The Ukrainian army's likely withdrawal from Russia's Kursk region would have a limited impact on Ukraine's defense but it could increase Russia's willingness to negotiate a ceasefire while intensifying U.S. pressure on Ukraine to make concessions, including on elections. On March 12, Russian forces advanced into the center of Sudzha, the largest town captured by Ukrainian troops during their incursion into Russia's Kursk region in August 2024, as Ukrainian forces withdrew with minimal losses. Later that day, President Vladimir Putin visited Kursk to receive a report from General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov regarding Russia's efforts in the region, at which Putin ordered Gerasimov to expel the remaining Ukrainian forces as soon as possible in order to prevent their presence in the region from being a bargaining chip in negotiations. He also asked Gerasimov to consider creating buffer zones across the border in Ukraine's Sumy region. Russia's biggest breakthroughs occurred on March 9, when Russian forces captured the towns of Malaya Lokhnya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Kositsa in the northern zone of Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Krusk region. The attacks north of Sudzha came after a major Russian breakthrough south of Sudzha around Kurilovka on March 7, which risked splitting the Ukrainian contingent in Kursk into two groups and potentially encircling Ukrainian forces. Ukraine's control of territory inside Russia has fallen by over 50% since Russian attacks intensified in late February, from well over 425 square kilometers (164 square miles) in late February to less than 150 square kilometers (58 square miles) as of March 13. The deterioration of the Ukrainian army's position in Kursk became clear on Feb. 28, when Russian forces entered Ukraine's Sumy region for the first time since the incursion, increasing threats to the flanks and supply lines of Ukraine's force in Kursk and causing a Ukrainian withdrawal from the area to appear increasingly imminent. 

• Ukraine's foothold had steadily withered in recent months. As of March 13, it had lost nearly 90% of the territory it once held in Kursk. By November 2024, its army had lost over 40% of the maximal territory it captured in August and over 60% of that territory by the end of January. 
• Ukraine is likely losing ground in the sector for several reasons. The main reason is that it is likely outnumbered by Russian forces in the sector, having already significantly reduced its troop count from its peak in September of around 20,000 soldiers. Recent estimates now place the number at around 10,000 — much smaller than the estimated 60,000 Russian and North Korean troops tasked with containing them, which even increased from around 50,000 late last year. Additional factors include Russia's continued advantage in artillery usage and its increasing use of fiber-optic controlled drones that Ukrainian electronic warfare equipment cannot jam. 
• Russia's recent advances have been bolstered by the deployment of an estimated 10,000-15,000 North Korean troops, the first of whom arrived in the region in October 2024. After being rotated off the frontline for much of January and being replaced with fresh soldiers from the DPRK, North Korean forces have been participating in the renewed assaults on Ukrainian positions since late February. 

Intensified Russian attacks in Kursk could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw in the coming days, while the partial achievement of the incursion's original objectives raises questions about its current military value. Russian gains have increased speculation that Ukrainian forces could be pushed out of the region in the coming days, which could make Russia more interested in the March 11 U.S. and Ukrainian proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, which, if accepted immediately without the full expulsion of Ukraine forces, would give Ukraine the ability to fortify its remaining position inside Kursk. Russian gains have also rekindled questions both within Ukraine and among its Western backers regarding the expedience of Kyiv's decision to conduct the incursion in the first place. Ukraine's incursion into Kursk, a territory of little strategic significance, had several purposes. Firstly, the incursion's primary purpose was to draw Russian forces away from other key sections of the front where the Russians had achieved breakthroughs earlier in the year and were advancing, particularly in the southern Donbas region toward Pokrovsk. The Kursk incursion's success in this regard was limited, as Russia was able to increase its rate of advance in Eastern Ukraine last fall. Additionally, it was intended to prevent Russia from opening a new front in Ukraine's Sumy region, as Russia had done recently in Ukraine's Kharkiv region, or to at least ensure that most combat would take place inside Russia rather than in Ukraine if such an incursion was inevitable. However, this goal was also of limited success, as Russian forces entered Sumy on Feb. 28 and could, per President Putin's latest comments, threaten to grow their foothold. Russia's accelerated rate of advance in the area and Ukraine's concentration into a small area mean it will likely be forced to withdraw its forces to preserve them. The military effects of such a withdrawal would be relatively minor, as both sides would still have to keep larger numbers of forces along the Sumy-Kursk border but could free insignificant amounts of forces to redistribute to other areas along the frontline. A withdrawal would not indicate a decline in Ukraine's ability to resist Russian advances, as defending from within its own territory would be logistically easier and strategically more compelling.

