What To Make of Europe's Counterproposal to the U.S. Ukraine Peace Plan

(YURIY DYACHYSHYN/AFP via Getty Images)

Smoke rises in the background as a Ukrainian flag flutters in the wind following a mass overnight Russian drone and missile attacks, in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv on Nov. 19, 2025.

European efforts to adjust core elements of the Trump administration's peace plan for Ukraine will still leave Kyiv exposed to Washington's threat to pull support, and limited leverage and internal constraints mean Europe remains largely unable and thus unlikely to sustain Ukraine's defense alone if negotiations with the Trump administration were to break down. On Nov. 24, the United Kingdom, France and Germany presented a joint counterproposal to the United States' 28-point Ukraine peace plan, which they and other European countries had widely criticized for largely favoring Russia, offering an alternative framework that removes several contentious provisions and reframes others. The document reaffirms Ukraine's sovereignty and calls for a comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Ukraine, Russia and NATO, while removing the original U.S. language on halting NATO enlargement and outlining "robust" security guarantees for Ukraine, including a U.S. commitment that "mirrors" NATO's Article V but would only apply if Ukraine refrains from conducting military operations inside Russia. The counterproposal caps Ukraine's post-conflict armed forces at 800,000, up from the 600,000 in the U.S. draft. It also states that Ukraine's NATO membership would remain dependent on Alliance consensus (which the plan acknowledges "does not exist"), while confirming that NATO will not permanently station troops under its command in Ukraine in peacetime. The counterproposal envisions short-term preferential EU market access for Ukraine while its membership process moves forward and confirms the broad reconstruction package outlined in the U.S. proposal. However, unlike the U.S. proposal — which called for channeling frozen Russian sovereign assets into U.S.-led investment vehicles — the European text stipulates that these assets will remain frozen until Moscow compensates Ukraine for wartime damage, even as Russia would still be progressively reintegrated into the global economy through phased sanctions relief and a possible return to the Group of Eight (G8). On territorial issues, the counterproposal removes language implying recognition of Russian control over occupied regions in Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk — let alone territory that Russia does not control but claims — while reaffirming that Ukraine will not seek to regain occupied areas by military means, with territorial negotiations starting from the current line of contact.

On Nov. 24, Ukrainian first deputy foreign minister Sergiy Kyslytsya said the United States and Ukraine had produced a revised 19-point draft peace plan after intensive talks in Geneva led by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Zelensky's Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak. The revised plan reportedly significantly scales back earlier U.S.-Russian proposals that Kyiv and its European allies had rejected. Ukrainian officials also stated that the new document removes most of the contentious elements from the leaked 28-point draft, including the proposed 600,000-person cap on the Ukrainian army, with key unresolved issues (including territorial questions and NATO-Russia-U.S. relations) left for Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump to resolve. The Trump administration is now expected to brief Moscow and evaluate whether talks can move forward, though it remains unclear whether Zelensky will be summoned to Washington in the coming days to finalise a deal or whether the Thanksgiving deadline — and the accompanying threat to curtail U.S. support — still applies. The 28-point peace plan was reportedly the only document that was discussed in Geneva, and though European representatives (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union) were included in the negotiations, the European counterproposal was not discussed at the meeting.
On Nov. 24, Russia dismissed the European counterproposal as entirely unacceptable, with Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov reportedly saying it fails to meet Moscow's interests and alters key points of the U.S. proposal on NATO and territory. But Ushakov signaled that many elements of the original U.S. plan remain acceptable to the Kremlin.
European leaders struck a cautiously optimistic tone after discussing the weekend's Geneva talks and the Franco-German-British counterproposal, signaling readiness to stay engaged with the negotiation process while insisting key elements of the U.S. plan must still change. Meeting on the sidelines of the EU-Africa summit in Angola on Nov. 24, leaders welcomed what they described as "new momentum," but stressed that any settlement must respect Ukraine's sovereignty and security red lines. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said a "solid basis" now exists for further work. French President Emmanuel Macron called the U.S. plan a "good initiative" but said it must be revised to ensure it benefits Ukrainians. U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer praised the "significant progress" made in Geneva, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stressed peace "won't happen overnight" and that Russia must be involved more closely in any further talks.

The European counterproposal seeks to provide Ukraine with greater support as part of a more balanced framework to wind down the war, reflecting fears that excessive concessions to Russia and weak deterrence mechanisms would leave Ukraine unstable and vulnerable to further aggression. European capitals recognize the war cannot go on indefinitely, and they view the risk of accidental escalation stemming from prolonged fighting as a genuine strategic concern. They will therefore engage positively with any framework capable of delivering a durable ceasefire while preserving Ukraine as a functioning, fully sovereign state, even if most European governments view the U.S. proposal in its current form as unacceptable. While European governments also support the idea of reviving the Russia-NATO dialogue after the war to reduce military risks on the continent, they insist that any eventual settlement must rest on significantly stronger and more credible security guarantees for Ukraine. This includes a more robust security architecture backed by sustained Western military assistance, clearer deterrence commitments modelled on (though not equivalent to) NATO's Article V, a higher permitted force ceiling for Ukraine that preserves Kyiv's ability to defend itself over the long term, and somewhat more nuanced language on eventual NATO deployments. Europe fears that the combination of a partially demilitarized Ukraine and security guarantees that are either too weak or ambiguous would leave Ukraine vulnerable, while Russia would retain full freedom and capacity to rearm, consolidate its gains and prepare for another potential invasion in the future. Moreover, European governments fear that excessive concessions from Ukraine — particularly provisions in the U.S. draft that effectively recognize Russian territorial claims, including areas not fully under Moscow's control — would significantly undermine Zelensky's domestic legitimacy and the stability of his or any future post-conflict government in Ukraine, and thus the country's long-term internal stability. There is also a risk that such concessions could encourage further revisionism elsewhere in the world by setting a dangerous precedent that legitimizes territorial conquest by force. Finally, while European governments support using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's recovery, the U.S. proposal to channel them into U.S.-led investment vehicles contrasts with EU plans for these assets to remain frozen until Russia pays reparations, and has raised concerns that this approach would leave Europeans covering the bulk of Ukraine's reconstruction costs. The European position, therefore, rejects profit-sharing arrangements, joint investment structures with Moscow, or any mechanism that shifts financial responsibility onto Europe.

