To Keep Its Hold on Moldova, Russia Gambles on a Gas Cut-Off

(TOMAS BENEDIKOVIC/AFP via Getty Images)

This picture taken on Sept. 2, 2014, shows equipment from the border release and compressor station of the gas pipeline from Ukraine in Veke Kapusany, eastern Slovakia.

Russia's decision to stop supplying gas to Moldova is meant to weaken its pro-European government. But should this plan backfire by failing to secure a victory for pro-Russian forces in Moldova's parliamentary elections, it risks undermining Russian influence in the country in the long run. On Jan. 1, Ukraine's gas transit agreement with Russia expired without replacement after negotiations on an alternative arrangement involving Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company SOCAR failed to make progress. That same day, Russian gas supplies to Moldova ended as Russia's Gazprom declined to supply the country with gas using an alternative southern route via the TurkStream pipeline, citing the outstanding debts Moldova owed to the Russian company. Both Moldova's government and the pro-Russian authorities in the country's breakaway Transdniestria region had long prepared for the possible end of Russian gas deliveries, with both having declared states of emergency in their energy sectors in December. As of Jan. 3, the situation in Transdniestria and the rest of Moldova was stable, though thousands of buildings lacked gas and hot water after various gas and electricity rationing measures were implemented in both jurisdictions. Much larger power outages have so far been avoided, primarily because the normally gas-fired Cuciurgan power station in Transdniestria, the largest in Moldova, has continued to operate, but at a lower capacity. The station previously generated up to 80% of Moldova's electricity using Gazprom gas supplied via Ukraine. But on Jan. 1, the Cuciurgan plant stopped supplying power to the rest of Moldova after switching to using coal and fuel oil to generate electricity, which Transdniestrian authorities said the plant can keep doing for around 50 more days before its reserves are depleted. Meanwhile, the Moldovan government said electricity rationing measures had cut energy consumption in the country by at least a third, and that it planned to meet 38% of the country's reduced demand needs via domestic energy production, with electricity imports from neighboring Romania and Ukraine supplying the remaining 62%.

Russian gas reaches Moldova through Transdniestria, where the country's largest Soviet-era gas-operated power plant is also located. Gazprom supplied 5.7 million cubic meters of gas to Moldova over the past two years, most of which entered the country via transit routes through Ukraine and Transdniestria.
Transdniestria had preemptively ended gas supplies to the rest of Moldova on Dec. 29 in anticipation of the end of transit through Ukraine, and then ceased electricity supplies starting Jan. 1. Amid the energy crisis, Transdniestrian authorities announced on Jan. 2 that all industrial enterprises, except those engaged in food production, will shut down for the foreseeable future, undermining the region's already fragile and Russia-dependent economy.
In 2021 and 2022, Moldova experienced temporary reductions and halts in Gazprom supplies due to contract disputes over outstanding debts, which prompted Chisinau to seek alternative suppliers and steadily reduce its dependence on Russian gas supplies.
Gazprom claims Moldova owes it $709 million, while a Moldovan government audit in 2023 placed outstanding debts for which it was responsible at a mere $8.6 million, claiming the separatist authorities in Transdniestria are responsible for any outstanding payment beyond that amount.

Russia is likely hoping the gas cut-off will boost pro-Russian forces' prospects in Moldova's upcoming parliamentary elections by fueling discontent against the country's current pro-European government, though Moscow's decision may fail to have the desired effect. Despite engaging in supply disruptions in recent years, Russia had previously avoided fully halting gas supplies to Moldova for fear of the collateral destabilization it would cause in Transdniestria. The end of Ukraine's gas transit agreement merely offered an excuse to end gas deliveries to Moldova; Gazprom could deliver via other routes, but in negotiations, it had conditioned this on Moldova first settling its alleged outstanding debt. The move to end supplies at this time thus appears to be aimed at undercutting support for Moldova's pro-European government ahead of the country's parliamentary election, which is set to be held in mid-2025. Encouraged by the relatively strong showing of pro-Russian forces in the country's October presidential election and referendum on EU membership, Russia likely believes it can help pro-Russian candidates unseat pro-European incumbents by inducing a destabilizing energy crisis in the lead-up to the vote. Indeed, the energy shortages this winter and the subsequent high prices could eventually trigger a humanitarian crisis if people are left without heat in frigid temperatures, along with a migration crisis if deteriorating living conditions force people to flee in Transdniestria and Moldova. Russia likely calculates such widespread destabilization will help it use its disinformation and propaganda apparatus to influence the election, specifically by fueling disenchantment with Moldovan President Maia Sandu and other pro-European political forces. Moscow likely also concluded that it should use its ''energy weapon'' against Moldova while it was still effective, given the Moldovan government's steady efforts to diversify away from Russian gas. However, this strategy is risky, as the economic and humanitarian fallout from the gas cut-off may instead turn more Moldovans or Transdnestrians against Russia amid the belief Moscow is not interested in their well-being and is merely using them as pawns to achieve its political ends, which could translate to support for pro-EU candidates in this year's parliamentary election. It could also backfire by cementing views among pro-European forces on the need to permanently end Moldova's reliance on Russian gas, despite its commercial competitiveness.

Going forward, Moldova may import more natural gas from non-Russian suppliers through Romania's Ungheni-Chisinau pipeline, from Bulgaria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline, from Central European countries through multiple interconnectors, or from terminals in Greece, Poland or Lithuania. However, non-Russian supplies will be more expensive for Moldova, which is the poorest country in Europe by nominal GDP per capita.
The Moldovan government may accept to resume negotiations with Gazprom in order to allow continued Russian gas supplies via southern Europe, meaning a compromise on the outstanding debt and resumed Russian supplies cannot be entirely ruled out. However, Moldova will continue its diversification efforts regardless, to ensure that even if the country ever resumes buying Russian gas, it will not be as vulnerable to another potential shutoff in the future.

Ukraine, Romania and the European Union will likely implement various support measures to help Moldova's government weather the energy crisis and, in turn, reduce the risk of a pro-Russian parliament being elected later this year. Ukraine is also grappling with electricity shortages due to Russia's winter bombing campaign on civilian and energy infrastructure. But despite facing its own widespread daily blackouts, the war-torn country began exporting electricity to Moldova on Jan. 2, specifically at night when Ukraine has small amounts of excess supply relative to demand. This move has proven controversial among Ukrainians, given the humanitarian hardships they are already experiencing at the hands of Russia's invasion. But Kyiv calculates that supporting Sandu's pro-European government in neighboring Moldova is worth the cost if it helps prevent pro-Russian forces from assuming power in neighboring Moldova, which could complicate Ukraine's defensive war efforts. Under similar logic, the European Union and Romania — two of the current Moldovan government's greatest backers — will likely provide more financial support to Chisinau or temporarily subsidize energy deliveries in the coming weeks, in order to ease the humanitarian fallout from Russia's gas shutoff in Moldova this winter. Like Kyiv, Brussels and Bucharest will see the economic and political cost of such efforts as being justified if it reduces the risk of having to deal with a pro-Russian parliament in Moldova, which would likely seek to effectively halt the country's EU integration, just as pro-Russian forces in Georgia have done.