As Hamas loses control of the Gaza Strip and is suppressed into an insurgency, Qatar will likely expel Hamas' political bureau and align its Palestine policies with the other Gulf Coordination Council members, though Doha will likely use humanitarian aid to maintain its independent foreign policy. Since the onset of the Hamas-Israel war in October, Qatar has adopted an active role in securing the release of hostages and a cease-fire. Earlier in the conflict, Qatar brokered the release of foreign nationals and dual passport holders from Gaza. Qatar subsequently coordinated the weeklong pause in fighting in late November, which saw Hamas release over 100 Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel releasing Palestinian prisoners and allowing for increased humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. Since then, Qatar has tried to broker another deal that would see Israel agree to a temporary cease-fire in exchange for Hamas releasing more of the roughly 134 hostages, dead and alive, who remain in Gaza after being kidnapped during the militant group's Oct. 7 assault on Israel. However, this effort has stalled amid both sides' steep conditions for further negotiations: Hamas has demanded an end to the fighting and the withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces from the Gaza Strip, while Israel has demanded a full release of all remaining hostages and has not committed to the permanent cease-fire envisioned by Hamas. 

Qatar's longstanding ties with Hamas have enabled the Arab Gulf country to serve as a mediator in the ongoing Gaza war. Qatar has long supported Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa, including Muslim Brotherhood offshoots like Hamas, which is part of Doha's foreign policy that seeks to keep ties with state and non-state actors across the region. Qatar supported Hamas after its takeover in Gaza following the group's victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, although the country's ties with the group date back to the 1990s. For years, Qatar also provided financial support and humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, including monthly payments since 2018 after the Palestinian Authority cut public workers' salaries. The Israeli government viewed this policy as a measure to prop up Hamas against the Palestinian Authority and weaken attempts for a unified Palestinian government, but Israel tolerated it nevertheless until Hamas' unprecedented Oct. 7 assault. Furthermore, Qatar opened Hamas' political bureau in Doha in 2012, hosting political leaders including the chief of Hamas' political wing, Ismail Haniyeh, at Washington's request to establish a channel of communication and facilitate negotiations with the group. The fact that Qatar has been able to host Hamas' political bureau while still maintaining ties with Israel positioned the country to serve as a natural mediator between the two sides. 

• In a post on X (formerly Twitter) in late October, Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi said he was ''pleased to say that Qatar [was] becoming an essential party and stakeholder in the facilitation of humanitarian solutions [in Gaza].'' However, as further hostage and cease-fire talks have stalled, the Israeli government has since become more critical of Qatar's negotiation efforts, suggesting that Doha could increase pressure on Hamas.

Qatar's role as a mediator and its relationship with Hamas are part of a foreign policy that seeks to keep ties with state and non-state actors across the region. Qatar became a mediating power in the Middle East as a way of protecting itself through relationships with regional countries after Iraq's 1990 invasion of nearby Kuwait exposed the vulnerabilities of smaller Gulf Arab countries. While many smaller Gulf countries at the time relied heavily on Saudi Arabia for security guarantees at the cost of their policies being influenced by Riyadh, Qatar focused on becoming a regional mediator by developing a multitude of diplomatic ties, which in turn helped it develop an image of perceived neutrality. As a part of this strategy, Qatar fostered relationships with non-state and state actors, brokering deals with both regional parties and Western entities. Over the years, this approach has enabled Doha to withstand political pressure from external forces, particularly other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as it did during the multi-year blockade coordinated by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, Qatar has been able to leverage its diverse diplomatic relationships for economic and defense cooperation, manifesting in closer ties with countries like the United States and Turkey. Doha's role as a regional mediator has also provided some security for not only Qatar, but countries with a military presence there, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. 

• Qatar has a history of brokering deals in the Middle East, including a September 2023 deal between Iran and the United States that involved a prisoner swap and unfroze $6 billion in assets.
• Qatar is a ''major non-NATO ally'' of the United States, hosting the United States' largest military base in the region at the Al-Udeid Air Base.

