China's accelerating anti-corruption investigations will in the short term improve President Xi Jinping's ability to carry out policies like real estate reform, but in the long term they could stoke a power crisis that spurs Xi to double down on national security and further isolates China's economy from the world. Investigations by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into corruption and disciplinary violations by senior officials — those at the deputy ministerial level or above, or those with high rank in key sectors — hit a record high of 45 cases (not counting military cases) in 2023, surpassing the 32 in 2022 and the previous record of 38 in 2014, according to recent calculations by the South China Morning Post. Moreover, 27 of those 45 cases were against retired officials, who prior to President Xi Jinping's leadership had largely been insulated from political persecution by the CCP. Anti-corruption and party discipline investigations are carried out by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), but at the senior level, they require signoff of President Xi, who has used CCDI probes as his primary tool for taking out political rivals, aligning high-level policy implementation with his goals, and genuinely cracking down on (usually extreme) cases of corruption since he came to office in 2012. Almost all the corruption probes into senior officials have resulted in their removal from office, removal from the Party itself, and/or jail time, and, in rare cases, execution. High-level cases even took down China's former Foreign Minister Qin Gang and former Defense Minister Li Shangfu in 2023.

• Since President Xi took office in late 2012, a total of 294 senior officials and 2.3 million officials have been targeted with investigations by the CCDI. Under Xi's leadership, the CCDI has investigated more managers of state-owned and private firms every year than Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao (in office 2002-2012) did in any year of his presidency. 
• Corruption is endemic in China, where rule by a unitary political party breeds abuse of power. Pervasive bribery also provides a natural lubricant for the wheels of bureaucracy in a government with limited resources that is tasked with ruling over 1.4 billion people spread over a vast geography.
• Xi's anti-corruption efforts have also targeted the Chinese military, particularly in the last six months, with many generals, as well as former Rocket Force and Air Force commanders, being taken down. These cases are tied up in not only corruption, political rivalry and policy alignment, but also concerns about military readiness and coup-proofing the CCP, and have far-reaching national security implications beyond the remit of this piece.

Xi's anti-corruption campaign is unlikely to end in the next decade, and it will improve government alignment with his national security policies and economic risk management. The CCDI is Xi's primary tool for targeting rivals and bolstering policy alignment, and thus his anti-corruption campaign will persist for the duration of his leadership, which is not set to end until at least 2027 (although more likely it will last until 2032 or beyond, assuming the now 70-year-old president's health holds strong). Given the entrenched drivers for corruption in China and the political nature of many CCDI probes, this campaign is unlikely to significantly curtail corruption, except for in the most visible and severe cases. Moreover, Xi's purges will likely target more and higher-level officials, as evidenced by his willingness to oust cabinet ministers, retired officials and even top military brass in recent years — categories of leaders who were largely protected from anti-corruption probes under previous presidents. These takedowns of more elites will bolster policy conformity along Xi's preferences, particularly his emphases on deflating debt bubbles (e.g. in real estate) through painful economic reforms; using ''lawfare'' (e.g. the Counter-Espionage Law and export licensing regimes) to counter perceived national security threats and Western trade restrictions; increasing state oversight over all data flows in China; and increasing the power of the Party over the state bureaucracy (and thus increasing the political nature of regulation).

• Xi's ruling legitimacy is based on his stewardship of the Party itself, with the CCDI serving as a means to maintain the CCP's administrative efficacy and the political and ideological loyalty of senior cadres to Xi. This is unlike China's last three presidents, whose legitimacy was based on their role in China's 1940s civil war or on the imprimatur of one of China's founding fathers, like Deng Xiaoping. 
• Chinese presidents have had unusually long lives compared to their fellow countrymen, thanks to their access to the state's best medical care. The founder and first leader of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, lived until 82 years of age; his successor Deng Xiaoping lived to 92, followed by Jiang Zemin (who lived to 96) and Hu Jintao (who is still living at 81).
• At the CCDI annual plenum on Jan. 8, 2024, Xi pledged to deepen the crackdown on corruption and increase punishments for bribery, noting that regarding ''the anti-corruption struggle…the situation remains grim and complex'' and that ''the struggle is a tough one and a protracted one.''
• The July 2023 ousting of Foreign Minister Qin Gang involved a CCDI probe into misconduct, and it did not result in one of Qin's deputies stepping in to fill the role. Instead, Wang Yi — a long-time ally of President Xi and current head of foreign affairs for the CCP — became the new foreign minister.

