As we have noted in various analyses, and in fact identified as one of the key factors that would shape the 2020s in our decadal forecast, global norms (including those specifically promoted by Western states that have shaped the post-World War II world order) are under severe strain. This process has been underway for many years, but two separate attacks in early April against diplomatic facilities have put the trend into stark relief. In the first case, Israel's bombing of an Iranian consular building in Damascus certainly flouted long-established customs about not attacking diplomatic outposts, even if legally Israel has claimed the building was a legitimate military target. In the second case, Ecuador's raid against the Mexican embassy in Quito seems to have been a clear violation of multiple treaties protecting diplomats.
While the two incidents generated extensive media attention, much of the coverage focused on the proverbial trees and missed the forest. In fact, the two attacks occurred against a much larger backdrop of myriad global norms under intense stress. As just three examples, look no further than the Russian invasion of Ukraine driving a tank-sized hole through the taboo against territorial conquest; China attempting to redefine human rights away from the civil and political rights of individuals in favor of cultural, economic and social rights of groups; or, led by the United States, many Western states' own turn away from free trade norms in favor of protectionist policies, ostensibly in the name of shoring up national security, fighting climate change and saving jobs. No matter the specific norm in question, the general process of norm testing, erosion and, at times, redefinition will only accelerate in the coming years as the international system becomes more multipolar. This will introduce more global uncertainty and volatility, severely challenging corporate decision-makers charged with planning for the future.
How Norms Are Made…and Broken
Global norms vary significantly in their longevity, scope and institutionalization, but at a basic level, they refer to generally shared expectations of how states and non-state actors should operate — both in terms of behaviors they should emulate and those they should avoid. Sometimes these norms stretch back hundreds of years, while other times they are more recent, still developing ideas. Sometimes they spring from formally codified agreements, whereas at others they simply develop due to informal understandings and repeated practice. Norms can also change over time: what was once seen as permissible can become frowned upon (or even illegal) — and vice versa. Taken together, norms are meant to bring order to the international system and enforce a generally shared code of conduct to minimize the risk of destabilizing unilateral actions.
By definition, norms are strongest when they either have near universal acceptance because all (or nearly all) major players in the international system agree on them, or when there is a single state or collection of states strong enough to enforce them on others. In the modern era, the post-World War II liberal, democratic and capitalist order promoted by Western states emerged seemingly victorious from the Cold War with the Soviet Union. This enabled the West, led by the United States, to strongly promote specific behaviors designed to enforce that vision on the rest of the globe for much of the 1990s and early 2000s. And, cognizant of some exceptions, when states grossly violated those norms (think of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990), the United States and its allies were generally sufficiently powerful and motivated to punish those actions.
This period, however, was an aberration. In fact, compared with most of history, the bipolarity of the Cold War, and especially the U.S.-led unipolarity that followed, are exceptions. Instead, most of history has been characterized by multipolarity in which there are different centers of power, none of which is powerful enough to assert its vision on the others. In a multipolar world, competition among rivals extends to norm-setting, as each tries to regulate others' behaviors. Since at least the 2010s, and becoming increasingly apparent in the 2020s, the world is once again moving back toward this multipolar state of play. Within this, there are multiple centers of influence, led not only by large global powers like the United States and China (and more recently, Russia), but also an increasingly assertive cast of middle powers like India, Japan and Turkey that shape events beyond their regions, as well as a growing list of rising smaller powers that play large and middle powers off each other for their own benefit. Powerful non-state actors like private companies with outsized global influence (think of major tech firms or large oil and gas companies) or major activist groups (such as major civil society organizations or more diffuse transnational movements promoting environmentalism or human rights) further complicate the struggle to agree upon and enforce international norms.
Given the diversity of interests in a multipolar world, it is no surprise that the many challengers to the U.S.-led Western order are seeking to weaken, reshape or fully remove certain norms. China is the most active in this respect, directly promoting alternative norms that go against the traditional Western liberal, democratic capitalist model — a message that resonates in many developing countries that feel the Western system has not sufficiently benefited them and in some cases has been designed to deliberately hold them back. For much of the so-called Global South, the West's assertions that there are supposedly universal values and ''right'' ways to do things ring at best hollow and at worst vaguely imperialist — giving China plenty of space to promote alternative norms that, for instance, do not prioritize the sanctity of personal freedoms or free enterprise.
