Iran's once-vaunted ''Axis of Resistance'' has been decimated since Hamas' Oct. 7 attack on Israel — something that is certainly going to lead Tehran to recalibrate its national security strategy. Israel's Sept. 27 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah capped off a ten-day period in which Israel's military and intelligence apparatus killed virtually the entire leadership of Iran's most important regional ally, as well as destroyed much of its internal communications structure. While Iran responded with a 180-strong ballistic missile barrage on Israel on Oct. 1, the attack caused little damage and also demonstrated Iran's limited ability to harm Israel with its ballistic missile arsenal. The barrage was likely partially designed to reassure Hezbollah that Iran has its back, though much of the damage to Iran's Axis of Resistance has already been done and trust between Tehran and Hezbollah is reportedly low. And Israel's increasingly aggressive strategy against Iran and its proxies has compromised their ability to retaliate against Israel if Israel attacks Iran, as it is almost certain to do in response to Iran's Oct. 1 attack. Israel's Oct. 1 incursion into southern Lebanon, meanwhile, is only likely to further weaken Hezbollah. This period follows the nearly one-year-long Israeli military campaign against Hamas in Gaza that has also left that Iran-backed Palestinian group severely weakened, with many of its leaders killed or likely to be on Israel's hit list.
And now, as Israel considers its own retaliatory options against Iran, it may feel that it has an even freer hand to carry out a significant attack against Iran's oil industry, nuclear facilities and military as Hezbollah — the crown jewel of the Axis of Resistance — is in no position to respond.
Iran's Proxy Strategy
While many in the United States view Iran as an evil irrational actor, Iran's Axis of Resistance is rooted in sheer national security pragmatism. Tehran is deeply concerned about foreign powers, like the United States, meddling in Iran's internal affairs and its territorial integrity being severely compromised. In modern history, outside powers have constantly intervened in Iran's affairs, including the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty that partitioned then-Persia, the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran that forced Reza Shah to abdicate the Peacock Throne, and the U.S.- and U.K.-backed 1953 coup against then-Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh — leaving the Islamic Republic of Iran constantly concerned about foreign powers meddling on its soil. Regardless of what U.S. administrations say, the United States' policy on Iran from Tehran's perspective is and has been for many years regime change. For Tehran, this concern was crystalized during the mid-2000s when the United States launched two military invasions in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq that toppled their governments all while then-U.S. President George W. Bush included Iran alongside Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North Korea in his famous ''Axis of Evil.'' It is therefore a strategic imperative for Iran to minimize the U.S. presence and influence within the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and the Levant, which is Iran's strategic underbelly given that a strong anti-Iranian power in Iraq could quickly seize Iran's vital oil resources in southwestern Iran, just as Saddam Hussein quickly did in the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. From this perspective, Iran views Israel — the United States' closest ally in the Middle East — as the tip of the U.S. sword in the region. For Iran, the fact that it can ideologically exploit hatred of Israel to benefit the regime is only an added benefit.
Iran's Axis of Resistance strategy is a central component of its strategy to counter Israel and the United States. Iran's conventional military capabilities pale in comparison to those of its neighbors and the United States, as many of Iran's military aircraft and armored vehicles date back to the Shah's rule prior to the 1979 revolution. Iran has sought to offset these conventional military shortcomings through an asymmetric strategy that is both a deterrence and defend-forward strategy. The key pillars of this approach include, but are not limited to, Iran's Axis of Resistance strategy, its nuclear hedging strategy, and its medium-range missile and drone program. The logic of building the Axis of Resistance strategy within Iran's broader asymmetric strategy is three-fold. First, it provides Iran strategic depth in the Middle East that can allow Tehran to influence regional decision-making in countries like Lebanon and Iraq. Second, by surrounding Israel with well-armed proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel is more likely to be bogged down in dealing with its immediate neighbors rather than being capable of threatening Iran more significantly. Today, Iran likely hopes Israel's incursion into Lebanon will lead to just this. Finally, arming these regional groups gives Iran a non-nuclear, asymmetric way to deter Israel and the United States from invading Iran or carrying out significant military or covert action against Iran because Tehran's proxies could retaliate by launching hundreds of drones, rockets and missiles. Today, Iran's Axis of Resistance spans many different groups across the Middle East, including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the Houthi movement in Yemen and numerous Iraqi Shiite militias and Kurdish groups.
Israel Calls Iran's Bluff
The last year, however, has shaken the foundation of the Axis of Resistance and its ability to achieve the goals Iran has sought to achieve with its proxy network. Israel has repeatedly taken action that Iran had hoped that its Axis of Resistance would deter and, with the assassination of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, Israel is only becoming more emboldened. Although Israel has certainly not completely defeated Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel has clearly routed them and does not appear to be as concerned about potential Hezbollah (and Iranian) retaliation for large-scale strikes against its leadership, weapons and communications system. In the case of Hezbollah, which is the most significant of Iran's proxies, it remains unclear just how much last week's assassination of Nasrallah and other Hezbollah members, as well as Israel's Sept. 17-18 pager attack that destroyed hundreds of communications devices used by the group, has impacted Hezbollah's internal decision-making structure. Israel has also targeted high-ranking officials from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including an April airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus where two top IRGC generals were meeting, which prompted Iran to retaliate by launching drones and missiles against Israel.
