While a ceasefire in Ukraine appears increasingly likely, Russia will likely delay a deal to secure limitations on Western military support and peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, and an end to Kyiv's NATO aspirations. On March 13, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he agreed with the U.S. proposal for a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine, but only as part of a broader deal that would lead to long-term peace by removing the ''root causes'' of the war. Most notably, Putin suggested that Ukrainian forces would have to withdraw from Russia's Kursk region, and appeared to demand that Ukraine not conduct additional mobilization measures, train soldiers or continue to receive Western weapons supplies during the 30-day pause in fighting. Putin also vaguely expressed a need to clarify who would control and monitor the ceasefire. On March 14, Trump said that his special envoy Steve Witkoff had ''very good and productive'' discussions with Putin in Moscow the previous day, and called on Putin to spare the lives of Ukrainian soldiers in Kursk amid accelerating Russian advances in the border region. Trump and Putin are expected to hold a phone call in the coming days, which could see Trump deploy a combination of concessions and threats to pressure his Russian counterpart into accepting a ceasefire.

In this context, there are three main scenarios for how developments on a ceasefire could evolve in the coming days and weeks:

Scenario #1 (Most Likely): Russia suggests it is open to an interim ceasefire but attaches additional conditions, significantly delaying its implementation.

Instead of firmly accepting or rejecting a 30-day interim ceasefire, Russia is most likely to suggest that it is willing to agree to a temporary truce so long as additional conditions are met. In doing so, Moscow will broadly seek to show Washington that Russia's high negotiating leverage means that it will dictate the terms and timeline for an interim ceasefire in Ukraine. The goal of this strategy would be to avoid triggering U.S. sanctions while also allowing Russian troops to continue making territorial gains and degrading the Ukrainian army to increase Moscow's leverage in ceasefire talks. In this scenario, Moscow would claim that because a ceasefire is in Kyiv's interest, Washington will need to sweeten the deal for Russia. Specifically, Putin's counterproposal would likely focus on the need for the United States to demonstrate how it would ensure Ukraine's neutral status and block European military forces from entering Ukraine, along with more tactical demands, such as a freeze on U.S. military aid during the ceasefire. The United States would, in turn, have to choose which of these Russian demands it is prepared to meet and how quickly — or, alternatively, what incentives (e.g., preemptive sanctions relief) or deterrents (e.g., greater sanctions pressure) it is willing to deploy to engender greater Russian cooperation. The United States has already said that it does not support Ukraine's NATO accession and stated that Ukraine will lose some territory. While the issue of European troops in Ukraine will remain contentious, there is room for a compromise if Russia manages to severely water down plans for such a deployment. Fearing that the White House may change its position on these issues, the Kremlin would eventually agree to a ceasefire. 

Scenario #2 (Less Likely): Russia quickly accepts a ceasefire deal with minimal stipulations, but then uses the 30-day period to make more demands that risk collapsing the peace process. 

In this scenario, rather than delaying and seeking greater concessions before a ceasefire, Russia would instead implement the 30-day ceasefire relatively quickly and with relatively few preemptive concessions from the United States, but then make additional demands ahead of the deal's expiration. Moscow would insist on its maximalist negotiating demands, including new measures to prevent Ukraine's NATO membership, limit and weaken the size of Ukraine's armed forces, and measures to water down the presence of foreign peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. Russia would frame its rapid agreement to the 30-day ceasefire as a major concession that the West could lose, claiming that a failure to accept Moscow's conditions on a potential peacekeeping force in Ukraine or other key Russian demands would give grounds for Russia to withdraw from the ceasefire. Not wanting to see a ceasefire unravel, the United States would resume pressure on Ukraine to capitulate to most of Russia's demands, including, most likely, serious limitations on Ukraine's army (to undermine its ability to defend itself) and a permanent end to Kyiv's NATO aspirations, along with quick elections and a new Ukrainian government. Moscow's calculation would be that because the United States has much greater leverage over Ukraine than Russia, it will be much easier for Washington to primarily pressure Ukraine should talks stall (i.e., by threatening more aid cut-offs); U.S. pressure on Russia, by contrast, would likely be limited to largely symbolic new sanctions that would not quickly undermine Russia's negotiating position. Kyiv could increasingly claim that it will not accept the result of U.S.-Russia negotiations, likely causing the war to continue. 

Scenario #3 (Unlikely): Russia rejects an interim ceasefire. 

Under this scenario, Russia would maintain maximalist demands in negotiations with the United States, preventing an agreement on an interim ceasefire. Moscow would then blame the failed ceasefire on Ukrainian and European intransigence, and claim that U.S.-Russia negotiations can take place without a cessation in hostilities. Moscow would say it can only consider an interim ceasefire once more concrete progress is achieved toward a new European security architecture, and that this progress must also be enshrined in preliminary documents and statements ratified by the United States and other involved parties showing acceptance of Russian demands. This scenario would risk drawing the strongest retaliation from the United States in the form of new sanctions on Russia, and even discussions of new U.S. military support to Ukraine. But Russia would remain undeterred, believing such measures would not significantly harm its economy or battlefield advantage in the near to medium term, and that the United States would eventually come back to Moscow with concessions to revive negotiations.