The Progress, Prospects and Risks of EU Enlargement

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Director of the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy at Ulm University Medical Center Dr. Jorg M. Fegert speaks during a press conference on the handover of the final report of the Special Panel on child safety online in Brussels, Belgium, on July 13, 2026.

EU enlargement is likely to make incremental progress over the next one to two years, driven by the bloc's geopolitical imperative to strengthen European security, but the pace of accession for Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Moldova will remain constrained by demanding reform requirements and the need for unanimous approval from all EU member states at each major stage of the process. On July 14, the European Union held a series of intergovernmental accession conferences in Brussels that advanced the membership negotiations of four candidate countries. Montenegro provisionally closed two additional negotiating chapters — Chapter 8 (Competition Policy) and Chapter 29 (Customs Union) — bringing its total number of provisionally closed chapters to 18. Albania provisionally closed its first three negotiating chapters: Chapter 25 (Science and Research), Chapter 26 (Education and Culture) and Chapter 30 (External Relations). Ukraine and Moldova each opened negotiations on Cluster 6 (External Relations), covering Chapter 30 (External Relations) and Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security and Defense Policy). The coordinated progress across the four countries represented one of the EU's most significant single-day enlargement milestones in recent years.

The EU accession process is structured around negotiations on the "acquis communautaire," the body of EU law and policy that candidate countries must adopt and implement before joining the bloc. The acquis is divided into thematic negotiating chapters, which are grouped into six broader clusters. Candidate countries first open chapters or clusters once they meet initial benchmarks, then work to align their legislation and demonstrate effective implementation. When the European Commission and EU member states determine that a candidate has sufficiently met the required standards, individual chapters can be provisionally closed. Negotiations are only completed once all chapters are closed, after which accession requires unanimous approval by all EU member states and ratification of an accession treaty by the candidate country and every member state.
Montenegro applied for EU membership in December 2008, was granted candidate status in 2010 and opened accession negotiations in 2012. Albania applied in April 2009, became a candidate in 2014 and formally opened negotiations in 2022. Ukraine submitted its application in February 2022, shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion, received candidate status in June 2022 and opened accession negotiations in 2024. Moldova, which also applied in March 2022, was granted candidate status in June 2022 and also formally opened negotiations in 2024.

Montenegro is the EU accession frontrunner, with progress dependent primarily on sustained implementation of governance reforms rather than legislative alignment. Unlike earlier negotiations, when the emphasis was on opening chapters, Montenegro's current priority is provisionally closing the remaining chapters by demonstrating sustained implementation of institutional reforms. Following the July conferences, Montenegro has provisionally closed 18 of its 33 negotiating chapters, leaving most of the remainder concentrated in politically sensitive areas such as the rule of law, public administration, judiciary reform, anticorruption measures, public procurement, environmental policy and financial control. The next steps will involve maintaining reform momentum while addressing longstanding EU concerns over judicial independence, organized crime, corruption and governance. Progress will increasingly depend less on adopting legislation and more on demonstrating consistent implementation over time. If reform efforts continue and no major political setbacks occur, Montenegro remains the candidate best positioned to conclude accession negotiations first.

Croatia remains Montenegro's principal bilateral gatekeeper within the accession process and has indicated its intent to condition support on resolving several outstanding post-Yugoslav disputes. Although Zagreb officially supports Western Balkan enlargement, it has linked further progress to a final settlement of the Prevlaka Peninsula border dispute between it and Montenegro, progress on unresolved wartime issues — including missing persons and compensation — and the return of the disputed naval training ship Jadran.

Albania has transitioned into a more demanding phase of accession by beginning to provisionally close negotiating chapters, shifting the focus from opening negotiations to demonstrating durable reform implementation. This marks an important transition from the rapid opening of negotiation clusters — which has characterized Albania's accession process since formal negotiations accelerated — to demonstrating sufficient alignment with EU legislation and policy implementation for individual chapters to be considered complete. The chapters closed in July are among the less politically contentious areas of the acquis, making them suitable early candidates for provisional closure. The more difficult work lies ahead, particularly in areas involving judicial reform, the rule of law, public procurement, competition policy, environmental standards, financial management and anticorruption measures. Albania has generally maintained a strong political commitment to EU integration and has benefited from broad domestic consensus supporting accession, but implementation capacity remains uneven across institutions. Moreover, a recent wave of anti-government protests and EU warnings over Albania's environmental safeguards could delay progress on environmental chapters. The next stage of negotiations will focus on closing progressively more demanding chapters while sustaining reform credibility over several years. If current momentum continues, Albania is likely to remain among the fastest-moving Western Balkan candidates, although the pace will inevitably slow as negotiations shift toward more politically sensitive policy areas. Finally, bilateral disputes with specific EU members could trigger future vetoes on Albania's progress — particularly from Greece over minority rights and local governance issues.

