The Close Results of Moldova's Referendum Raise Fears of a Pro-Russian Government

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An illustration of Russian and Moldovan flags.

The close results of Moldova's constitutional referendum on EU membership raise the risk of a pro-Russian government taking office in 2025 that would end Moldova's European integration and potentially complicate neighboring Ukraine's resistance to Russia's ongoing invasion. On Oct. 20, Moldova held the first round of its presidential election and a concurrent referendum on adding the country's aspirations to join the European Union to its constitution. Pro-European President Maia Sandu won the presidential ballot after receiving 42% of the vote, with second place going to pro-Russian challenger Alexandr Stoianoglo, who received 26%. But Sandu's failure to secure at least 50% in the first round means she will compete against Stoianoglo in a runoff vote on Nov. 3. Meanwhile, the constitutional referendum just barely passed, with only 50.4% voting in favor of securing Moldova's course toward EU membership and 49.6% voting against it. The razor-thin margin of victory — and particularly the fact that the election commission's official tally showed ''No'' votes in the lead throughout the day on Oct. 20 and not flipping until over 97.5% of the ballots had been counted — led pro-Russian propaganda outlets to claim the Moldovan government rigged the vote to secure the referendum's passage.

Turnout in the presidential election was 51.68%, around 10% higher than the turnout of the first round of the 2020 presidential election, while turnout for the referendum was slightly lower due to a campaign to boycott the referendum. Turnout is typically higher in the second round of presidential elections in Moldova, where higher turnout also often favors pro-European candidates.
Opinion polls had suggested the referendum would pass by a somewhat more comfortable margin. Sandu and officials from her ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) attributed the weaker-than-expected result to ''unprecedented'' Russian ''hybrid'' interference, as well as credible accusations of vote buying. But low turnout was likely the biggest spoiler, as at least five of the 11 presidential candidates called on their supporters to only participate in the presidential race and boycott the referendum on EU membership — including, most notably, Renato Usatii, who came in third place in the presidential election after receiving nearly 14% of the vote. Usatii is a soft Eurosceptic who sought to appeal to both pro-Russian voters and disenchanted pro-European voters; Moldovans who voted for Usatii in the first round of the presidential election will likely split between Sandu and Stoianoglo in the runoff.
The effective mobilization of pro-Russian political forces in Moldova's breakaway region of Transdniestria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia likely also factored into the referendum's close result. In Gagauzia, nearly 95% of voters cast ''No'' ballots, while over 63% did so in Transdniestria (although Transdniestrian authorities had likely hoped for an even stronger rejection of the referendum on EU membership). The referendum also underperformed in rural areas, including Moldova's western districts of Ungheni, Falesti and Cahul districts, which border EU member Romania.

The referendum's poor performance reflects the continued strength of pro-Russian political forces in Moldova and raises the stakes of the Nov. 3 presidential runoff. The referendum's passage merely means aspirational clauses about Moldova's EU membership course will be added to the country's constitution. This will likely prove relatively inconsequential because, at the end of the day, Moldova's accession to the bloc is almost entirely in the European Union's hands (indeed, similar clauses in Ukraine and Georgia's constitutions have had little impact on either country's EU integration). Still, the referendum's close result speaks to Moldova's polarization ahead of the Nov. 3 presidential runoff and beyond. Sandu's opponents will portray the result as an embarrassingly close call for the president, who initially proposed the referendum as a way to boost turnout among pro-European voters in the concurrent presidential election. To boost turnout in her favor in the runoff, Sandu will seek to use the referendum's extremely narrow victory to demonstrate the imminent danger of a revanche by pro-Russian political forces. But the outcome will nonetheless demoralize pro-European voters, who may begin to see Sandu and her ruling party as in decline. Sandu's rivals and pro-Russia propaganda, meanwhile, will present the close result as a sign that EU financial support and prospects of membership are failing to motivate Moldovans to support pro-European political forces. This will embolden the pro-Russian movement against EU integration, who have seen their support decline in national and regional elections since 2020, potentially boosting their turnout on Nov. 3. While the presidential runoff is likely to be close, Sandu is still favored to win because she and the other pro-European presidential candidates who ran in the first round of the election together won over 50% of the vote, thereby positioning Sandu for a victory if roughly the same electorate participates in the second round. However, much will likely depend on turnout — particularly among the diaspora voters casting ballots from outside Moldova, who overwhelmingly favor Sandu.

Around 190,000 Moldovans voted in the Oct. 20 presidential election from polling stations abroad, with Sandu receiving more than 73% of the vote from this group. Renato Usatii received nearly 14% from this group, with firmly pro-Russian candidates only receiving around 10% — demonstrating the importance of high turnout from the Moldovan diaspora for Sandu.

The referendum's close result also highlights the risk of pro-Russian forces returning to power following Moldova's 2025 parliamentary election. The strong showing by pro-Russian voters in the Oct. 20 votes suggests next year's more impactful parliamentary election could see pro-Russian forces assume political power in Moldova, which would at a minimum pause — and potentially reverse — the country's EU course. A victory by Alexandr Stoianoglo in the Nov. 3 presidential runoff, while unlikely, would accentuate this concern by opening the door to pro-Russian forces taking complete control of the Moldovan government (i.e. both the presidency and the parliament) for the first time since 2019. But even in the more likely case that Sandu wins reelection, the number of ''No'' votes cast in the referendum on EU membership shows pro-Russian forces could still retake control of parliament in 2025 — a situation that would risk early elections and likely see Sandu and the legislature clash over appointing a prime minister.

Mass protests by the pro-Russian camp claiming the presidential election was stolen are likely following the Nov. 3 presidential runoff, particularly if the result is as close as expected. Still, these protests are unlikely to be large enough to threaten the government, as pro-Russian forces turn their focus to the 2025 parliamentary vote, when they are likely to increase their political power.

The low-likelihood, high-impact possibility of the return of a pro-Russian government in Moldova would pose significant dangers to Ukraine as well. If the Moldovan government is deeply divided or becomes more aligned with Russia, Ukraine may be forced to re-devote crucial resources to securing its border with the country. For Ukraine, the rise of pro-Russian forces in neighboring Moldova would not pose the same level of threat as Russian influence in neighboring Belarus, which has a much larger economy and hosts far more Russian troops than Moldova. However, fears of growing Russian influence in Moldova could still push Kyiv to consider a military operation to disarm Transdniestria in the hopes of preventing Russia from using the breakaway region to destabilize Ukraine. Additionally, a more pro-Russia government could seek to reverse Moldova's current cooperation in facilitating the flow of people, goods and military supplies between the European Union and Ukraine, though Chisinau's willingness to do so would be somewhat constrained by Moldova's economic reliance on trade with both Ukraine and EU countries.