If former U.S. President Donald Trump returns to the White House, his administration would likely deprioritize supporting Ukraine in favor of other policy priorities, likely decreasing Kyiv's negotiating leverage vis-a-vis Russia and risking continued or future war. As the United States prepares to elect a new president in November, there are enduring questions about what the U.S. policy on Ukraine would look like if Republican candidate Donald Trump wins another term in office. Trump has expressed skepticism toward U.S. financial and military support for Ukraine, and his candidate for Vice President, Ohio Senator J.D. Vance, is one of the most outspoken opponents of Ukraine aid in the U.S. Senate; indeed, on April 30, Vance was one of just 15 Republican senators who voted against a bill providing around $61 billion in support for Ukraine. While Trump himself has not unveiled an official plan to end the war, he reportedly responded favorably to a plan presented in June by retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg (a former chief of staff in Trump's National Security Council) that included withholding military support to Ukraine until the country makes concessions to Russia to end hostilities. 

• If he wins the 2024 U.S. presidential race, Trump has repeatedly said he would seek to end the war in Ukraine quickly, which his campaign has called ''a top priority.'' After meeting with Trump on July 11, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban noted that the former U.S. president had ''detailed and well-founded plans'' for ''act[ing] as a peace broker immediately'' in Ukraine and that Trump would ''not wait until [after] his inauguration'' to do this if he is elected.
• On April 23, Senator Vance said that withholding U.S. support to Ukraine would increase the likelihood of a diplomatic solution to the conflict that was favorable to U.S. interests. Vance claimed resources and funds for Ukraine could be better used to support domestic initiatives or to counter China. 

A second Trump administration's efforts to deter China could jeopardize Ukraine's ability to defend itself, while the war's development in 2025 and beyond will hinge on the involved parties' risk tolerance. Trump's approach to the conflict would likely contrast with current U.S. President Joe Biden's approach of preserving and increasing support to Ukraine in order to help the country better defend itself and impose greater costs on Russia for continuing the invasion. The ultimate goal of Biden's strategy is to enhance Kyiv's leverage over Moscow in eventual cease-fire and peace negotiations and, in turn, reduce the likelihood of renewed hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, which would enable the United States to allocate more resources to deterring China in the long term — particularly as Beijing is more likely to take military action against Taiwan in 2028 or later. But while the Trump administration would likely also see China as its main national security priority, its efforts to fend off Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific could see the United States take measures that undermine Ukraine's defensive capabilities. This could involve redirecting U.S. supplies from Ukraine to Asia, thereby leaving Kyiv with fewer U.S. weapons and assets (including long-range precision munitions like ATACMS and interceptors like Patriot PAC-3), as well as less logistical and other support. Such moves to reduce U.S. support for Ukraine would lead Russia to believe that its negotiating position will continue to strengthen over time, as it can continue to weaken Ukraine at a lower cost. In the event of a second Trump presidency, the evolution of the Ukraine war will thus largely depend on whether the new White House deems action in support of Ukraine as riskier — from a security, political and economic standpoint — than inaction, along with the risk tolerance of other key actors such as Russia, Ukraine, European governments and China.

Against this backdrop, there are four main scenarios for how a Trump administration could impact the war in Ukraine in 2025 and beyond:

Scenario #1 (Most Likely): Cease-fire talks collapse, the U.S. decreases support for Ukraine but Kyiv continues to fight. 

In this scenario, the threat of reduced U.S. financial and military support under a second Trump administration compels Ukraine to eventually enter talks with Russia. There may also be a Trump-Putin meeting to discuss the war. The Trump administration will very likely initially take action to help Kyiv enter negotiations from a position of greater strength, most likely by reducing restrictions on weapons supplied to Ukraine and their use inside Russia. But talks eventually break down as one or both sides believe that their negotiating position will likely be stronger in the future. Ukraine continues to push for the return of more of its territory. Russia, meanwhile, keeps insisting on annexing Ukrainian territory and limitations on Western support, including a freeze on Ukraine's integration with NATO, under the assumption that Kyiv will not receive decisively more support from the Trump administration or stronger security guarantees from NATO. With neither side willing to compromise on key demands, cease-fire talks collapse without a deal, which, in turn, sees the White House and the U.S. Congress either decline further supplemental support packages for Ukraine, or slow and decrease the size of a new U.S. support package, gutting financial support and key systems and munitions. This sends the Ukrainian government toward economic ruin amid continued Russian air attacks and further losses of its territory on the battlefield, but Ukraine continues resisting, gambling that increased European support will deter Russia from escalating the war and buy enough time for renewed U.S. support. In an alternate version of this scenario, Ukraine does not enter cease-fire negotiations with Russia at all, resulting in the United States reducing its support with similar consequences.

