Bangladesh will likely adopt a more assertive foreign policy, which will likely include strengthening ties with Pakistan while balancing its economic dependencies on India and maintaining cooperation on security and regional stability. On Jan. 24, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said India was closely monitoring signs of increasing military cooperation between nearby Bangladesh and Pakistan following reports that the chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had visited Bangladesh, which the Bangladeshi government later denied. The announcement also follows reports by Indian media in late December that Pakistan would begin training Bangladesh's army in February 2025, which would mark the two countries' first military training agreement since the 1971 Liberation War that led to Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. While Bangladesh dismissed these reports as well, the developments nonetheless reflect New Delhi's growing tensions with the new interim government in Dhaka, which has sought a more balanced approach to foreign policy since assuming power — including by deepening ties with India's regional rival Pakistan. 

Tensions between India and Bangladesh have worsened since the interim Bangladeshi government led by Muhammad Yunus assumed power in August 2024 following the overthrow of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. In recent months, India has raised concerns over attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh, while Bangladesh has voiced similar grievances about the treatment of Bangladeshis in India. The Yunus government has also criticized India's harboring of former Prime Minister Hasina, who was overthrown amid nationwide protests and subsequently fled to India. On Jan. 21, Bangladesh's interim government announced its intention to seek Hasina's return from India. Law Adviser Asif Nazrul warned that India's refusal to extradite the deposed prime minister would violate India and Bangladeh's 2013 extradition treaty, which obligates both countries to return individuals sought for legal proceedings. However, given Hasina's longstanding alignment with India and her role as a strategic partner, New Delhi is unlikely to fulfill the extradition request in the short term. Instead, India will likely wait for a new government to be elected in Bangladesh (Yunus has indicated that Bangladesh's next elections will take place in late 2025 or early 2026) and try to stabilize bilateral ties post-election. In the meantime, however, the contentious issue of Hasina's extradition will continue to generate diplomatic tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi. 

• Hasina has been residing in India since Aug. 5, after fleeing Bangladesh in the wake of a massive student-led protest that brought an end to her Awami League party's 16-year rule. Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal has issued arrest warrants against Hasina, along with several former Cabinet ministers, advisers, and military and civil officials, accusing them of ''crimes against humanity and genocide.'' Last year, Dhaka formally sent a diplomatic note to New Delhi requesting Hasina's extradition.
• The 2013 extradition treaty between India and Bangladesh allows for the deportation of individuals in response to legal requests but includes a provision permitting either country to refuse extradition if the offense is deemed to be of a ''political nature,'' granting India the discretion not to fulfill such requests in Hasina's case.
• Many Bangladeshis accuse India of enabling Hasina's rise to power in 2007 and backing her increasingly authoritarian rule. Critics allege that New Delhi shielded her government from global scrutiny over human rights abuses, including the targeting of opposition supporters, which they claim has eroded Bangladesh's democracy. Allegations of Indian interference in elections have also fueled ''India Out'' campaigns and boycotts of Indian products, reflecting growing anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.
• On Dec. 3, Bangladesh's foreign ministry summoned India's envoy to condemn the storming of its consulate in India a day earlier by protesters angered over the detention of Hindu leader Krishna Das Prabhu on Nov. 26 on charges of sedition. Prabhu's arrest triggered violent protests in Bangladesh, with clashes between security forces and hundreds of Hindu demonstrators in Dhaka and Chittagong killing at least one person. These events, amid a backdrop of periodic anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh, have heightened tensions, prompting further demonstrations in India, including in West Bengal at the largest border crossing between the two countries on Dec. 3.

Further complicating the situation are Bangladesh's warming ties with India's strategic rival Pakistan, though outstanding grievances related to the 1971 war will likely complicate full reconciliation between Dhaka and Islamabad. Bangladesh-Pakistan ties have historically remained strained since the Bangladesh War of Independence in 1971, during which the Pakistani military committed atrocities widely regarded as genocide. However, the shifting political landscape in Bangladesh after Hasina's departure has opened the door for deeper ties with Pakistan, especially as both countries share rising anti-India sentiments. Exchanges of officials are increasing, business links are growing, and initiatives like the resumption of maritime routes, potential direct flights and easier visa access for Pakistanis are enhancing connectivity. In September, Bangladesh's interim leader Yunus met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in New York City, advocating for stronger ties. Both countries are also working to boost annual trade to $3 billion, up from the current $700 million; this is facilitated by new business agreements, such as the formation of the Pakistan-Bangladesh Joint Business Council, and discussions about a free trade agreement. The resumption of the Karachi-Chittagong maritime route, dormant for over five decades, is another major step forward, as the reopened route is expected to not only facilitate trade but potentially pave the way for passenger services as well. Additionally, defense cooperation is on the rise, with high-ranking officials from both sides discussing joint efforts to ensure regional peace and stability. However, historical grievances — such as Pakistan's failure to formally apologize for its actions in 1971 and unresolved matters regarding the repatriation of Urdu-speaking people — will complicate the path to full rapprochement. Pakistan's continued denial of the alleged genocide committed during the Bangladesh War of Independence remains a deep source of anguish for many Bangladeshis, both within the interim government and among the broader population. Against this backdrop, Dhaka's warming relations with Islamabad could eventually raise the risk of domestic unrest, as many Bangladeshis may not be receptive to such rapprochement without a formal apology and reparations for the 1971 war, especially given that Pakistan is unlikely to quickly address these issues. 

