During a summit in the Spanish city of Granada on Oct. 6, the 27 governments of the European Union expressed their support for incorporating new countries into the bloc. However, they failed to provide a clear timeline for enlargement and only made vague promises of progress by 2030. This lack of headway is symptomatic of internal divisions over the issue, as some leaders argue that an expanded membership would strengthen the European Union's geopolitical clout, while others warn against adding new members to a bloc that is already difficult to govern. The European Union is unlikely to resolve this dispute in the foreseeable future, exposing it to frequent instability in its periphery and opening the door to greater influence from foreign actors in EU candidate countries.
There are eight official candidates to join the European Union: Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Georgia and Kosovo are also considered potential candidates. While the list of candidates is long, enlargement is controversial in the European Union, which accepted its last member state, Croatia, a decade ago. Supporters of enlargement argue that accepting new countries would expand the bloc's internal market, creating new investment and trade opportunities for both old and new member states. A larger membership, so the argument goes, would also increase the European Union's influence over international affairs, as the bloc represents a growing number of countries that are willing to cooperate on defense and foreign policy. Enlargement enthusiasts additionally argue that accepting them as members would force candidate countries to align with EU standards, thereby strengthening democratic institutions in these nations and contributing to peace and stability in Europe.
While support for enlargement depends on the political conditions of the time, countries like Germany tend to defend the economic benefits of a bigger bloc, while most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have advocated for granting membership to the Western Balkan and Eastern European candidates to stabilize the region. In recent months, many EU officials have argued that the ongoing war in Ukraine confirms the need for a larger, stronger European Union. From this perspective, countries like Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia and others should be given a clear path to membership, so that the bloc can firmly anchor them to the West. This would eliminate what some EU leaders have described as ''gray zones'' in Europe that open the door for non-EU players (primarily Russia, but also China) to increase their influence in the European Union's backyard. EU leaders and officials have argued that if these ''gray zone'' countries are accepted as member states, it would decrease the risk of them looking eastward for economic and political support; they would also become more prosperous and therefore less volatile, reducing the risk of severe social unrest or even new wars in the European Union's periphery.
The Obstacles to Enlargement
Despite these apparent benefits and the constant expressions of interest in enlargement, the process faces significant obstacles that reduce the possibility of membership expansion at least through this decade. To begin with, the critics of enlargement argue that the different national interests and priorities of 27 member states already make decision-making extraordinarily complex and that adding new member states would only make the process more difficult. Decisions on issues such as approving the European Union's multi-year budget require months of negotiations between member states, while the approval of free trade agreements takes years. Additionally, imposing sanctions on third countries and approving new taxes require unanimity, enabling individual member states to use their veto power to obtain concessions on other issues. As a result, many EU voices, including France, argue that the bloc will only be ready to accept new members once it has streamlined its decision-making process (including by reforming voting mechanisms) and simplified its institutions. However, the European Union is unlikely to make these reforms in the foreseeable future precisely because reforming the bloc's institutions and decision-making mechanisms would be a very complex and lengthy process.
Then there is the issue of money. All the candidate countries have lower living standards than the current EU members, which means that if they join the European Union they will become net recipients of EU agricultural subsidies, development funds and other forms of financial assistance. This means the EU budget would need to grow to fund extra assistance for the new member states, something that net contributors to the system, most of which are in northern Europe, would oppose. (According to an internal EU report, a bloc with 35 members would need a budget that is at least 21% larger than the current one, which means an extra 257 billion euros — $272.58 billion — for a seven-year budget.) This diversion of EU funds also means that the current beneficiaries of EU financial assistance, such as Poland or Romania, would lose some of their aid. This puts Central and Eastern Europe in a dilemma, as most countries in the region support enlargement for security reasons, but the economic implications make them hesitate. Poland's decision in September to close its borders to cheaper Ukrainian agricultural products to protect Polish farmers showed the extent to which individual member states' political and economic interests can imperil a common strategic objective, such as supporting Ukraine.
In addition, some countries in western and northern Europe are skeptical of the democratic values and the institutional transparency of the candidate countries. Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia and the other candidates still present high levels of corruption, institutional opaqueness and insufficient market reforms that complicate their membership aspirations. Moreover, democratic backsliding is occurring in some of the newest EU members like Poland and Hungary, where, according to the European Union, the rule of law has weakened while media freedom and the rights of sexual minorities have been undermined. These developments give ammunition to enlargement critics who argue that the candidate countries are far from aligning their institutions and values with those of the bloc even when they formally meet the criteria for admission.