Scenario #2 (Likely): Cease-fire talks collapse, but the U.S. maintains support for Ukraine, bolstering Ukraine's security and negotiating position. 

In this scenario, cease-fire talks also collapse, but the United States decides to maintain or even increase crucial military support to Ukraine for fear that a loss of such aid would severely undermine Ukraine's ability to hold ground on the battlefield, thereby emboldening Russia to prolong the war and pose a greater threat to NATO countries. This decision is also partially motivated by U.S. concerns that cutting aid to Ukraine could embolden China to become increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific by sowing doubts over Washington's resolve to protect its global allies. In an effort to force Moscow to accept a permanent end of hostilities roughly along current lines and no real limitations on Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy, the United States gives Ukraine what it needs to properly defend itself and, eventually, recover more of its territory. The war rages on as a result, imposing increasing economic, demographic and military costs on both Russia and Ukraine. But the continuance of U.S. support assures Kyiv that an end of hostilities will eventually come with stronger security guarantees from the West, potentially in the form of forces from European governments inside Ukraine performing non-combat roles and anti-air support, acting as tripwire forces and bridging the gap for the many years until Ukraine eventually joins NATO.

Scenario #3 (Somewhat Likely): Cease-fire talks result in a temporary end of hostilities that leaves the door open for Russia to restart the war in the future. 

In this scenario, U.S. threats to reduce support bring Ukraine to the negotiating table. Russia signals its willingness to relinquish claims to Ukrainian territory it does not control in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions in exchange for limitations on U.S. support to Ukraine, including an informal but indefinite freeze on Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations. Moscow eventually agrees to a cease-fire, calculating that it will lead to reduced European and U.S. support for Ukraine, as some Western governments and political movements argue that a negotiated settlement is within reach and should be encouraged by heeding Moscow's top demand, which is slowing military support and freezing Ukraine's integration with NATO. But as the Trump administration and potentially other NATO governments take steps to withhold military assets previously earmarked for Ukraine, internal political infighting becomes increasingly visible within and between NATO states. The cease-fire enables Russia to fortify its occupied areas of Ukraine and prepare to re-escalate the war at a time of Moscow's choosing, potentially only after a matter of months. 

Scenario #4 (Unlikely): Ukraine becomes more brazen in its strikes inside Russia, risking a major escalation and Russia-NATO conflict. 

In this scenario, Kyiv miscalculates and deems both the threat of reduced U.S. support and of capitulation to Russia at the negotiating table as existential. Kyiv believes that it has no political or material security guarantees capable of preventing Russia from resuming the war in the future, such as tripwire NATO support forces on its territory, let alone assurances that NATO would collectively defend portions of Ukrainian territory under Article 5 of the Western security alliance's treaty. Therefore, Kyiv becomes increasingly desperate to impose greater costs on Russia and induce stronger support from the West, even if this risks escalatory retaliation by Moscow against Kyiv or NATO. This scenario likely involves Kyiv initiating a tit-for-tat escalatory spiral with Russia that risks triggering a greater Russia-NATO conflict as a result of either a deliberate escalation or an accidental spillover of the conflict in Ukraine. One of the most likely triggers for such an expanded conflict would be Ukraine conducting an aggressive assassination campaign targeting high-ranking Russian officials, or even Putin, in a bid to sow chaos and political infighting in Russia that Moscow would then blame on the West. Another involves Kyiv violating Western restrictions on using their weapons in Russia and conducting increasingly provocative strikes on energy and other infrastructure, prompting a physically destructive Russian cyberattack or other highly disruptive response against Kyiv or NATO. However, this scenario is unlikely because Kyiv is unlikely to miscalculate that Western powers, particularly under a Trump administration, would risk direct conflict with Russia, as the United States is more likely to decisively reduce support for Ukraine if a Russia-NATO conflict appears imminent.