As Hamas loses control of Gaza, Qatar's political incentives and diplomatic capital associated with hosting the militant group's political bureau will decrease. Qatari ties to Hamas were advantageous to the United States and Israel so long as Hamas was the primary governing body in the Gaza Strip. Both Israel and the United States have said that Hamas will not have a role in Gaza's future governance, as the group will either be destroyed or expelled from the strip. As the war continues, the fragmentation between Hamas' political wing and the militant wing will increase. Even if Hamas survives but is kicked out of Gaza, it will significantly lose any political legitimacy without control of the Gaza Strip, while cells in Lebanon, the West Bank and some neighboring countries will likely take more of a militant approach. As a result, Qatar's leverage will decrease since it has more influence over Hamas' political wing. Furthermore, hawkish elements of the United States will likely question not only Qatar's relationship with Hamas' political bureau but also inquire about the extent to which Doha was aware of the group's plans to attack Israel on Oct. 7. Should Qatar preserve its ties with Hamas, it would also face a potential diplomatic crisis with Israel, as Israel would likely conduct targeted assassinations against Hamas leaders after the end of the war. If Israel conducted an extraterritorial attack in Qatar against Hamas' political leaders, Qatar would likely be forced to respond due to infringements on its national sovereignty. 

• The Israeli government has rejected the idea of Hamas returning to power in Gaza after the war ends, proposing that Palestinians unaffiliated with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority instead govern the strip. The United States has suggested that a reformed Palestinian Authority could take over Gaza. Regardless, Hamas is unlikely to be included in post-war governance discussions. 
• Israel has reportedly never assassinated Hamas figures on Qatari soil. However, in Dec. 3 recordings, the head of the Israeli security service Shin Bet vowed to kill Hamas leaders in ''every location,'' including countries outside of Palestinian territories — naming both Turkey and Qatar.
• Since the onset of the war in Gaza, Israel has conducted at least two targeted strikes against Hamas leaders in Lebanon, including one that killed the group's deputy political head in January 2024. There have been reports that Israel reassured Qatar that assassinations would not happen on Qatari soil, but that could change once hostage negotiations end.

After the war ends, Qatar will likely expel Hamas from its territory and align its Palestinian policies with those of the other Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) members, but Doha will probably still assert some independent influence over the Gaza Strip via reconstruction efforts. Shortly after Hamas' Oct. 7 attack on Israel, Qatar's emir reportedly asked if it was time for the United States to ask Qatar to expel the Palestinian militant group. In late October, Washington and Doha then agreed to revisit the issue after the war ended. Once Israel removes Hamas from power in Gaza and the group loses its negotiating power, Qatar will have little reason not to heed Western and Israeli pressure to expel Hamas, which Doha will likely do after the conflict is over. Such a move would risk straining Qatar's relations with Iran, Hamas' key supporter and weapons supplier. It could also harm Doha's ties with Turkey, which does not view Hamas as a terrorist organization and previously hosted some of the group's political leaders. However, Turkey's longstanding relationship with Qatar — which is rooted in their shared support of Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood — would likely withstand the decision, as would Qatar's relationship with Iran — which is rooted in the two countries' economic cooperation. But even if its relations with Turkey and Iran deteriorate significantly, Qatar's strong ties with the West — particularly the United States — would grant Doha some political flexibility by offering alternatives to offset any deterioration in those relationships. Without Hamas as the governing body in the Gaza Strip, however, Qatar will lose its diplomatic advantage over the Gaza Strip and, in turn, some of its prized diplomatic independence. As a result, Qatar will be compelled to align its priorities for Palestinian governance and statehood with the greater GCC bloc and Saudi Arabia. Doha will also likely support the GCC position in post-war negotiations, as regional stakeholders and the broader international community discuss the future of Gazan security and governance. However, compared with its Gulf Arab peers, Qatar will be more inclined to provide humanitarian aid for Gaza's reconstruction to assert its influence over the strip; other GCC countries will likely implement more conditionality on reconstruction aid, such as an independent Palestinian state. This will likely still give Qatar some independent influence in Gaza, despite its policies aligning more closely with other GCC countries after the war ends. 

• Turkey has a military base in Qatar and has expanded bilateral trade with the Gulf Arab country. Iran also has bilateral agreements with Qatar and has previously used Qatari ties with the West for leverage in negotiations, such as the September 2023 prisoner swap.
• Once the military operations end, the GCC's primary goal in the medium-to-long term will be establishing Palestinian statehood and improving Palestinian rights. However, many of the regional bloc's members do not have an interest in maintaining Hamas' political survival in Palestinian politics. 
• Even if it expels Hamas, Qatar remains unlikely to expel other controversial groups from its territory, such as the Taliban, which would conflict with Doha's open-door policy. Any additional expulsions would be based on the group's utility and the benefit provided by maintaining communication channels with said group.