Though a sustained resurgence in Somali piracy would put additional pressure on the global shipping industry, and potentially contribute to geopolitical tensions between India and China, such piracy's impact will likely be limited compared to its late 2000s peak due to stronger multinational counterpiracy structures. The International Chamber of Shipping on Dec. 14 announced the hijacking of the Maltese-flagged Ruen bulk carrier, the first successful hijacking off the coast of Somalia since 2017. Thereafter, the Indian navy on Jan. 5 foiled the attempted hijacking of a Liberian-flagged bulk carrier 460 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. Between November 2023 and January 2024, no less than 14 piracy incidents have been reported off the Horn of Africa. Initially conflated with Houthi attacks targeting container ships in the southern Red Sea, the difference in how the weapon systems used in these attacks has been more akin to piracy has raised concerns about a potential resurgence of this threat off the coast of Somalia. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations on Jan. 30 confirmed that at least two pirate-action groups were operating in the western Indian Ocean. 

• The Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi militant group began targeting commercial shipping vessels in November 2023 in response to Israeli military operations in Gaza, causing major disruptions to global shipping. 
• While Houthi attacks on commercial vessels have largely relied on drones, and to a lesser extent on long-range missiles, attacks by Somali pirates mostly involve hijacking attempts using fishing vessels and light weapons. 
• Highlighting concerns in the global shipping industry, maritime shipping provider West of England P&I Club launched a new piracy protection product for shipowners in late January. 

The resurgence in piracy off Somalia's coast appears opportunistically motivated by Houthi attacks in the southern Red Sea, but also by local drivers such as resentment of illegal foreign fishing and an apparent partnership between pirates and jihadist group al Shabaab. Piracy off the coast of Somalia posed a major threat to global shipping activity in the late 2000s and early 2010s, when pirates successfully hijacked more than 100 commercial vessels and significantly raised the cost of maritime transport in the region. Multilateral counterpiracy operations subsequently managed to stamp out this threat over the past decade. Given the steep decline in piracy off the Horn of Africa and the surge in Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the southern Red Sea from late November 2023 onward, outside attention rapidly shifted to deterring Houthi attacks, thus leaving more leeway for pirates. Pirates meanwhile now have many more potential targets off the coast of Somalia given the growing number of vessels awaiting orders to proceed from the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea due to the Houthi threat. And a resurgence in illegal fishing operations by foreign fishing vessels since the 2010s as piracy waned has cut into local fishermen's income, also giving them an incentive to turn to piracy to make ends meet. In addition, a new partnership between pirates and jihadist group al Shabaab could also explain the surge in pirate attacks, with reports noting that the militant group is providing protection to pirates in exchange for a share of the ransom obtained from hijacked ships. 

• According to a 2011 report from Ocean Beyond Piracy, the indirect cost of Somali piracy approached $7 billion due to factors that include rising insurance premiums, the rerouting of ships, legal proceedings and the hiring of private security personnel. 
• The success of counterpiracy operations over the past decade led shipping associations to rescind the Indian Ocean High Risk Area in January 2023. 
• Local elections in Somalia's Puntland state in January may have acted as a temporary driver behind resurging pirate attacks, as the organization of the elections saw security forces leave coastal security positions to police the election inland, creating a security vacuum off the region's coast.
• Al Shabaab has not officially confirmed its alliance with pirates, but reports suggest that the group may receive up to 30% of the pirates' ransom proceeds.

The presence of local drivers behind the recent uptick in Somali piracy could persist even if Houthi attacks come to a halt, but stronger counterpiracy structures and greater preparedness from the shipping industry will limit the impact of piracy. Sustained Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea will likely see the Yemen-based group remain the main threat to regional maritime security over the coming weeks, if not months, which will continue to create leeway for Somali pirates to operate. The existence of local drivers, however, suggests that the threat of pirate attacks off Somalia's coast could remain even if Houthi attacks were to come to a halt. First, Somalia's limited coast guard fleet, as well as corruption in parts of the Somali government, indicate that illegal fishing operations — especially by foreign vessels — are likely to remain widespread, which will continue to help Somali pirates recruit. Furthermore, successful hijacking operations could see al Shabaab become more actively involved in piracy to fund its intended expansion of militant activity against both Ethiopia and Somaliland following the latter's maritime deal. But unlike in the 2000s and early 2010s, counterpiracy operations are now well-structured, with the European Union and other multinational bodies conducting frequent patrols in the western Indian Ocean to deter attacks and help ships facing hijacking attempts. The shipping industry is also better prepared to face resurging piracy activity, as commercial vessels now more commonly deploy armed guards and feature citadels, or fortified spaces on ships where crews can shelter in the event of hijacking attempts. This all suggests that while resurging piracy activity off Somalia's coast could persist beyond the current Red Sea crisis, the threat is unlikely to reach its scale at the turn of 2010. 

• Leading counterpiracy efforts are the European Union's Operation Atalanta as well as the multinational Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151; India and China also have a significant naval presence in the region. 
• EU officials confirmed that additional vessels would be deployed to the Horn of Africa by mid-February to curb the recent surge in attacks. 

Although unlikely to be as disruptive as during the late 2000s, persistent piracy off the Somali coast would raise pressure on the already strained global shipping industry and likely increase the militarization of the western Indian Ocean, which could increase tensions between India and China. Despite the shipping industry being better prepared to confront pirate attacks, sustained piracy off the Horn of Africa would most likely increase shipping insurance premiums for commercial vessels traversing the western Indian Ocean. This would add further pressure on the global shipping industry, which already faces rising costs from the diversion of much of global shipping from the Red Sea to the much longer route around the southern tip of Africa, surging shipping insurance rates in the Black Sea due to the Russia-Ukraine War and continued limitations on traffic through the Panama Canal due to an ongoing drought. A sustained surge in Somali piracy would thus risk fueling already spiking container shipping rates, further raising costs for global supply chains. Given its potential global implications, a sustained increase in piracy off the coast of Africa would likely see growing naval deployments from multiple states. While countries can contribute ships to the multilateral Combined Maritime Task Force, India and China are likely to continue to deploy ships to the western Indian Ocean independently in a bid to secure ships that are India or China-flagged or inbound to India or China. India has already significantly increased its naval presence in the region since December 2023, and New Delhi may look to leverage the resurging threat posed by Somali piracy to make a renewed push to secure a military base on the Seychelles' Assumption Island. Conversely, Beijing's counterpiracy efforts will likely be coordinated from China's naval base in Djibouti, but Chinese vessels could look to make port calls either in the Maldives or Pakistan as part of its counterpiracy operations, in turn likely prompting tensions with India. In the absence of deconfliction mechanisms, the growing presence of Indian and Chinese vessels in the western Indian Ocean will carry the risk of unplanned encounters, in turn raising the risk of accidents and potential confrontation. 

• Information-sharing tools for navies engaged in counterpiracy operations, such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism, were set up in the late 2000s, but their use has declined amid the receding threat posed by piracy through the late 2010s. 
• India first attempted to secure military access to the Seychelles' Assumption Island in the 2010s, but the project was scrapped amid backlash from locals amid sovereignty and environmental concerns. While India has the use of a military base on Mauritius' North Agalega island, it is located farther from the Horn of Africa than is Assumption Island, in turn making the latter more appealing as a docking point for counterpiracy operations. Furthermore, setting up a base on Assumption Island would help India strengthen its strategic position at the entrance of the Mozambique Channel.
• In addition to China and India, Turkey is likely to expand its naval deployments off Somalia's coast following its conclusion of a bilateral defense agreement with Somalia on Feb. 8.