This central policy alignment, however, will reduce local officials' ability to cater policies toward immediate economic and social needs at the local level and aggravate China's relations with the West. Xi's focus on central policy conformity will come at the cost of flexible and tailored policymaking at the city and provincial level, and could thus exacerbate existing issues of high labor unrest and rising youth unemployment, which have impeded China's post-COVID consumption recovery. It will also exacerbate China's deteriorating trade and diplomatic relations with the West, as Xi's brand of indignant nationalism goes unchecked by more dovish Party elites, whose views are increasingly silenced due in no small part to pressures from anti-corruption authorities.

• Consumption in China has failed to recover from the city lockdowns and travel restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Consumer sentiment indices stagnated around 30% below pre-pandemic levels throughout all of 2023, a year that outsiders and CCP leaders alike projected in late 2022 would see a major economic rebound.

Despite this growing chorus of seemingly pro-Xi cadres, the expanding scope of anti-corruption probes raises questions about how policy failures could spur government paralysis. The core conundrum of Xi's anti-corruption purges is that while it engenders ideological conformity (at least in the public eye) and better policy alignment with Xi's priorities, it also stokes unspoken resentment among those indirectly affected by the purges. These include the professional networks of purged cadres, as well as those who quietly believe that Xi is severely mismanaging China's affairs, and those whose vested interests (e.g. cadres with nest eggs tied up in real estate) have suffered greatly under Xi's policies. Furthermore, the accelerating pace of senior-level anti-corruption cases suggests that either this cohort of the disaffected is growing and that Xi is attempting to combat it, or that Xi's other goals for CCDI probes — particularly, bolstering alignment with his policy goals — remain unmet despite a decade of investigations. CCP cadres have a high tolerance for bearing onerous policies from strong-man leaders, meaning Xi's anti-corruption campaign could grow unchecked for years to come. However, the prospect of major policy failures — as China's internal and external policy challenges mount — could bring out a wave of dissenters against Xi. Such failures could include a genuine economic recession (i.e. negative growth) caused by a real estate crisis, a resurgence of mass protests like those of November 2022, or even a failed invasion of Taiwan. In this scenario, a resurgence of dissent would initially trigger central policy paralysis or whipsaw decision-making, e.g. on economic management. 

In response to such a policy crisis, Xi would likely double down on his political purges, prompting the further "national securitization" of China as he clings to power. The prospect of major policy failures and the concomitant risk of Xi losing legitimacy as the Party's leader would likely see him retaliate in a significant way to regain power, akin to Mao's Cultural Revolution. This retaliation could take the form of a lightning campaign of arrests against a cohort of rival leaders (e.g. in the Central Committee and even in the CCP's top political body, the Politburo) under the auspices of foiling a coup attempt. Afterward, Xi would double down on his focus on internal and external security, crushing social unrest and strengthening retaliatory policies meant to counter Western trade and technological containment. This deeper ''national securitization'' of China would accelerate the flight of foreign businesses and investment, and would make China's economy even more autarkic, threatening Xi's goal of restoring China's position as the world's leading superpower.

• Mao Zedong used rule by force to maintain his unitary political power over the CCP from 1935-1976, although his tool of choice was popular uprisings (e.g. peasant rebellions), not the anti-corruption investigations favored by Xi. Mao's failed rural collectivization efforts of 1958-1962, which killed tens of millions by famine, presented a rare opportunity for his political enemies to criticize him and call for more moderate economic policies. To reassert his leadership primacy, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution from 1966 until his death in 1976, a period of anarchy and economic stagnation wherein China's youth, at Mao's behest, violently persecuted his enemies in the CCP and society at large.