While Ethiopia is unlikely to launch a large-scale invasion of Eritrea in 2026, worsening tensions over sea access and Asmara's ties to groups opposed to the Ethiopian government increase the likelihood of intensifying proxy clashes along the border that could quickly escalate into a larger military confrontation. On Oct. 28, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called for international mediation regarding Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea, stressing that maritime access was a "matter of survival" for Ethiopia. This came after Abiy claimed in early September that it was only a "matter of time" before Ethiopia regained access to the Eritrean port of Assab, arguing that the loss of the port following Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 had been a "mistake." These comments came as Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister Gedion Timothewos accused Eritrea and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, or TPLF, in early October of entering a pact to "wage war against Ethiopia" and claimed that both were "funding, mobilizing and directing" Ethiopian rebel groups such as Fano, a loose coalition of Amhara ethno-nationalist militias. Meanwhile, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki conducted a five-day trip to Egypt — Ethiopia's arch-rival — in late October following Abiy's call for international mediation, while open source intelligence indicates that several heavy-lift aircraft capable of carrying disassembled drones and radar systems have landed in Eritrea from Iran in recent weeks. Against this backdrop, Gedion said on Nov. 14 that Ethiopia had "ample ground" to exercise its right to self-defense against Eritrea, pointing for the first time at Eritrea's occupation of Ethiopian territory in northern Tigray and stressing that Addis Ababa's military restraint was "not indefinite nor unconditional."

• Satellite imagery shows that one IL-76 heavy-lift aircraft likely linked to Iran was present in the Eritrean city of Massawa on Nov. 1, while flight tracker data indicates another IL-76 flew from Tehran to Massawa on Nov. 10. The aircraft may have been delivering advanced weapon systems to Asmara, potentially including drones, but it appears more likely that the heavy-lift aircraft was transporting military equipment for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which both Iran and Eritrea support in its fight against Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. However, Eritrea's willingness to act as a logistics hub for Iranian support to the SAF could be accompanied by some form of Iranian military support for Asmara.

Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions have resurged since the end of the Tigray war in late 2022, driven by Abiy's decision to sign a peace deal with the TPLF that excluded Asmara, and have been exacerbated by Abiy's push to secure direct maritime access and Eritrea's ties to anti-Abiy groups in northern Ethiopia. Relations between Isaias and Ethiopia's then-ruling TPLF swiftly deteriorated following Eritrea's independence, resulting in the two countries fighting a war between 1998 and 2000. While bilateral ties remained strained for nearly two decades, the TPLF's ouster from Addis Ababa in 2018 was followed by Abiy striking a historic peace agreement with Asmara the same year. The partnership between Abiy and Isaias continued through the Tigray war, during which Eritrea deployed thousands of troops against the TPLF in Tigray. However, Abiy's decision to strike a peace deal with the TPLF in November 2022 that kept the Tigrayan party intact without including Isaias in the negotiations initiated a downturn in bilateral ties, as Asmara sought to definitively eliminate the TPLF. Tensions were further fueled by Abiy's fresh push for Ethiopia to secure direct maritime access, which prompted Eritrea to tilt closer to Egypt. Meanwhile, rising tensions within the TPLF between a faction amenable to Abiy — which led Tigray's regional government in the aftermath of the Tigray war — and the party's old guard ultimately saw the latter forcefully seize control of Tigray's regional government in March 2025 after having expelled the Abiy-friendly faction's leadership from the party in late 2024. While Abiy averted a new military escalation by striking a compromise with the TPLF on Tigray's regional leadership, he also facilitated the emergence of anti-TPLF Tigrayan armed groups, with clashes between the two sides escalating in early November. Amid worsening ties with Abiy, some factions within the TPLF now appear to be tilting closer to Eritrea, even though the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear. Separately, Addis Ababa has enabled Eritrean Afar armed groups such as the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization, or RSADO — which has long opposed Isaias' government — to train within Ethiopia. But while Abiy appears to be supporting the rise of proxies of his own, the Ethiopian government has also faced fresh setbacks against Fano in the Amhara region in recent months, with Fano militants making significant gains around the town of Weldiya.

