The United States and Israel are pushing for regime change in Iran with their latest military strikes, though the most likely outcome is a regime that is even more hostile to the West and Israel, as Iran has likely enacted mechanisms to ensure regime continuity amid the strikes. While the United States has struck a number of Iranian missile and other military targets as part of its joint military strike on Iran on Feb. 28, Israel has reportedly concentrated its attacks on killing top leaders of the Iranian regime in an effort to cause the Islamic Republic's government to collapse. Israel has reportedly targeted Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his son and potential heir Mojtaba, President Masoud Pezeshkian and other senior political figures and military commanders. Thus far, there are reports that senior advisor Ali Shamkhani, Defense Minister Amir Nasirzadeh and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohammed Pakpour have all been killed in the strikes. The highest-ranking Iranian official to speak publicly since the strikes began is Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who said that "as far as I know" Khamenei and Pezeshkian, as well as the head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeii, and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, are alive. However, after Araghchi spoke, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said there were signs that the supreme leader was "no longer." Soon after, Israel's Channel 12 cited an Israeli official saying that he was dead. By attacking U.S.-linked targets in a half-dozen countries in the Middle East, Iran is clearly trying to regionalize the war to pressure U.S. partners into quickly mediating an end to hostilities. However, the conflict remains ongoing, with the United States and Israel likely considering further strikes targeting Iran's leadership. It will thus be key to track how political continuity and the chain of command in Iran evolve in the coming hours and potentially days. 

U.S. strikes on Iran — as well as Israel's goal of regime change — have been telegraphed for weeks, giving Iran ample room to ensure continuity of government in the event of an attack, despite a lack of certainty over how this process would actually play out. In addition to Khamenei and Pezeshkian, the most crucial Iranian political leaders are Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Larijani, Qalibaf and Mohseni-Ejeii. These three individuals are all key members of the political system who would need to help keep day-to-day operations functional. They are also viewed as possible successors to Khamenei, in addition to his son and several figures on Iran's Guardian Council, such as Mohsen Araki and Alireza Arafi. Some more reformist and moderate figures of the political establishment, such as former President Hassan Rouhani and the grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini, Hassan Khomeini, also remain potentially influential figures in a crisis. If Khamenei was killed as the Israelis suggest, Iran's 88-member Assembly of Experts would be formally tasked with naming an heir. However, until that decision is made, Iran's constitution stipulates that a three-person council would manage day-to-day affairs. This council would consist of the president (Pezeshkian), the head of the judiciary (Mohseni-Ejeii) and a representative from the Guardian Council, though Larijani — a long-time regime insider who has held many different positions and comes from a very prominent Iranian family — would likely be instrumental during this interim period as well. While a decision to replace Khamenei would likely take time to implement, particularly amid ongoing U.S. and Israeli strikes, Khamenei has reportedly compiled a list of three potential heirs, though it has not been made public. Western media have reported that Mojtaba and Hassan Khomeini are not on the short list, though amid the June 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian officials leaked that the two were the frontrunners. If Pezeshkian is killed, then Iran's first vice president, currently Mohammad Reza Aref, would formally take his duties under the constitution until a new election can be held. Iran's military branches and intelligence apparatus has almost certainly delegated more operational authority and decision-making on how to respond to the attacks, as well as given initial orders, to medium- and lower-ranking military commanders. This shift is designed to compartmentalize the tactical decision-making in order to ensure that any strikes killing high-ranking officials, like the reported deaths of the defense minister and IRGC commander, do not compromise Iran's ability to retaliate. 

Moving forward, if U.S. and/or Israeli strikes kill a significant number of high-ranking Iranian officials, including Khamenei, and a significant political transformation occurs, it is most likely that a more hard-line government would take power. Israel's decision to reportedly target Pezeshkian, a relative moderate-reformist in Iran's political system who has supported negotiating with the West, demonstrates that the Israeli goal, and perhaps the American goal as well, is total regime collapse in which no major leaders in the current political system survive or are able to operate the government if Khamenei was killed. This will largely push Iran's ruling elite to unify around the leaders who survive and may make it more difficult, at least initially, for a significant regime transformation that makes Iran more willing to make major concessions to the United States.

If U.S. strikes lead to major political changes in Iran, three broad scenarios could unfold:

• Hard-Liners Take More Control: Most likely, the U.S. and Israeli strikes, which in Iran will be viewed as unprovoked aggression, will result in Iranian hard-liners taking stronger control of the country. These individuals could come from Iran's clerical ranks, which have many figures that are more hard-line than Khamenei, or the IRGC. They would use the attacks to justify sidelining or silencing viewpoints calling for engaging in significant talks with the United States that include concessions on key issues like its nuclear and missile program. If a more hard-line version of the regime survives intact, it will likely view these programs as even more essential to its survival, as more Israeli and U.S. attacks in the future would be expected. 
• Moderates and Reformists Take More Control: The strikes could empower moderate and reformist figures in Iran who advocate for engaging with the West and offering greater concessions, seeing this as the only way for the regime to survive. This scenario would provide the most realistic path toward a long-term decline in U.S.-Iran tensions (and by extension Israel-Iran tensions) and could occur if Iranians carry out widespread protests and the Iranian security apparatus is unable to manage the protests due to the strikes degrading the response mechanism. However, it remains improbable because Israel, and potentially the United States, are unlikely to trust any established Iranian politician, even if they are more moderate, unless they offer near-total capitulation to U.S. demands. Furthermore, the IRGC, which controls Iran's nuclear and missile programs, would probably oppose the moderates' positions and attempt to undermine their political influence. Many in the IRGC would only support such concessions if the supreme leader himself — not a reformist or moderate politician outside his office — ordered concessions to the United States. While Khamenei, if alive, could do so if he thinks the regime is facing collapse, such a decision would more likely come from a successor, should Iran's political and clerical elite seek to replace Khamenei with someone more concerned about their long-term control of the country. 
• Total Collapse: Finally, a total collapse of governance cannot be ruled out if the Israeli and U.S. attacks last for days and kill dozens of Iran's senior leaders and/or there are widespread protests in the aftermath. While Iran has almost certainly put into place some contingency plans, if most or the entirety of its top leadership is killed during the strikes, it is more likely that those contingency plans break down. This could lead to a power vacuum, potentially resulting in a coup attempt, elements of the IRGC rejecting the existing authority in Iran, or splits emerging between the IRGC and Iran's regular military, the Artesh. Such an outcome appears to be Israel's goal, given its targeting of Pezeshkian. But it also risks a total collapse of the state, which could spill over into Iraq and Afghanistan. This scenario could also hinder efforts to negotiate a ceasefire if the chain of command in Iran becomes unclear or is not respected during the ongoing conflict.