Iran likely perceives Israel's aggressive action against the Axis of Resistance over the last year as provocations going well beyond the previously established norms of the two countries' shadow war. But despite this, Iran and its proxies' retaliation has so far been more bluster than destruction, particularly as Iran has been hesitant to support its proxies by getting directly involved with significant boots on the ground or a sustained missile and drone campaign on Israel. Essentially, Iran's Axis of Resistance is weakened and Israel appears to be learning that Iran will not go to war to defend it, even as Iran carried out its Oct. 1 missile attack on Israel.
Abandoning Friends
IRGC Quds Force general Qassem Soleimani, the architect of Iran's Axis of Resistance strategy who was killed by a U.S. strike in 2020, once allegedly quipped to an Iraqi militia leader that ''We're not like the Americans. We don't abandon our friends.'' However, Iran appears to be doing just that amid its apparent unwillingness to sufficiently defend its key proxies, namely Hezbollah, against Israeli aggression.
Iran's Oct. 1 missile attack on Israel appears designed in part to show Hezbollah rank-and-file soldiers that Iran supports them. But Iran still appears to have little appetite for waging a full-blown war with the United States, as it gave ample warning to the United States and Arab countries that the attack was going to occur, rather than trying to keep it a secret to maximize the potential for damage. In recent months and years, Iran has repeatedly tried to limit its retaliation against U.S. and Israeli actions in an attempt to avoid a broader conflict. In 2020, for example, after the United States killed Soleimani, Iran carried out an airstrike targeting a base in Iraq housing U.S. forces and largely closed the case afterward (though Iran has also been accused of carrying out shoddy assassination plots against the U.S. officials involved in the assassination). More recently, following Israel's April 1 attack on an Iranian consulate in Damascus, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles against Israel. But while clearly aimed at causing some damage to Israel, most of Iran's heavily telegraphed response came from slow-moving drones, many of which it likely knew Jordan, the United States and Israel would be able to shoot down. This week's attack, while not involving drones, was also telegraphed in advance.
Subbing In Other Militants
To compensate for the damage wrought by Israel over the past year, Iran will likely need to rely more on support from Axis of Resistance groups that have not suffered the same losses as Hamas and Hezbollah. This will probably see Iran focus on boosting support to Shiite militias in Iraq, where several impending developments could bolster Tehran's efforts to effectively make the country a client state. On Sept. 27, the United States and Iraq announced they had reached a deal for the former to draw down its troop presence in Iraq over the next year as the U.S.-led coalition operations against Islamic State wrap up. Global news coverage of the announcement was unsurprisingly overshadowed by Israel's assassination attempt on Nasrallah that same day. But the agreement is nonetheless notable, as a smaller U.S. footprint in Iraq will likely enable Iran to have a more influential role in the country's next election, which is due by October 2025, and the subsequent coalition-building process between Shiite factions. Additionally, the eventual death of 94-year-old Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani — Iraq's top Shiite cleric who has contrasted Iran's Islamic governance model in favor of separation of church and state — could also give space for the Islamic Republic's brand of Shia ideology to take more root in the country as well.
In Yemen, Iran will also likely seek to deepen its ties with Houthi militants, who have proven to be a vital component of Iran's Axis of Resistance strategy by being able to launch disruptive attacks on Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea, similar to the maritime attacks Iran has long threatened to conduct in the Strait of Hormuz. In yet another development overshadowed by Israel-Hezbollah escalation last week, it was reported that Iran is helping broker an agreement with Russia to send the Houthis advanced anti-ship missiles that are far more capable than those Tehran has been supplying to the Yemeni group.
But these relationships have their own liabilities and constraints. Neither the Houthis nor Iraqi militias are based in countries that share a border with Israel. While both have launched occasional missiles and drones against Israel, the long-range they must travel makes drones and cruise missiles easier to intercept. And unlike Hamas and Hezbollah, Iraqi and Houthi militants also lack the capability to launch hundreds of short-range rockets on a daily basis in an effort to overwhelm Israel's air defense system. Moreover, in Iraq, Iran's growing influence after Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003 has, like the U.S. presence, sparked resurgent Iraqi nationalism among figures like Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who wants both U.S. and Iranian presence to diminish. Thus, the impending drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq also risks driving Iraqis to focus their complaints on Iran's influence. In Yemen, Iran's ideological links to the Houthis, which are primarily Zaidi Shiites (unlike most Iranian and Iraqi Shiites) are weaker, though the Houthis have increasingly adopted some of Iran's ideological tenets as it relates to Israel. Nevertheless, as these Iraqi and Yemeni groups pose a lower threat to Israel than Hezbollah (and Hamas), it would not be surprising if Israel attempted to also kill the leaders of the Iraqi and Yemeni groups by launching drones and missiles at them in the coming weeks, such as Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. However, a decapitation strategy against these groups, which are even more decentralized than Hezbollah, may even be less effective.
