The Chinese government's annual work report indicates it will resist major economic stimulus and focus on risk mitigation in all areas of governance in 2024, while obscuring information flows about an increasingly insular China. On March 5, Chinese Premier Li Qiang read out the 2024 Government Work Report at the opening of the annual meeting of China's National People's Congress (NPC). The report highlighted the government's accomplishments in 2023, as well as its policy priorities and goals for 2024. Key themes in this year's work report were ''high-quality development,'' political unity around the personage and ideas of President Xi Jinping, and bolstering food and resource security amid a ''complex external environment.'' It stressed that stability was ''of overall importance, as it is the basis for everything we do,'' and highlighted the importance of China's technological self-reliance and boosting public awareness of national security risks. China also released its draft budget for 2024. 

• The NPC's meeting is one of two major political events currently taking place in China. The other is the meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an industry and society policy consultation body. These two events are collectively known as the annual Two Sessions legislative meetings. The rest of the Two Sessions period, through March 11, includes speeches by President Xi, discussions on forthcoming laws and policies, of China's Rapid Dismissal of Two Top MinistersWhat to Make of China's Rapid Dismissal of Two Top Ministers, and press conferences with various ministers on their policy areas.

Regarding economic issues, the report was heavy on risk mitigation, detailing Beijing's aversion to stimulus, as well as its emphasis on debt derisking and other policies that may improve China's long-term economic health but could also push foreign businesses to diversify their supply chains away from China. The report insisted on the importance of ''high-quality development,'' a byline of Xi Jinping's about the need to pursue painful economic reforms — like the curbs on real estate debt and wasteful local government spending — despite China's growth slowdown and concomitant low foreign business and investor sentiment. Moreover, economic stimulus measures outlined in the report were modest and quantifiably very similar to 2023. The report gave much lip service to Beijing's commitment to economic reform and opening, as well as improving the business environment and attracting foreign investors, but details on new initiatives and budget commitments toward these ends were scant. Meanwhile, some top-line economic goals (like the target urban unemployment rate) seemed unambitious and readily achievable in 2024, while others (like consumer price growth) were optimistic given current trends. But the goals nonetheless indicated Beijing's priorities, like boosting household consumption and securing sustainable economic growth (i.e. not debt-heavy growth from real estate expansion). Overall, the policy guidance in the report suggested that President Xi's heavy influence on economic policy will continue, especially his focus on stability over rapid growth, with Premier Li Qiang focused on implementation unlike his predecessor Li Keqiang, who attempted to balance the influence of top political leaders with technocratic realism and an eye toward foreign business concerns. As such, Beijing's policy agenda for 2024 will perpetuate the slow erosion of foreign business confidence in China — given Beijing's continual prioritization of internal political and economic goals over the concerns of foreign businesses — and drive corporate efforts at supply chain diversification and regulatory risk reduction in the Chinese market. In the long term, however, should Xi's push for stable, healthy growth succeed, it could improve China's economic outlook.

• Government support measures included 1 trillion RMB ($138 billion) in sovereign bonds for ''national strategies'' (likely infrastructure spending); this is a repeat of the 1 trillion RMB in bonds Beijing issued for that purpose in late 2023. It also detailed tax and fee cuts for manufacturing and for science and technology work, and a commitment to meet the ''justified financing demands'' for healthy real estate sector growth. In addition, the measures included $3.9 trillion RMB ($542 billion) in special purpose bond allocations to local governments, which are typically used for infrastructure — a small increase from last year's 3.8 trillion RMB ($528 billion).
• Topline economic goals included GDP growth of ''around 5%'' (Beijing's official numbers show growth in 2023 was 5.2%), an urban unemployment rate of 5.5% (5.2% in 2023), and a rise in the consumer price index (CPI) of ''around 3%'' (0.2% in 2023).

The report also prioritized risk mitigation on foreign and domestic policy areas beyond economics, which will impede China's efforts in 2024 to improve trade relations with Europe and the United States and further obscure critical information flows for understanding Beijing's actions and goals. On non-economic matters, ranging from energy to military and politics, the report also focused on risk mitigation. Throughout, it referenced the importance of resource security in the face of external geopolitical challenges, including quotas for raising food yields, boosting energy security with a coal-power backstop to renewables, and expanding strategic mineral exploration. While it only briefly discussed national security, the report indicated that China's priority clearly remained on expanding state capacity to curb all manner of security risks, partly via the enlistment of civil society. On Taiwan, the report emphasized both confrontation and cooperation, suggesting Beijing's policy of military coercion toward Taipei (e.g. via air incursions and occasional military drills around Taiwan) will continue, even as China engages with Taiwan's legislative opposition on economic matters, stoking regional security concerns and the expansion of military capabilities among U.S. partners in the Asia-Pacific region. On politics, the report's rhetoric was also resolute: strengthen the central leadership role of President Xi and expand education on Xi's policies and nationalistic theories at the civilian, military and government levels. Relatedly, the report urged the strengthening of grassroots (civilian) political networks and state guidance of private industry and investment. Together, these resource, security and political indicators suggest China will remain focused on national security concerns in 2024, which will continue to come at the expense of diplomatic efforts to settle economic disputes (e.g. with Europe and the United States). To that end, China will keep building out its regulatory toolset to combat perceived Western efforts to contain China's growth and undermine its authoritarian political model. Meanwhile, civil, human rights and political opposition groups in China (emaciated as they are) will continue to deteriorate as Xi sidelines or attacks all direct and indirect threats to his authority and policy preferences (including even Xi's allies, like Premier Li Qiang), further obscuring access to and fidelity of information flows for foreign persons, businesses and governments trying to understand China. 

• The report enjoined a ''holistic approach to national security,'' a shift toward a ''prevention-based model'' of public security governance, ''raising public awareness concerning national defense,'' and strengthening ''mutual support between civilian sectors and the military and between the military and the people'' at all levels of government. The state budget showed national defense spending in 2024 would rise 7.2% year-on-year to 1.67 trillion RMB ($232 billion), the same growth rate as 2023.
• Regarding Taiwan, the report urged ''resolution opposition'' to Taiwan's independence and external (foreign) interference, while pushing for peaceful development of cross-strait relations and ''firm advancement'' of China's renunciation.
• On March 3, CPPCC spokesperson Lou Qinjian revealed that Premier Li Qiang would not conduct a press conference on the last day of this year's Two Sessions nor for any Two Sessions through 2027. This press conference has been held annually since 1993 and is a rare opportunity for the public to ask high-level (though strongly vetted) questions about China's economic development.