional de-escalation. Echoing the sentiments, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi expressed concern over Iran's attacks on Gulf states and called for regional de-escalation. So far, Turkey and Egypt have been among the few Middle Eastern countries relatively spared from Iranian attacks following the new round of U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran which began on Feb. 28. Following the attacks, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the U.S. and Israeli strikes a "clear violation" of international law, criticized Iran's retaliatory attacks on Gulf Arab countries, especially against civilian targets, and offered to mediate a ceasefire. 

• Iran's retaliation targeted countries throughout the region that house U.S. military assets, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Prior to the U.S. and Israeli strikes, Gulf Arab countries had prohibited the United States from using their bases to conduct attacks against Iran and had previously reassured Iran of their neutrality during elevated periods of Israel-Iran tensions.

Egypt and Turkey have been exposed to spillover effects from the region's conflict since the start of the Hamas-Israel war in 2023, but relative calm following the ceasefire had decreased some of the external risk. Since the start of the Hamas-Israel conflict in October 2023, both Turkey and Egypt have called for regional de-escalation and stability. Neither Turkey nor Egypt have an interest in becoming embroiled in Israeli conflicts or a broader regional war, but their geographic position and political stances have exposed them to spillover effects from the conflicts, including energy shocks and disruptions to shipping routes. Following the October 2025 Hamas-Israel ceasefire and the Houthis' suspension of their maritime attacks in solidarity with Gaza, broader regional tensions largely decreased, mitigating the spillover risks to both Egypt and Turkey. 

• The Houthi maritime strikes had disrupted maritime shipping routes through the Red Sea and decreased Egyptian state revenue derived from the Suez Canal. After a lull in Houthi maritime attacks and the suspension of their campaign, maritime shipping companies gradually resumed traveling through the Suez Canal, though levels remain lower than before the start of the Houthi campaign of shipping harassment in late 2023. 
• Regional uncertainty at the start of the Hamas-Israel conflict decreased tourism to Turkey and caused the prices of energy — especially oil — to spike. As the conflict de-escalated, energy prices and tourism levels stabilized. However, the expanded conflict risks energy shocks and well as travel and business disruptions throughout the region, including Turkey.

Though Turkey and especially Egypt are less likely to be struck by Iran than other regional countries, their ties to the U.S. military still make them vulnerable to attacks, while Turkey's proximity to the conflict makes it more vulnerable to potential refugee inflows. Despite Egyptian and Turkish efforts to improve relations with Iran in recent years, their balancing of ties with both the United States and Iran will be insufficient to fully mitigate the risk of Iranian attacks. Both Egypt and Turkey are within Iran's striking range. Their hosting of U.S. military assets and personnel makes them vulnerable to potential Iranian retaliatory attacks, though they are less likely than Gulf Arab countries to be targeted. For one, Egypt is farther from Iran than Gulf countries and Turkey, making Iranian attacks targeting Egypt more likely to be intercepted over foreign airspace. The U.S. military presence in Egypt is much smaller than in Gulf countries, Jordan and Israel. Secondly, though Iran and its regional allies previously threatened to retaliate against Gulf countries and their energy infrastructure, these threats did not extend to Egypt and Turkey. Additionally, Turkey's NATO membership provides additional insulation against Iranian attacks — despite its proximity to the conflict — since Iranian direct attacks risk provoking a Turkish kinetic response and invoking NATO's collective defense mechanism, which risks embroiling additional countries, mostly in Europe, in the conflict. Even so, despite these constraints, the March 4 missile headed toward Turkish airspace indicates that Turkey still faces a security risk. Furthermore, while Egypt's distance from the conflict insulates it from some of the security threats, Turkey's shared border with Iran makes it vulnerable to spillover effects from the conflict's violence, including refugee inflows. As such, Turkey will increase border security along the 350-mile Turkey-Iran border and restrict some cross-border travel, especially since Iranians can enter Turkey without a visa. Turkey has already banned Iranian citizens from entering the country at its border with Iran for short trips, though Turkish and third-country citizens are still permitted to enter Turkey. However, if the violence near the border escalates, Turkey will likely increase travel restrictions along the land border.

• Turkey hosts around 1,500 U.S. forces at the Incirlik Air Base near Adana in southern Turkey. The U.S.-operated Kurecik Radar Station in central Turkey, an early-warning system for ballistic missiles, has been a point of friction with Iran. A few hundred U.S. personnel are stationed on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula as part of Task Force Sinai, mostly in logistical and support roles.
• A March 2 Reuters report indicated that hundreds of Iranians had crossed the border into Turkey to escape the conflict. Turkey has hosted a large number of Syrian refugees since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Anti-refugee sentiment within Turkey is significant. As such, there are elevated domestic concerns over large numbers of Iranian migrants crossing the border into Turkey if the war expands. 
• Media reports on March 3, citing unnamed sources, suggested that the United States and Iranian Kurds were in discussions for a potential Kurdish-led attack on Iran's security forces. The CIA is reportedly supplying weapons to support the Kurdish militants. This will likely fuel Turkish concern over a resurgence of the Kurdish autonomous movement and a heightened risk of potential cross-border Kurdish attacks in the future.