However, Kyiv could seek to hold a small portion of the region due to continued perceptions of its potential value in negotiation and to avoid the negative political impacts of a withdrawal. Since U.S. President Donald Trump's election in November 2024, the incursion's justifications have shifted to become more politically oriented, namely to strengthen Kyiv's hand in negotiations with Russia and avoid the political implications of a withdrawal. Kyiv likely seeks to maintain at least some presence in Kursk, if possible at low losses to men and equipment, in order to exchange the territory for Russian withdrawals from Ukraine's Kharkiv region, which Russia has not yet annexed (unlike the other regions in which combat is taking place). Ukraine could seek to hold an area roughly the size of Russia's northern Kharkiv front and exchange the territories as part of a ceasefire and confidence-building measures. In this context, the timeline for the final Ukrainian withdrawal from Kursk depends on how many forces it commits to its toehold, how large of an area it seeks to hold, and how quickly its presence can be used in negotiations and whether it is worth the cost. Kyiv is unlikely to commit to maintaining the incursion in the coming months should it become clear that its presence in Kursk is not changing Russia's negotiating position — as Moscow is more likely to instead suggest Ukrainian troops' presence in Kursk is a reason why it cannot accept a ceasefire along current battle lines because that would allow Ukraine to formalize its occupation of the region, which is unacceptable to Moscow. Therefore, a withdrawal from Kursk would raise questions from domestic and international audiences alike about the merit of Kyiv's decision to have conducted the incursion in the first place, which could hurt Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's approval rating and constitute a blow to front-line morale. However, these effects would be significantly mitigated by the fact that most influential political and military figures in Ukraine still believe that the incursion had to be attempted, including in order to test its political effects on Russia, and would support a withdrawal from Kursk to preserve the lives of Ukrainian forces that could be put to better use defending Ukraine's own remaining territory, rather than Russian territory that it would have to withdraw from before or after ceasefire. 

• On March 10, Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Oleksandr Syrsky stated in a social media post that as a result of Russian advances in Kursk, the Ukrainian army would take steps to ''strengthen [the Kursk contingent] with the necessary forces and means, in particular, electronic warfare and an unmanned component.'' The comment suggests that Ukraine could seek to delay its final withdrawal from the region.
• As recently as Feb. 5, Zelensky said that the incursion could be an ''important part'' of the negotiation process with Russia and has, on several occasions, suggested that Ukraine's presence in Russia could be a bargaining chip that would allow Ukraine to enter negotiations from a stronger position. 

Withdrawing from Kursk would be a blow to Ukraine's negotiating strategy with the United States and Russia, potentially prompting both countries to intensify their push for Kyiv to make concessions, including regarding elections soon after a ceasefire and Zelensky's potential removal, in order to convince Moscow to accept a longer-term truce. The loss of its presence in Kursk would weaken Ukraine's position in ceasefire negotiations and could pressure it to accept more Russian terms. The Trump administration would likely portray a Ukrainian withdrawal from Kursk as further evidence of Ukraine's military exhaustion and inability to hold ground. This narrative could be used to justify why Ukraine should accept a ceasefire deal brokered between Moscow and Washington before its negotiating position worsens. However, despite the withdrawal, Ukraine's ability to defend the rest of its territory in the coming months would remain largely intact. Moscow will be eager to expel Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region in the coming days to heighten domestic and international pressure on Zelensky, and will likely only accept a ceasefire once Ukraine has been ejected from Kursk. Pushing Ukrainian forces completely out of Kursk before a potential ceasefire deal would mean the ceasefire would not allow Ukrainian forces to fortify their presence in the region and use its hold there as a bargaining chip for territorial exchanges in ceasefire and peace talks. 

• Believing the loss of Kursk further undermines Zelensky's domestic position, Moscow would likely double down on its demands for elections in Ukraine and Zelensky's removal as part of a longer-term ceasefire deal in hopes that this would politically destabilize Ukraine and thereby create more favorable conditions for future aggression.