While China is the strongest challenger, it is far from alone. Russia has now transitioned its foreign policy to be largely defined in opposition to everything Western. Its invasion of Ukraine is of course the most glaring example. But more broadly, Russia's widening cooperation with China, Iran, North Korea and other states that chafe at the Western-led order illustrate the incipient makings of at least a loose anti-Western movement. Even if these countries have many contradictions among them and seeming limits on the scale of their cooperation, their shared desire to reduce the West's dominance and instead shape new norms of global behavior attests to the challenge confronting the West.
This challenge is magnified by the fact that many middle and smaller powers like Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates all have many areas in which they diverge from the West — for example, regarding environmental, governance or human rights norms — even as Western states see them as key economic and/or security partners. And even within the West, the two major poles — the United States and Europe — do not always see eye to eye. Consider the transatlantic split in norms around data privacy, for instance. This and many other points of divergence will only accelerate significantly should former U.S. President Donald Trump retake the White House.
Finally, Western states themselves are hardly blameless in the erosion of some of the norms they have historically championed. Consider free trade. This was once a bedrock principle of the post-World War II Western order in which the United States, Europe and their partners shaped norms to promote open economic interactions. Today, however, what was once a consensus is now under deep strain — and, in many places, in retreat — as lawmakers in Washington, Brussels and other Western capitals react to domestic political pressures to recast norms around global trade and resort to a growing number of protectionist policies. And when the prior champions of a norm begin to weaken their own adherence to it, it provides easy cover for challengers to do the same.
The Struggle To Make New Norms Normal
If previously established norms are already being seriously challenged, the battle to shape future norms is only just beginning. In a multipolar world where there is no clear unipolar state or alliance of them, competition to establish and enforce new norms will be one of the defining features of geopolitical competition in the coming years. Already, it is easy to identify multiple norms that will be hotly contested, including behaviors in cyberspace, the development and deployment of artificial intelligence, the use of autonomous weapons, ideas for climate engineering, and space exploration.
Although shared interests in certain areas may enable at least some degree of cooperation among the most influential global players, the more likely scenario is one where different powers try to shape norms around these and other subjects in varied ways. This is all the more likely given that the international system appears to be headed toward an even more multipolar world, meaning a wider variety of smaller and middle powers (and non-state actors) able to exert influence and resist the domination of a hegemonic power like the United States or China. While in some cases non-Western powers will seek to establish wholly different norms, in other cases they may simply pursue a negativist approach in opposing whatever is Western. This will likely result in multiple competing — and frequently shifting — spheres of influence and less global agreement regarding crucial norms. Instead, existing norms will likely become more frequently eroded and new norms will likely only emerge at a regional, rather than global, level. While this will offer some opportunities for cooperation among likeminded partners (particularly in regions where there is a state powerful enough to enforce norms in its sphere of interest), fragmentation will make it even harder to generate collective action around transnational challenges, and will also make conflict more likely as rival powers disagree about fundamental norms of behavior.
For corporate decision-makers tasked with planning ahead, this is a sobering forecast because it makes their jobs much more difficult. After all, a world in which the behavior of states and non-state actors is less predictable will be much harder for companies to navigate. Even when there is some certainty over expected norms in one area of the world, this will likely clash with those elsewhere — for instance, a divergence between a U.S.-led bloc and a China-led bloc. This means companies will need to be agile in adapting their operations to fit accordingly. But as is increasingly the case in a multipolar world, it is becoming harder for companies to stay proverbially neutral and adhere to competing rules, as they are being forced to choose a side (or at least prioritize operations in one over another). This multipolar world will therefore bring more nationalism into the C-suites of multinational firms, fundamentally reshaping the process of globalization seen in recent decades.