Regional uncertainty will cut Israeli natural gas exports to Egypt and threaten Turkey's natural gas imports from Iran, pressuring Egypt and Turkey to secure alternative energy sources, and, over time, pushing Turkey to further diversify its energy suppliers away from Iran. The war and Iranian attacks on or near energy production facilities have resulted in disruptions to energy production and exports. Israel's Leviathan gas field, which supplies natural gas exports to Egypt, was pre-emptively shut down on Israeli Energy Ministry orders, resulting in cuts to Israeli energy exports to Egypt. As a result, Egypt brought forward some of its LNG orders and indicated plans to secure additional LNG cargoes for peak consumption months during the summer. Even so, the halt to QatarEnergy's LNG production as well as shipping disruptions for LNG cargoes through the Strait of Hormuz, which affects around 20% of the global supply, will likely raise the cost for LNG on the spot market. As such, elevated LNG prices risk straining Egypt's foreign currency reserves and expanding fiscal deficits, despite Cairo's progress in improving its macroeconomic indicators under its International Monetary Fund program. In the event of a protracted conflict that results in natural gas shortages, Egypt will likely look to secure fuel oil to support the country's power generation needs to reduce the chance of government-imposed power cuts or the diversion of fuel resources away from industries — including fertilizer and petrochemical plants — to prioritize electricity generation. On the other hand, Turkey's reliance on Iranian gas imports, which account for around 13% of total natural gas imports, and disruptions to Iranian supply due to attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure or Iranian export cuts to prioritize domestic demand, risk pushing Turkey to look for LNG cargoes on the spot market at elevated rates. Prolonged elevated energy costs risk higher-than-anticipated inflation in Turkey, despite the central bank's multiyear effort to decrease inflationary pressures. As Turkey's energy deal with Iran is set to expire in mid-2026, regional uncertainty, previous Iranian cuts and international pressure may push Turkey to further diversify its long-term energy suppliers and increase the Western share of gas imports. 

• Israel supplies around 1 billion cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt, or 15-20% of the country's total gas consumption. Egypt and Israel reached a deal in December 2025 to increase Israeli natural gas exports to Egypt to 130 billion cubic meters of gas through 2040. Israeli natural gas exports — delivered via a pipeline to Egypt — are cheaper than LNG cargoes. The deal was intended to secure long-term energy supplies to Egypt as demand grows. 
• On March 3, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly announced that Egypt had secured alternative natural gas supplies to compensate for the Israeli export cuts.
• Turkey and Iran inked a deal in 2001 for Ankara to secure up to 9.6 billion cubic meters of imported natural gas annually from Iran through mid-2026 via the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline. However, Iranian gas exports to Turkey have often stood at less than capacity due to poor infrastructure maintenance and Iranian diversions of gas supply to domestic markets.

Over time, Cairo and Ankara will become even more concerned about Israel's assertive regional strategy, likely fueling cooperation between Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to counter Israel's expanding regional influence. Egypt will, however, remain reliant on Israel for security and energy cooperation. While Egypt and Turkey's focus over the next several weeks will be on regional de-escalation, Egypt and Turkey will likely be even warier of Israel's assertive regional posture destabilizing the region due to the magnitude of its assault and the involvement of Iran's regional allies and proxies, which had stayed out of the June 2025 war. Israel's killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — long thought to be a red line — has further elevated existing concerns throughout the region about the threat posed by Israel, especially since the United States has enabled its ally's aggressive approach. Still, even though U.S. support for Israeli actions and Washington's participation in the latest attacks has caused frustration in both Cairo and Ankara, their reliance on U.S. cooperation and bilateral ties constrains them from doing much more than not providing support for U.S. attacks and rhetorically criticizing them. In addition, Egypt's reliance on Israel for energy cooperation and border security provides Cairo with limited flexibility to reduce its ties with Israel. But this will further incentivize Turkey to expand its influence in Syria and the Horn of Africa through military and economic cooperation to counter Israel's expanding regional influence, although a direct military confrontation between Israel and Turkey remains unlikely. As Egypt and Turkey's own ties expand, in conjunction with a growing pragmatic alignment with Saudi Arabia, the alignment between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will likely expand to counter the Israeli-Emirati alliance and wariness over its potential for regional destabilization, though cooperation will likely remain pragmatic toward shared regional interests.