The Africa Corps' reported takeover of remaining Wagner Group units in Mali indicates that Russia will likely sustain bilateral defense cooperation over the coming year, but Moscow's military support is unlikely to prevent Mali's security environment from deteriorating further, portending rising threats to the capital, Bamako. On June 6, Russia's paramilitary Wagner Group announced on its Telegram channel that it would exit Mali, where it was first deployed in December 2021 to support counterterrorism operations and provide personal protection for the country's Russia-friendly junta. The same day, the Africa Corps — another Russian paramilitary organization that is closely backed by Russia's Ministry of Defense — announced that it would remain in the country. Thereafter, diplomatic sources quoted by Agence France-Presse said on June 8 that the Africa Corps had taken over the Wagner Group's remaining military units in Mali. Amid the reorganization of Russia's military presence in the country, Mali's council of ministers backed plans on June 11 to appoint junta leader Gen. Assimi Goita as president for a five-year term without holding a presidential election.

• In late April, a junta-controlled political conference supported plans to appoint Goita as president without organizing elections. This triggered the first significant anti-government demonstrations in the country since Goita rose to power in 2021, which prompted the junta to dissolve all political parties on May 13.
• According to Le Monde, the Africa Corps deployed around 1,000 personnel to Mali between December 2024 and March 2025, while the Wagner Group reportedly retained 1,500 military personnel as of March. This came as Russia pressed ahead with several significant deliveries of military equipment to Mali in the first half of 2025, including T-72 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. According to Malian security sources quoted in Le Monde, this equipment was destined for Russian security forces, rather than their Malian counterparts.

Wagner's exit from Mali comes as the Kremlin is seeking to tighten its grip on Russia's overseas military deployments and as Goita has likely grown suspicious of the group amid mounting intra-junta tensions. The Wagner Group first deployed to Mali in December 2021 as Bamako sought new security partners after France froze bilateral military cooperation following the May 2021 coup. Wagner's deployment enabled Mali's junta to consolidate power, which supported Russian efforts to undermine French influence in Africa while simultaneously giving the Kremlin a degree of plausible deniability. However, former Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin's June 2023 rebellion showcased the threat that the paramilitary group posed to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Ever since Prigozhin's death in a suspicious plane crash two months later, which has been widely blamed on the Kremlin, Moscow has sought to take over the Wagner Group's overseas deployments, which notably involved Russia's Ministry of Defense setting up the Africa Corps in late 2023. However, the Wagner Group's phasing out has proven gradual, as many of its fighters have opposed coming under the more direct supervision of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, many Malian security officials, including Minister of Defense Sadio Camara, proved reluctant to see Wagner's presence come to an end. However, Camara's reported fallout with Goita, driven by Goita's own centralization of power and increasingly unilateral decision-making, likely accelerated Wagner's exit from Mali. Given Camara's pivotal role in securing Wagner's deployment to Mali in 2021 and his close personal ties to Wagner commanders, Goita is believed to have grown wary of Wagner Group units, which likely played a role in his decision to accept Russian demands to integrate them into the Africa Corps. 

• While Russia established the Africa Corps as a distinct entity in late 2023, the opaque nature of Russia's paramilitary structures meant its distinction from the Wagner Group did not become clear until late 2024. 
• Mali's 2023 Constitution stipulates that Goita would have needed to step down from his position as transitional president four months before a tentative presidential election, during which President of the National Transition Council Malick Diaw, another key personality within the junta, would have acted as transitional president. However, the presidential election was indefinitely postponed in September 2023. Goita's push to be nominated as president without holding an election is allegedly motivated by his concerns that Diaw would leverage the position of transitional president — and Goita's need to step down — to seize power.