• The TPLF and Isaias were allies in the late 1980s, during which both led insurgencies against Ethiopia's then-ruling communist Derg regime, and the TPLF-led coalition that defeated the Derg agreed to grant Eritrea independence following a 1993 referendum. While Ethiopia initially retained access to the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa, Asmara steadily increased hauling fees during the 1990s, eroding trust between the two countries and prompting Ethiopian traders to favour Djibouti. Meanwhile, territorial disputes along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border prompted the outbreak of border clashes in 1998, with the ensuing war resulting in between 70,000 and 100,000 fatalities according to most estimates, although others point to larger death toll figures. 
• In March, former members of the Tigray Defense Forces opposed to the TPLF's old guard and its forceful seizure of Tigray's regional government formed the Tigray Peace Force, the main anti-TPLF Tigrayan armed group. The group reportedly has several thousand fighters under its command and is based in the neighbouring Afar region near the Tigrayan border, from where it has coordinated anti-TPLF operations within Tigray. In early November, it reportedly conducted attacks against pro-TPLF forces, prompting the latter to allegedly occupy six villages in the Afar region in response. Thereafter, the TPLF accused the Ethiopian government of launching drone strikes against its position, which — if true — would mark a first since the end of the Tigray war in late 2022. 
• Despite its historical animosity with Eritrea, the TPLF enabled the reopening of the Tigray-Eritrea border in June. Meanwhile, Asmara has reportedly authorized Tigrayan regional authorities to import goods from Massawa, which has enabled Tigray's regional government to soften the blow of Addis Ababa's curtailment of food and fuel supplies to Tigray. However, evidence of TPLF-Eritrea military cooperation has yet to emerge. 

Abiy is unlikely to launch a large-scale offensive to seize Assab prior to Ethiopia's 2026 general election due to domestic security and economic challenges, but he may still tacitly endorse attacks in Eritrean territory by the RSADO and associated groups, which could trigger border skirmishes. Abiy will likely maintain a strong rhetoric on the matter of Ethiopia's access to Assab ahead of the country's June 2026 general election, as it enables him to tap into nationalistic sentiment and distract from domestic political tensions. However, Ethiopia's domestic security and economic challenges suggest that Abiy is unlikely to initiate a large-scale invasion of the Assab region prior to the upcoming general election. Ethiopian security forces are already stretched thin due to ongoing insurgencies by Fano militias in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia. Moreover, rising political tensions risk further pressuring Ethiopian security forces in the run-up to the general election, which is unlikely to be free and fair. Election-linked security threats will be especially the case in Tigray, where the TPLF is unlikely to be allowed to participate in the general election. If confirmed, the TPLF would likely refuse to recognize the election outcome, which could trigger a fresh military escalation in Tigray. Separately, Ethiopia's launch of a fully-fledged invasion of southern Eritrea would expose the country to U.S. and European sanctions and likely freeze its support program from the International Monetary Fund, threatening to worsen the Ethiopian birr's depreciation and steeply exacerbate macroeconomic challenges. However, these constraints would ease in the latter part of the year and in 2027 if Abiy secures a relatively smooth reelection, reaches peace deals with more Fano factions and averts a new military escalation with the TPLF surrounding the general election. Meanwhile, Abiy may still tacitly endorse attacks by the RSADO and other Eritrean Afar militant groups into southern Eritrea prior to polling day. Such operations could be aimed at pressuring Isaias into negotiations over maritime access and/or creating a fresh outbreak in tensions with Eritrea to rally domestic support or distract the Ethiopian public from internal challenges. However, such operations would carry a significant risk of resulting in border skirmishes between the two countries, as Eritrean security forces could pursue Eritrean Afar rebels back into Ethiopian territory.

• Since losing access to Eritrean ports, Ethiopia has largely reached international markets via Djibouti, through which 95% of its trade is transited. However, this has imposed severe financial costs on Addis Ababa, which faces annual port fees of over $1.5 billion from Djibouti. 
• Shortly following the outbreak of the Tigray war, the Ethiopian government designated the TPLF as a terrorist organization and revoked its legal status as a political party. In August 2024, Ethiopia's election board reregistered the TPLF as a political party, but did so under ''specific circumstances'' that required the party to hold a general assembly within six months and notify the board 21 days in advance. However, the TPLF refused to comply with these conditions, arguing that the Pretoria Agreement — which ended the Tigray war — reinstated its prewar legal status. As a result, the TPLF's legal status was eventually revoked again in May.