Replacing Proxy Deterrence With Nuclear Deterrence?
As it tries to replicate the deterrence benefits of its now weakened Axis of Resistance strategy. Iran will likely harden its position on its nuclear program as well. The death of Nasrallah and the weakened state of Hezbollah has compromised Iran's non-nuclear deterrence strategy. But while this is alone unlikely to prompt Iran to shift its calculation on developing nuclear weapons, it will lead to more calls within the Iranian political system to rekindle more research that could be utilized to develop them in the future. This is because, in addition to being a deterrent to significant military action against Iran, the possession of nuclear weapons would represent an existential threat to Israel, which Iran may assess would make the Israelis more risk-averse when targeting Iran in the future.
Against this backdrop, more aggressive Israeli action targeting Iran (such as frequent direct strikes on Iranian soil, or a return by the United States to an explicit regime change-style maximum pressure campaign) could incentivize Tehran to develop a nuclear warhead, which Israel would try to prevent by any means necessary — portending more Israeli strikes that would only reinforce Iran's desire to create such weapons. For now, however, Iran may still pursue nuclear talks with the West and at least feign that it is open to negotiation. But Israel's impending response to Iran's recent missile attack could change this calculus if Israel takes the opportunity to strike key Iranian nuclear sites, like the Natanz enrichment center, or a key part of Iran's oil and gas sector — two options Israel is reportedly considering. If Israel's retaliation is more narrow and Iran still pursues nuclear talks with the West, those negotiations would probably stall, as Tehran is unlikely to agree to concessions that would significantly compromise its ability to quickly restart its nuclear program.
Turning To Russia and China
With it no longer able to achieve deterrence through its proxies alone, Iran will also increasingly lean on its deepening ties with Russia and China. In recent years, Iran has supplied Russia with drones and ballistic missiles for Russia to use in Ukraine. And in exchange, Iran is hoping to receive advanced Russian fighter jets and air defense systems, which would modernize Iran's conventional military powers and help Iran defend itself from Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. In yet another major news item last week that went under the radar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was a ''closed issue.'' Given that North Korea has provided Russia with weapons for its war in Ukraine, Lavrov's statement suggests Russia is now willing to accept nuclear proliferation along its borders if it helps Moscow secure the support it needs to maintain its Ukraine invasion. This means that if Iran continues to support Russia's efforts to fight Ukrainian troops and counter NATO, Moscow may also be willing to support Iran's nuclear program at the U.N. Security Council. However, deeper ties with Russia and China also create strategic dilemmas for Iran and its national security strategy. While Russia can offer a counterweight to the United States, throughout most of Iran's modern history over the last two centuries, Moscow — not Washington — has been the one meddling in Iranian affairs. For centuries, Russian and Persian empires have fought over influence in the Caucasus region that lies between them. While Iran and Russia are currently working together, their cooperation can be at best described as a marriage of convenience, not a true strategic partnership. Indeed, Russia's historical interventions in Iran helped spark public backlash in 2016 when Russia used an Iranian air base to carry out military strikes in Syria over the fact that Iran was letting a foreign power on its soil. More recently, Russia has thrown its support behind the proposed Zangezur Corridor between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which would cut through Armenia at the border with Iran, which Iran's foreign minister recently warned was ''totally unacceptable'' as it would effectively redraw Iran's border with Armenia.
Iran-China ties have also deepened in recent years. In 2021, the two countries commemorated their 25-year partnership, which Iran hopes will eventually mature into a defense relationship that grants it access to more Chinese military hardware in addition to Russian hardware. But China otherwise offers little for Iran's national security strategy due to Beijing's apparent unwillingness to significantly violate U.S. sanctions on Iran. China is also unlikely to ever come to Iran's military aid in the event of a conflict with the United States, Israel or any other party. At best, China is a customer for Iran's oil. Cozying up to Russia and China also risks making Iran overly dependent on non-Western powers — a key argument made by Iranian leaders like former President Hassan Rouhani and new President Masoud Pezeshkian, who both support signing a nuclear deal with the West in an effort to ensure that Russia and China's influence in Iran do not increase to the point where they can interfere with Iran's sovereignty and shape its behavior.
Ultimately, exactly how the weakened Axis of Resistance reshapes Iran's national security strategy remains to be seen. But there is no obvious best way forward for Tehran, whose alternatives for deterrence against Israel and the United States — namely, relying more on nuclear threats, other proxies or other global powers — all come with their own unique set of drawbacks.