The Africa Corps' apparent takeover of Wagner Group units will avert a potentially significant downsizing of the junta's counterinsurgency capabilities and help Goita further centralize power by weakening rivals within the junta, even though the risk of a military coup will persist. The Africa Corps' takeover of remaining Wagner Group units in Mali will strengthen Goita's position vis-a-vis Camara and other rivals within the junta, which will facilitate his nomination as president without the organization of elections. While the Council of Ministers' endorsement of Goita's nomination as president suggests that Camara is currently seeking to avoid a direct confrontation with the junta leader, mistrust between the two means Goita may still remove Camara as defense minister after his full instatement as president, which would raise the risk of a military coup. However, Goita's consolidation of power and the Africa Corps' reported absorption of Wagner Group forces — whose loyalty to Goita himself was unclear — means Camara will be in a less favorable position to forcefully remove Goita than he was just a few months ago. Even so, a successful coup against Goita cannot be ruled out, as Camara remains influential among the Malian military's high command. Aside from helping Goita consolidate power, the Africa Corps' takeover of Wagner Group units suggests that it will now engage more frequently in forward deployments, a departure from its prior focus on military training and regime security. This shift appears all the more likely amid Russia's deployment of heavier weapons systems to the country as well as the deployment of Africa Corps personnel to northern Mali, where Wagner units were previously dispatched. Despite their own limitations and drawbacks, Russian forces' continued engagement in forward deployments will mitigate the risk of a severe downsizing of the junta's counterinsurgency capabilities that would likely have occurred if Russia had not replaced the Wagner Group.

• On June 13, Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, ambushed Malian security forces and Africa Corps paramilitaries south of the locality of Aguelok in northwestern Mali. The FLA claims to have killed dozens of Malian and Russian security forces, but fatality figures thus far have not been verified. 
• Mali's junta financed the Wagner Group's $10 million a month contract by leveraging tax revenue from mining companies operating in the country. While the Africa Corps may maintain a similar funding model in the short term, this funding arrangement could gradually shift toward Russian state-linked mining companies gaining a direct stake in Mali's extractive sector, especially gold mining. 

Despite sustained Russian military support, the Africa Corps' manpower constraints and JNIM's ongoing territorial expansion mean Mali's security environment will likely keep worsening over the coming year, which will support the jihadist group's efforts to build an anti-junta coalition and raise security threats in and around Bamako. Despite the Africa Corps' takeover of Wagner Group units in Mali, the total number of Russian forces in the country remains limited, with recent estimates suggesting that the figure is around 2,500 fighters. While Russia could deploy an additional few hundred Africa Corps personnel in the coming months, a major buildup in Russian forces currently appears unlikely without a sustained de-escalation in fighting in the Russia-Ukraine war. Given Mali's vast territory — which is nearly twice the size of Texas — Russia's manpower constraints will provide space for JNIM to continue to frequently conduct large-scale attacks on Malian security forces for the foreseeable future. These gaps will likely enable the group to strengthen its hold over rural areas in central Mali and expand its alliance network by building new ties with local elites and communities beyond its Tuareg and Fulani support base. As JNIM expands its outreach to groups beyond its traditional support base, Malian and Russian forces will grow more likely to target local communities previously spared the junta's aggressive counterinsurgency tactics, including mass killings, which would push more local leaders to cooperate with JNIM. This would fit with the group's efforts to build an anti-junta coalition, which also involves strengthening cooperation with the Tuareg separatists of the FLA. Likewise, Goita's consolidation of power and mounting crackdown on dissenting forces may lead some opposition groups to consider cooperation with JNIM, further facilitating JNIM's efforts to build an anti-junta coalition. JNIM's consolidation of control in central Mali and expanding support base will likely enable the group to increase its activity in southern Mali, raising the risk of attacks on the capital and other strategic sites, such as mining facilities. 

• JNIM and its predecessors mainly drew their support from Fulani and Tuareg communities, which have been marginalized for many decades amid historical mistrust dating back to pre-colonial times. Ethnic profiling has been especially pronounced against the Fulanis, who are frequently subject to mass extrajudicial killings.
• In late May, reports emerged that JNIM had expanded efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate Dozo militant fighters in the central regions of Mopti, San and Segou. This development showcases JNIM's efforts to expand alliances beyond its traditional Tuareg-Fulani support base, as Dozo militias in Mali are comprised of many ethnic Dogons, a group that has faced centuries-long rivalry with Fulanis rooted in competition over land and resources.