U.S. Greenlights Limited Ukrainian Strikes Inside Russia with Long-Range Missiles

(Photo by OLEKSANDR GIMANOV/AFP via Getty Images)

Debris lies in the courtyard of a damaged house following a missile attack at an undisclosed location in Ukraine's Odesa region on Nov. 17, 2024.

The U.S. decision to allow Ukrainian strikes with Western weapons deeper inside Russia could increase attrition among the Russian army and prompt Moscow to respond with escalation, but will not stop Russian advances or fundamentally change the trajectory of the war. On Nov. 17, U.S. Joe President Biden authorized the first use of U.S. long-range missiles by Ukraine for strikes inside Russia. The first strikes with Army Tactical Missile System (commonly known as ATACMS missiles), which have a range of 190 miles (305 kilometers), will reportedly be carried out on Russian and North Korean forces in the Kursk region in the coming days. The move comes after months of deliberations among Western governments on the topic and Kremlin efforts to forestall a final decision, but reports the same day suggested the governments of France and Great Britain could follow suit by allowing the Ukrainian military to use SCALP/Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles on Russian territory. In line with previous U.S. policy changes regarding Ukrainian usage of its weapons, the United States will probably not officially acknowledge the policy change until some time after the weapons have already been used inside Russian territory.

On Sept. 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, "If this decision (to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles within Russia) is made, it will mean nothing less than the direct participation of NATO countries, the United States and European countries, in the war in Ukraine," adding it would significantly change "the very nature of the conflict." He argued this was because the satellite targeting data and the actual programming of the missiles' flight paths would have to be done in cooperation with NATO military personnel.
On Sept. 25, Russia amended its nuclear doctrine, expanding the list of threats that could warrant a nuclear response by Russia in an effort to increase Western caution regarding allowing strikes inside Russia and their support for Ukraine.
In May 2024, Russia opened a new front in Ukraine's Kharkiv region. However, at the time, the Biden administration only allowed Ukraine to use HIMARS, which have a range of about 50 miles (80km), to defend the Kharkiv region against Russian forces directly across the border, declining to allow the Ukrainians to use the longer-range ATACMS.
The United States acknowledged providing Ukraine ATACMS only days after Ukrainian forces first used them in combat for the first time on Oct. 17, 2023 — almost five months after the start of Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive that commenced on June 4 of that year.

The strikes alone are unlikely to deter North Korea from deploying additional forces to aid Russia in countering Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Kursk region, which may lead to further Western policy adjustments in the coming months. Biden made his decision shortly after the announcement that thousands of North Korean troops were already on the ground supporting Russia's war efforts and weeks before Donald Trump's inauguration as the next U.S. president. Reports indicate the new policy change is confined to a short list of targets in Russia's Kursk region. The policy change will put at risk previously safe Russian logistics nodes, ammunition depots and supply lines, raising the attrition and cost of the war for Russia. A key objective of the policy change is likely to discourage North Korea from deploying additional troops to support Russia beyond the over 10,000 North Korean soldiers already engaged against Ukrainian forces. However, allowing Ukraine to strike Russian and North Korean troop concentrations and equipment in Russia's Kursk region will not alter the trajectory of the war due to Ukraine's manpower disadvantage and will likely only somewhat impede the over 50,000 Russian and North forces gathering for an offensive there, which is more than double the number of Ukraine's forces in the region. This is particularly the case as assessments by some G20 nations conclude that North Korea could rotate up to 100,000 troops to aid Russia's war on Ukraine in batches in the coming months, ensuring a likely constant contingent of 15,000-20,000 fresh soldiers in Kursk. However, the amount of U.S. ATACMS and French/British missiles available to Ukraine for the foreseeable future will likely be too small on their own to meaningfully constrain Russia. Therefore, Western governments would likely need to allow Ukraine to strike in other regions of Russia and provide more weapons of similar range, such as the 230-mile range JASSM air-launched missile, to significantly support Ukrainian forces' position in Russia's Kursk region or alter the trajectory of the war by constraining the Russian military's offensive capabilities in the months ahead.

Lockheed Martin, which manufactures the various variants of ATACMS missiles, has said production is already reaching its full rate of around 500 missiles per year, and there is currently no confirmation that this production rate will quickly grow further in the coming years. Stocks of Franco-British Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, for which the United States makes the key components, are also limited. However, Lockheed Martin plans to increase the production of JASSM missiles to 1,000 missiles annually, easing a speculated delivery of the system to Ukraine as soon as next month.
On Nov. 18, German defense minister Boris Pistorius said German Taurus missiles would not change the battlefield situation, though the new German government could provide the missiles anyway after the February 2025 elections.
On Nov. 16, the Washington Post reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin will seek to take back Russia's Kursk region before any serious peace talks, as he does not want Western powers and Ukraine to attempt to use Kursk to be used as a bargaining chip in potential future negotiations.

Russia is unlikely to respond with escalation that would risk direct Russia-NATO conflict because it is skeptical the strikes will occur in sufficient quantity to decisively undercut Russia's battlefield advantage, particularly as a Trump administration could cease long-range weapons supplies to Ukraine. A September assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies argued that Ukrainian ATACMS strikes inside Russia were unlikely to significantly alter the trajectory of the war but would come with escalatory risks, including through more arson and sabotage targeting Europe, including potentially lethal attacks on U.S. and European military bases. Because Moscow, like Washington, does not assess that a small number of long-range strikes inside the Kursk region will decisively undercut its battlefield advantage, its initial response is very unlikely to seriously threaten direct Russia-NATO conflict. Moscow will also step up its air campaign on Ukraine's critical infrastructure this winter, which commenced the same day by launching its second-largest combined airstrike on Ukraine ever on Nov. 17. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Moscow is likely to respond by supplying weapons to groups targeting Western interests in regions like the Middle East, such as increasing support for Yemen's Houthis via Iran, potentially providing them with anti-ship missiles. While a Trump administration is unlikely to openly cancel the permissions granted by the Biden administration, which would forfeit leverage likely needed to fulfill his campaign promise of ending the war, the administration will likely further limit the amount of ATACMS and other long-range munitions provided to Ukraine, arguing that U.S. stocks are too low and that they are precisely the kinds of munitions that the United States and Taiwan need to effectively deter China in the Indo-Pacific. A Trump administration could also remove the provision of JASSM and other long-range strike capabilities from the agenda if it concludes their provision would be an obstruction to talks to end the Russia-Ukraine war.

Several key associates of incoming President Donald Trump criticized Biden's decision, aligning with Trump's campaign narrative that supporting Ukraine risked triggering World War III and a misallocation of U.S. resources. President-elect Trump's eldest son and close confidant, Donald Trump Jr., tweeted that "The Military Industrial Complex seems to want to make sure they get World War 3 going before my father has a chance to create peace and save lives. Gotta lock in those $ Trillions. Imbeciles!"
On Nov. 17, Russia launched its second-largest airstrike on Ukraine of the entire war, using over 120 missiles and 90 drones (the largest attack was on Aug. 26, when they used 127 missiles and 109 drones). The attack targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including the substations serving the Rivne Nuclear power plant and several thermal power plants in the country. The most impactful damage was reportedly to the Mukachevo power substation near the Hungarian border, from which Ukraine receives a significant portion of its electricity imports from the European Union.
Since the summer of 2024, Russia has provided targeting data to members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, who were embedded with the Houthis in Yemen to help attack Western ships in the Red Sea with missiles and drones. Further Russian support measures for Iranian proxies, facilitated by Iran's IRGC, are likely in the future, including the possible provision of more advanced weaponry to the Houthis, such as anti-ship missiles.