Eritrea's concern about a potential Ethiopian invasion of Assab will likely lead it to increase support for anti-Abiy groups within the country, which could intensify the proxy conflict between Asmara and Addis Ababa and create additional escalation pathways for border skirmishes. Although a full-scale Ethiopian invasion of Eritrea's Assab region is unlikely in 2026, it cannot be fully ruled out. The risk of an invasion, either in 2026 or after, will likely prompt Eritrea to attempt to heighten Ethiopia's domestic security challenges to keep the country internally unstable and distract Abiy from Assab. This campaign will likely involve expanding financial and weapon smuggling to Fano militias, considering similar plans with the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia, as well as fuelling anti-Abiy misinformation campaigns within Ethiopia ahead of the general election. Meanwhile, Eritrea will also likely seek to expand cooperation with the TPLF in order to encourage the party to take a more confrontational stance against Abiy. However, TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael will be constrained in expanding military cooperation with Asamara, given entrenched anti-Eritrean sentiment among the Tigrayan public and the Tigray Defense Forces in the aftermath of the Tigray war. Nonetheless, Asmara's economic cooperation with the TPLF will continue to blunt Addis Ababa's curbs on food and fuel supply to Tigray, thereby enabling the TPLF to maintain a strongly critical stance against Abiy. This deadlock will increase the risk of more clashes between the TPLF and anti-TPLF groups ahead of Ethiopia's next general election. While Abiy will likely tolerate limited skirmishes between the two, an intensification of clashes or their spillover into Ethiopia's Afar region could compel him to intervene militarily to quell the fighting and increase the monitoring of the Tigray/Ethiopia border, which would heighten the risk of border skirmishes given Eritrean troops' presence in northern Tigray.

• Except for the 2018-22 period, Eritrea's security doctrine largely centered on undermining Ethiopia's domestic stability, driven by concerns that a strong and economically ascendant Ethiopia would pose a threat to Eritrean sovereignty due to its significantly larger population. This saw Asmara build ties with many Ethiopian opposition groups, which it has sought to leverage as proxies. 
• Ethiopia holds a diverse fleet of attack and surveillance drones, including China's CH-4 and Wing-Loong, Iran's Mohajer-6, Turkey's TB2 and Akinci, and Israel's Bluebird Aero Systems WanderB. The Ethiopian government has also supported domestic drone production through the launch of the state-owned SkyWin Aeronautics Industry in March and AeroAbay in September — with the latter focusing on the production of loitering munitions. According to Ethiopia's Information Network Security Administration, cooperation between SkyWin and AeroAbay has enabled the assembly of 300 drones in August-October, although these drones were reportedly primarily for commercial and entertainment purposes. Ethiopia's domestic drone production currently primarily consists of assembling Chinese-imported drone components, but the Ethiopian government plans to gradually increase the use of local content. 
• Ethiopia would likely seek to leverage the RSADO and other anti-Eritrean government rebels as part of an invasion of Assab, as the latter could focus on disrupting Eritrea's supply lines to Assab. Together with potential Ethiopian drone attacks along the corridor, this would help minimize manpower requirements for an Ethiopian takeover of Assab. 

Although a conventional conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that lasts more than a few months appears unlikely in 2026, the growing potential for intensifying proxy clashes and associated border skirmishes creates a high risk of miscalculation that could quickly escalate into a severe military confrontation and increase the likelihood of a full-scale war. Third parties are already engaging in backchannel diplomacy to de-escalate rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But while this mitigates the risk of a full-blown escalation, a comprehensive resolution appears unlikely in the coming months, given the numerous disagreements between the two sides. Meanwhile, Egypt and Iran's de facto backing of Eritrea will likely embolden Asmara to take more assertive action against Ethiopia. Although Abiy faces major constraints in launching an invasion of southern Eritrea, domestic political imperatives will put significant pressure on his government to retaliate kinetically against perceived Eritrean violations of Ethiopia's sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. Moreover, worsening domestic tensions in Ethiopia in the run-up and/or aftermath of the 2026 general elections could prompt Abiy to externalize the crisis by heightening anti-Eritrea rhetoric and increasing troop deployments near the border, in the hopes of generating a "rally around the flag" effect that unites Ethiopians behind his government. These dynamics create a high risk of miscalculation from either side, with the potential for localized clashes to rapidly escalate into fighting across much of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. While mediation efforts by the United States and other regional actors would stand a good chance of averting a protracted conflict, a severe military escalation would nonetheless raise the risk of Ethiopia and Eritrea entering a high-intensity war. The likelihood of such an escalation would also increase if the TPLF refuses to recognize the outcome of Ethiopia's 2026 election, as certain TPLF factions may decide to directly cooperate with the Eritrean military in the face of a perceivably inevitable conflict with Abiy's government. Such a course of events would increase the likelihood of the Ethiopian government launching a fresh military intervention in Tigray to reassert federal control, which, in turn, would threaten to ignite a direct conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

• On Nov. 25, Abiy met with Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, General Dagvin R. M. Anderson, before holding a phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Dec. 3. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has also mediated contacts between the United States and Eritrea, and Isaias met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Dec. 10. 
• The United States' potential decision to recognize Somaliland's statehood, which the Trump administration is considering, could ease Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions over maritime access by making Ethiopia more likely to revive its Berbera port deal with Somaliland. However, this very action would also risk prompting Eritrea to escalate its efforts to undermine Ethiopia's internal stability due to concerns over the geostrategic gains Addis Ababa would enjoy from implementing the proposed port deal with Somaliland.