In the meantime, the increasingly popular nationalist and right-wing political parties across the European Union are against opening the bloc's doors to migrants from the new (and poorer) candidate states. In the mid-2000s, the accession of countries like Poland and Romania led to a significant increase in migration from these countries to western and northern Europe. This was one of the many triggers of the Brexit referendum in 2016, as nationalist British politicians argued that EU membership had exposed the United Kingdom to uncontrolled immigration from poorer member states. Of all the candidate countries, Turkey is probably the most problematic in this regard, as its massive population of roughly 85 million people would make it the most populated country in the bloc. Ukraine, with a pre-war population of roughly 40 million, faces similar challenges. And even if the Western Balkan candidates are considerably smaller, their combined population is around 18 million, which means that nationalist EU politicians will also be skeptical of their membership.
Finally, some of the EU candidates have unresolved territorial issues that will reduce their chances of membership. The most obvious example is Ukraine, which will not join the European Union until the war is over. Even after the eventual end of the war, there will almost certainly remain unresolved territorial disputes with Russia that will complicate Kyiv's EU membership. Moldova is in a similar position, as part of its territory belongs to a pro-Russia breakaway republic, as is Serbia, where unresolved disputes with Kosovo have for years delayed Belgrade's accession negotiations with Brussels. Even Georgia, which is not a formal EU candidate but has shown interest in joining the bloc, has some of its territory under Russian control. Many in the European Union argue that it was a mistake to accept Cyprus in 2004 because of the unresolved problem of Northern Cyprus (which is governed by a pro-Turkey republic that most of the international community does not recognize), so the bloc is unlikely to accept new member states that are not in full control of their claimed territory.
The Consequences of Delayed Enlargement
The European Union's decision not to accept new members will have multiple consequences over the coming decade. First, it will give the bloc time to focus on internal issues, as member states will prioritize reforms to make the decision-making process more efficient and coherent. Voting mechanisms will be at the center of these conversations, as EU countries are increasingly accepting the fact that the unanimity rule is too problematic. If implemented, a more streamlined decision-making process would increase the possibility of enlargement in the 2030s. Still, success is not guaranteed because of the diverging interests between the member states. Many of the reforms that the European Union needs require treaty changes, and many in the bloc are skeptical of opening a treaty reform process that could lead to unintended consequences (such as nationalist governments demanding less integration and not more).
Preserving the current membership will also enable the European Union to focus its financial resources on the protection of its economy in a context of growing competition with China and the United States. In recent years, the combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, the energy crisis and the growing technological competition between the United States and China opened the door to billions of euros in internal EU subsidies as the bloc became increasingly protectionistic. EU national governments and institutions will be more willing to prioritize this kind of spending as opposed to elevating the living standards of large countries like Ukraine or Turkey.
This does not mean that the European Union will completely give up on its periphery. Brussels and individual member states will explore alternatives to membership that seek to preserve economic and political cooperation without giving the candidates the benefits of full membership. Trade, investment and financing will be politically acceptable avenues for the European Union to engage with its periphery. Discussion forums like the recently created European Political Community (which includes 44 European countries) will continue to proliferate in the coming years, even if their concrete impact will likely remain modest. Still, issues like granting citizens from the candidate countries the right to live and work in the European Union or including them in the passport-free Schengen area will remain off-limits because they are too politically sensitive for EU governments. The bloc also will not give candidate countries voting rights or any other form of say in EU decision-making, while participation in large financing programs like the Common Agricultural Policy or the multiple types of cohesion funds will also not materialize.
Despite the European Union's efforts to remain engaged with its periphery, the decision not to accept new member states will create geopolitical challenges for the bloc. A weaker promise of EU integration will decrease the bloc's political influence over the candidate countries, which will be more willing to explore alternative partnerships and alliances. While the European Union will maintain some influence by providing financial support, the longer the promise of accession is delayed, the more likely these countries will be to keep their options open in terms of trade and investment agreements and political and military cooperation. This will create fertile ground for the likes of China, Turkey and Russia to deepen their presence in places like the Western Balkans and the Caucasus.
Even if the prospects of EU accession remain elusive, the candidate countries will still have an incentive to reform their economies and become more institutionally transparent to attract foreign direct investment. But without constant EU pressure to do so and without a clear timeline for membership in the bloc, the process could slow down. Some countries may even resort to more nationalistic, anti-globalization and anti-minority policies without a concrete path for EU membership. For example, the promise of EU accession is one of the factors preventing a severe escalation of violence between Serbia and Kosovo and intra-communal violence within Bosnia.
The evolution of these trends suggests that while keeping its current membership would create opportunities for the European Union to reform itself, this may come at the expense of weaker influence over its periphery if it fails to provide a credible path for enlargement. As the so-called Global South looks for alternatives to the Western-dominated global order and institutions, the European Union risks losing an opportunity to shape geopolitical events in places like the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, which will not go unnoticed by its rivals.
