Jordan's Alignment With Israel Will Put It in Iran's Crosshairs

(Getty Images)

Jordan will remain aligned with the United States and Israel, which will result in a heightened risk of attacks by Iranian-backed proxies and growing risks of radicalization at home. On April 13, the Royal Jordanian Air Force intercepted dozens of drones that entered Jordanian airspace during the Iranian attack on Israel, during which Tehran launched more than 300 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. On April 14, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi summoned the Iranian ambassador after Iranian official media sources reportedly said that Jordan would be targeted if Jordan sided with Israel. That same day, King Abdullah II spoke with U.S. President Joe Biden to discuss the risk the war could spread regionally depending on the scale of Israeli retaliation.

Key Israeli allies including the United States, the United Kingdom and France took action to intercept drones en route to Israel during the attack.
Prior to the attack, Jordan closed its airspace as a precautionary measure. Amman has said it intercepted the drones in Jordan because they "posed a threat to [Jordanian] people and populated areas."

Throughout the Hamas-Israel War, Jordan has emphasized regional de-escalation amid concerns about spillover effects from the war and increasing domestic unrest from its pro-Palestinian population. Although Jordan, along with other Arab allies, has called for regional de-escalation since the beginning of the Hamas-Israel War and for Israeli restraint, Amman has juggled its cooperative relationship with Israel, particularly for water imports and border security, while trying to prevent domestic unrest. In recent weeks, pro-Palestinian protests have escalated outside of the Israeli Embassy in Amman as Jordanians, including Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front supporters, have protested Israeli operations in Gaza and the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. While Jordan has had some tolerance for pro-Palestinian protests, Jordanian security forces have arrested several protesters. Furthermore, amid criticism of what some Jordanians view as a weak stance on Israel, pro-Hamas sentiment has grown within Jordan, despite Hamas being prohibited in Jordan. While Jordan has made efforts to secure its borders, including from pro-Palestinian Jordanians attempting to enter the West Bank earlier in the war, it has been impacted by spillover violence. On Jan. 28, Iranian-backed militias attacked Tower 22 in Jordan, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. troops, an incident the U.S. retaliated for while Jordan did not.

Jordan and Israel have maintained a pragmatic relationship since they signed their 1994 peace treaty and have jointly collaborated on counterterrorism efforts, border security, and water-for-energy deals in which Jordan exports energy to Israel and receives potable water in return. Controlling its border with Israel improves Jordanian security, in contrast with its porous borders with Iraq and Syria.
About 60% of Jordanians are of Palestinian descent, and many of them are ardently pro-Palestinian. During the Hamas-Israel War, Amman has demonstrated solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza by facilitating humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, repeatedly calling for a cease-fire along with other Arab nations and criticizing Israeli military actions.

With the threat of Israeli retaliation and subsequent Iranian response, Jordan is very unlikely to shift from its U.S. alliance and will continue to intercept Iranian attacks aimed at Israel, but this could make Jordan a target itself. Although Jordan will pressure Israel directly and via Washington to take a restrained approach and avoid escalation and a second Iranian attack, Jordan will continue to intercept Iranian drones regardless of Israel's decision. If Iran does carry out another attack against Israel, Amman will be compelled to intercept drones again due to its strong alliance with the United States. Iranian-backed proxies in Syria and Iraq may target Jordan in any second strike to distract Jordanian air defenses from a barrage of drones and missiles and to inflict some damage due to Jordan's perceived support for Israel and its alliance with the West. In a less likely but high-impact scenario, Iran may directly launch missiles toward Jordan during a second attack to distract air defenses and inflict some damage as a signal to other regional actors, including Gulf Cooperation Council countries, that support for Israel and the West may result in their being targeted. This, however, would likely force a response from Jordan, which could involve striking Iranian proxy groups in Syria and Iraq. That would widen the conflict in a way that regional stakeholders, including Jordan and Iran, do not want. The increased risk to Jordan means Amman will likely leverage its relationship with the United States as well as its proven ability to intercept Iranian drones to request additional military aid such as the Patriot missile system to advance its air defense capabilities. While the United States might not be able to deploy it to Jordan due to high demand for the system, it will likely increase military aid to Jordan to bolster regional security.

Jordan is a key non-NATO ally of the United States, and the United States is Jordan's largest provider of bilateral assistance, with $1.45 billion in annual assistance since fiscal year 2023. Jordan hosts about 3,000 American military personnel, and U.S. military aid to Jordan accounts for at least 20% of Jordan's military defense budget. The United States uses Muwaffaq al-Salti air base to conduct operations in Syria and Iraq.
After the April 13 attack, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said that Jordan would have intercepted an Israeli attack on Iran if Israel had sought to use Jordanian airspace. The United States, a key Israeli ally, might pressure Jordan not to do so in the event of an actual Israeli attack on Iran traversing Jordanian airspace.
Jordan and Iran have a tense relationship in part due to Iran's support for Hamas, a militant Islamist organization banned in Jordan, and to Iranian backing for smugglers and militias in neighboring Syria and Iraq who destabilize the region through the drug trade and attacks on U.S. troops.
In late October 2023, Jordan requested the deployment of the Patriot missile defense system to bolster its border defenses.

Jordan's defense of Israel and its U.S. alliance will increase anti-Western sentiment against the regime, intensify recurrent protests, and risk militancy and emboldened terror cells within Jordan. Many pro-Palestinian Jordanians will likely view Jordan's drone interceptions as defending Israel, and will resent Jordan's alignment with the West despite Amman's anti-Israel rhetoric. Jordanians will become increasingly critical of the government's actions and of the United States, and may protest near the U.S. Embassy in Amman, though security forces would likely strongly disperse those protests. Furthermore, protests and online forums with swelling anti-government rhetoric will likely result in a tougher crackdown by Amman, which will use its August 2023 Cybercrime Law to quell criticism of the government and monarchy online. As Jordanians become increasingly frustrated with the government's actions, pro-Hamas sentiment will likely increase as Hamas is seen as taking action to support Palestinians in Gaza. Furthermore, with Iranian-backed proxy networks in Syria and Iraq, Jordan will likely face increased smuggling activities of arms and illegal drugs like fenethylline (commonly known as Captagon), which will cause Jordan to increase border security. Illegal arms entering Jordan would broadly increase the threat of terrorism since some would likely reach Islamic State cells in Jordan, making attacks likelier. While smuggling will increase the potential for violence, Jordanian security forces will likely be able to mitigate the risks. Jordan will likely increase security deployments in border areas to prevent smuggling, and perhaps even to target Iranian-backed smugglers in Syria as Jordan did in early 2024.

Jordan has arrested more than 1,500 individuals since the Hamas-Israel War began, with more than a third being arrested since March 2024. Jordanian security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse protests in March.
In early April, Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Iraqi militant group, threatened to arm 12,000 Jordanian fighters in a move that would undermine Amman and put pressure on Jordan's border with the West Bank and Israel. In such a scenario, Jordan would inevitably increase its security presence along the border, increasing the potential for clashes between Jordanian security and armed protesters.

Editor's Note: An earlier version of this piece misstated the name of the Jordanian foreign minister.