Even though most European governments are hesitant about extending NATO membership to Ukraine, European countries fear the original U.S. draft's explicit prohibition on future NATO enlargement and permanent exclusion of Ukraine from the alliance would undermine NATO's open-door principle — a shift some in Europe fear would fracture alliance cohesion, particularly by alienating eastern members, and ultimately weaken NATO's eastern flank.
The U.S. proposal would convert roughly $100 billion of frozen Russian assets into a U.S.-led investment vehicle in Ukraine, with U.S. companies receiving half the profits, while the rest of the frozen assets are progressively unfrozen or transferred into a joint U.S.-Russia fund. However, this collides with the European Union's own months-long effort to anchor a big "reparations loan" for Ukraine on those same assets, and instead uses them as leverage in a U.S.-Russia bargain, leaving Europeans carrying most of the fiscal burden for reconstruction while Washington reaps the profits.

Despite deep reservations about Trump's plan, European governments will remain engaged in U.S.-led peace efforts, making a complete transatlantic rupture on Ukraine policy unlikely, but still leaving Kyiv exposed to Trump's threat to withdraw support if it does not accept the U.S. proposal by Nov. 27. Some of the more ambiguous elements of the U.S. draft leave considerable room for adjustment. European capitals will continue pressing for changes on territorial arrangements, security guarantees and reconstruction financing while avoiding a direct confrontation with the Trump administration that could derail negotiations altogether. This calibrated approach is reflected in the fact that the counterproposal softens, modifies or reframes provisions in the U.S. framework, instead of discarding them outright, even on issues previously deemed unacceptable by European leaders, such as capping the size of Ukraine's armed forces. Although it remains unclear which elements of the European text the United States will ultimately incorporate into its negotiating position, a complete rupture between the two sides remains unlikely in the near term. Still, this dynamic on its own is not sufficient to immediately ease U.S. demands on Ukraine and still leaves Kyiv exposed to Washington's threat to pare back support for Kyiv in the coming days as Trump recently threatened to do if Ukraine did not agree to the U.S. proposal by Nov. 27 (Thanksgiving Day).

The European Union's limited leverage and internal constraints make prolonged unilateral support for Ukraine largely unfeasible if Trump makes good on his threat to pull support from Kyiv. Despite the European effort and public statements from U.S. and Ukrainian officials suggesting positive progress in talks, were Trump to decide to remove support from Ukraine, it would leave Europe, and by extension Ukraine, in a difficult place. In theory, the European Union could respond to a U.S. refusal to accommodate its concerns by unilaterally seizing frozen Russian sovereign assets to sustain Ukraine's war effort. Yet such a move remains unlikely because the assets are central to the U.S. plan, and acting independently could prompt Washington to disengage from the peace process entirely or, worse, to lean further toward Moscow in pressuring Kyiv and Brussels into accepting the proposed settlement. While unlikely, a full breakdown is possible if, for example, the United States rejects all European amendments and escalates pressure on Ukraine by suspending intelligence support or easing sanctions on Russia. In this scenario, unilateral European action would face significant internal constraints. For one, using frozen Russian assets requires unanimity among EU member states, and beyond unresolved legal and financial reservations from the Belgian government, more Russia-leaning governments like Slovakia and Hungary, which have recently received carve-outs from U.S. sanctions on Russian oil, would likely side with Washington and block any move to deploy the assets against U.S. plans. However, even if Brussels were to overcome internal vetoes and seize the assets to keep Ukraine fighting, Europe would still struggle to compensate for the loss of U.S. intelligence support. And should Washington also unilaterally ease sanctions on Russia, evidence shows that Europe alone lacks the coercive leverage to significantly hurt Russia's economy and meaningfully alter Moscow's calculus. In fact, only the latest U.S. sanctions on Russia, which target its oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil, have produced signs of real economic strain in the country, and any reversal would sharply reduce the impact of EU measures. If U.S. strategy shifts, Europe is thus unlikely to dramatically escalate unilateral support to Ukraine, and would at best be able to temporarily sustain the country's war efforts while attempting to re-engage with Washington.

Belgium has an outsized role in negotiations over EU proposals to leverage frozen Russian funds because most of the assets are held in the Brussels-based Euroclear clearinghouse. Belgium has so far opposed these plans due to legal exposure, financial liabilities and reputational risks.
The 28-point U.S.-Russian peace plan — which was reportedly drawn up last month by Moscow's special envoy Kirill Dmitriev and Trump's representative Steve Witkoff — has heightened concerns about weakening transatlantic unity, as the plan suggests that Washington is prioritizing strategic outreach to Moscow, even if it comes at the expense of European interests. More broadly, the U.S.-Russian plan also reinforces long-standing European fears of being sidelined in decisions shaping continental security and heightens concerns about U.S. reliability, particularly following Trump's latest threats to curtail support for Kyiv.