Ukraine continues to advance through accession negotiations, although its long-term trajectory will depend on maintaining reform momentum and the evolution of the war. Ukraine remains in the comparatively early stages of accession negotiations but continues to advance at a rapid pace, given the scale of the required reforms and the country's ongoing war with Russia. The opening of Cluster 6 expands negotiations into external relations, including the common commercial policy and alignment with the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Ukraine has already demonstrated high levels of alignment with EU foreign policy positions since 2022, making this cluster comparatively straightforward relative to more demanding governance-related areas. The country's immediate objective is to continue opening additional negotiating clusters while implementing the extensive legislative, judicial, anticorruption and public administration reforms required under the accession framework. Although wartime conditions create substantial practical challenges for implementing reforms, the conflict has also reinforced political support within much of the European Union for maintaining Ukraine's accelerated accession trajectory as part of a broader European security strategy. Nevertheless, difficult negotiations remain ahead in areas such as judicial independence, anticorruption institutions, agricultural policy, budgetary implications and eventual integration into EU decision-making structures. Even if Kyiv continues to make progress on reforms and additional negotiating clusters are opened, full EU membership is unlikely while the country remains engaged in an active war. Although the EU treaties do not explicitly prohibit admitting a state at war, many member states will remain reluctant to accept a new member with unresolved territorial disputes and major security risks. The European Union is likely to continue pursuing intermediate forms of integration — including deeper access to the single market, expanded participation in EU programs and closer regulatory alignment — that strengthen Ukraine's economic and political integration while postponing full institutional membership until security conditions become more favorable.

Hungary is likely to become less of an obstacle to Ukraine's accession following Viktor Orban's departure from office in April. However, the new Hungarian government does not support a fast-track path for Kyiv and some bilateral tensions persist. Moreover, countries such as Slovakia and Poland retain the ability to slow or block progress over issues including agricultural imports and minority rights.

Moldova's continued advancement will depend on sustaining institutional reforms and political stability while managing structural vulnerabilities. Moldova continues to progress broadly in parallel with Ukraine, reflecting the European Union's effort to maintain synchronization between the two candidates. Opening Cluster 6 represents another step in expanding Moldova's accession negotiations beyond the initial phase into additional areas of the acquis. Moldova has pursued an ambitious reform agenda since receiving candidate status and has made progress in judicial reform, anticorruption efforts and alignment with EU foreign policy, despite significant domestic political pressures and continued Russian influence operations. The country's next objective will be opening additional negotiating clusters while sustaining implementation of governance reforms that satisfy the European Commission's rigorous monitoring requirements. Moldova faces structural constraints stemming from its relatively limited administrative capacity, economic vulnerability and the unresolved status of Transdniestria. As with Ukraine, Moldova's pace of advancement will ultimately depend on both technical reform performance and continued political consensus among EU member states regarding enlargement. Maintaining reform momentum while preserving domestic political stability will remain central to Moldova's accession strategy over the coming years.

The European Union's decision to decouple Albania's accession process from North Macedonia's in late 2024 demonstrated that politically paired candidates can diverge when one country encounters reform delays or bilateral obstacles. A similar decoupling of Moldova and Ukraine cannot be ruled out if their political or reform trajectories diverge, allowing the European Union to advance each accession process on its own merits rather than maintaining parallel progress.

Looking ahead, EU enlargement is likely to remain a gradual but strategically significant process, generating economic incentives that support reform while leaving long-term outcomes dependent on sustained political commitment from both the European Union and candidate countries. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, the European Union's growing divergence with the United States, have altered the strategic logic underpinning enlargement, transforming accession from primarily a technocratic process into a central instrument of European security policy. This shift has generated sustained political momentum for advancing negotiations with both Eastern Partnership candidates and Western Balkan applicants. The European Commission has likewise adopted a more proactive enlargement posture, while many member states increasingly view successful enlargement as essential for stabilizing Europe's eastern and southeastern neighborhoods and reducing opportunities for Russian and other external influence. However, important constraints remain. Accession continues to require unanimous agreement among all member states at multiple stages, leaving individual governments able to delay or block progress for bilateral or domestic political reasons. Many Western European countries are also facing "enlargement fatigue" and are skeptical of adding new members to an increasingly hard-to-govern union — a trend that could become even stronger if nationalist parties take over in large EU countries such as France. The candidate countries must also demonstrate durable implementation of complex reforms in areas including judicial independence, anticorruption enforcement, governance, public administration and economic competitiveness — areas that historically have proven the most difficult to complete. In parallel, the European Union itself faces internal debates regarding institutional reform, budgetary implications, agricultural policy and decision-making arrangements before accepting additional members. Consequently, while accession negotiations are likely to continue advancing across all four leading candidates over the next one to two years, the process is likely to remain gradual rather than linear. The economic incentives associated with the accession process are likely to sustain reform efforts in all four countries in the near to medium term. Over the longer term, however, if candidate countries perceive membership as increasingly unattainable, domestic support for EU-driven reforms could erode, creating greater political space for nationalist and euroskeptic actors and encouraging governments to expand engagement with alternative external partners, including China and, where politically feasible, Russia.

Across all four countries, the accession process itself produces economic benefits well before membership. Businesses and investors respond not only to eventual EU accession, but also to the reforms required to get there. In particular, the process is meant to reduce regulatory uncertainty, strengthen the rule of law and contract enforcement, improve access to EU grants and development finance, lower trade barriers through regulatory convergence and increase FDI by signaling long-term political and economic stability.
The main constraint is that the largest economic gains — full access to the EU single market, free movement of labor and capital, participation in EU decision-making and eligibility for cohesion and agricultural funds — only materialize upon accession. Until then, candidate countries benefit from progressively deeper integration but remain outside the European Union's core economic institutions.