• On Jan. 14, Bangladeshi military officials visited Pakistan, where both nations emphasized their ''enduring partnership,'' further underscoring the increasing collaboration between the two militaries.
• While there have been previous attempts by Bangladeshi leaders to engage with Pakistan, these efforts were largely limited to statements with little actionable outcome, often failing to yield tangible results. Former Prime Minister Hasina, whose Awami League party led the independence movement under her father, was notably resistant to improving relations with Islamabad, especially given the rival Jamaat-e-Islami party's collaboration with Pakistan during the war. 

Bangladesh's improving ties with Pakistan, alongside China's increasing influence over Dhaka, pose a challenge to India's regional interests. Bangladesh's growing ties with Pakistan, particularly in security cooperation, could threaten India's regional influence due to Pakistan's historical connections with insurgent groups and parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, which is closely aligned with the main opposition group Bangladesh Nationalist Party. As a result, the Indian government is worried that the upcoming elections in Bangladesh could lead to deeper Pakistani influence and security cooperation with Bangladesh, potentially exacerbating threats to India. Of particular concern is the Chicken Neck, a narrow and geopolitically sensitive corridor that connects India's northeastern states to the rest of the country. Given its reliance on transit routes through Bangladesh, any shift in Dhaka's security posture could raise the risk of militant groups in Bangladesh crossing into India by exploiting less secure sections of the two countries' border to carry out attacks or establish a presence, potentially reigniting insurgency threats that India has long sought to contain. In response to the political developments in Bangladesh, India will thus likely strengthen surveillance and ensure military readiness along the shared border and in the Chicken's Neck corridor, in particular. Bangladesh's deepening relations with China, a close ally of Pakistan, are also a source of concern for India. In recent years, China has increased its presence in Bangladesh, especially through investment and infrastructure projects, which could limit India's economic clout in the region. 

• After Bangladesh's independence in 1971, Pakistan continued to maintain ties with Islamist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, which had supported Pakistan during the war. These groups remained influential in Bangladesh's political landscape, despite the country's independence. For India, the collaboration between Pakistan and these parties was concerning, as it reinforced anti-Indian sentiment, particularly in regions with insurgent groups.
• The Chicken Neck, or Siliguri Corridor, is a narrow land strip in West Bengal that serves as India's only land connection to its northeastern states. Its strategic importance comes from its vulnerability, as it borders Bangladesh and Nepal, making it susceptible to external influence or blockades. Any disruption in this corridor could isolate the northeast from the rest of India. Connectivity challenges due to terrain, security risks, and infrastructure gaps make Bangladesh crucial for alternative transit routes and ensuring regional stability. While Bangladesh is unlikely to close these routes, India could still face significantly higher transportation costs and delays amid constrained access due to any regional instability or disruptions in Bangladesh, hampering both economic activity and logistical operations. Furthermore, these routes through Bangladesh are key to Indian national security by facilitating the movement of personnel, resources and supplies to regions that have historically faced insurgencies.

However, even as it pursues a more assertive foreign policy, Bangladesh will still maintain pragmatic cooperation with India on shared economic, security and regional stability concerns. Bangladesh's interim government will likely continue to strengthen ties with China and Pakistan to diversify its economic and strategic partnerships. This shift to a more balanced approach to foreign policy could result in Bangladesh pressing India for more equitable solutions to their various water and river-sharing disputes, including the contentious Teesta River agreement, with Dhaka potentially threatening to offer China the development project to use as leverage over India in negotiations. However, Bangladesh's geographical realities and strong economic ties with India make a fully anti-India stance unlikely. Bangladesh relies on India for crucial infrastructure development, electricity and addressing shared challenges like climate change and rising sea levels. And India, for its part, also depends on Bangladesh for regional stability, particularly in its northeast, where transit routes through the Chicken Neck corridor are crucial for connecting India's geographically isolated states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura with the rest of the country. These shared pressing priorities in trade, water management, and border security will thus likely lead to continued pragmatic cooperation between India and Bangladesh, despite the recent uptick in tensions. Additionally, the anti-Hindu attacks in Bangladesh have largely subsided and remained localized, which further suggests a major escalation in tensions is unlikely. 

• Bangladesh is India's largest trade partner in the subcontinent, while India is Bangladesh's second-largest trade partner in Asia, after China. Key Indian exports to Bangladesh include vegetables, tea, petroleum products and machinery, while Bangladesh primarily exports fish, plastics, and apparel to India. Over the past eight years, India has provided approximately $8 billion in credit for infrastructure development in Bangladesh, including projects like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link and the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline.