Belarus' apparent economic recovery will be short-lived as structural issues undermine long-term growth, but pervasively fragile economic conditions will not be enough to reignite opposition against the regime in Minsk ahead of elections in 2024. On Aug. 8, Belarusian First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Snopkov announced at a meeting of the country's Council of Ministers that Belarus had returned to positive economic growth rates as of March and that gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 2% year on year in the first half of 2023. This return to growth would mark a change of direction for the Belarusian economy, which, according to the IMF, contracted by 4.7% in 2022. The government's efforts to return to growth have focused on stimulating domestic demand with cheap loans and mass re-exports to Russia of American and European Union goods that Russia can no longer procure due to sanctions.  However, Belarusians' panic buying of Western brands that continue to leave the country constitutes a significant component of the country's rising consumption rates. At the same time, rising salaries will also fuel higher prices, resulting in an overheated economy, with high inflation accompanying this increase in consumer growth. These factors, which are driving Minsk's recent return to growth for the time being, are fundamentally unsustainable and mean that Belarus' recovery will remain modest and possibly short-lived. 

• Belarus' 2022 recession is particularly striking when viewed alongside its fellow Eurasian Economic Union members, with whom it competes for lucrative re-exports to Russia. Kazakhstan, for example, grew 3.2% in 2022 and is set to grow more this year, while Armenia and Kyrgyzstan grew 12.6% and 7%, respectively. Even Georgia, which is outside the Eurasian Economic Union but similarly able to profit from re-exports to Russia, grew by 10.1%. 
• Compared to other countries in the Eurasian Economic Union, Belarus' dependence on the Russian economy prevents it from benefiting from re-exports to Russia to the same extent as its counterparts. At the same time, Minsk is experiencing the cumulative mid-term effects of the sanctions placed on Belarus since 2020 after mass protests swept the country following the falsified presidential election results in favor of long-time and current president Alexander Lukashenko.

Despite the positive economic recovery reportedly registered in recent months, Belarus' prospects for long-term growth remain pessimistic as a result of structural issues. Belarus' economy will face the metastasizing of old inhibitors to growth and the possible appearance of new impediments in the months and years ahead. Demographics are a key growth constraint, as a May 2023 BEROC research center analysis found that around 170,000 Belarusians (at least 1.8% of the country's population) had left the country for permanent residence in EU countries in the years 2021 and 2022 alone. Well over 2% of the population has left for Western countries since 2020, and the number is even higher if including those who left for Russia and the rest of the world, while the majority of emigrants are of prime productivity and childbearing age. The recent mass exodus was mostly due to political repressions but also the result of a combination of factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic, lack of economic opportunities amid sanctions and, later, the war in Ukraine. This explains why staffing shortages and the inability to find labor are the most commonly reported impediments to business growth, according to BEROC. The second structural impediment is the contraction of Belarus' IT sector. On July 31, Belarus' economy minister Alexander Chervyakov said that the IT industry, which used to be considered an engine of the country's economic future amid a lack of resources and a large population, had constricted by an astounding 17% in the first half of 2023. In May 2023, the number of workers in large and medium-sized IT firms was at its lowest in the past three years at just 61,000, 15% less than in May 2020. Finally, any Belarusian recovery will still face the chronic ailment of reduced attractiveness for foreign investment due to reputational and legal risks. This threat could further manifest should EU states further close their borders with Belarus, which, for example, Poland and the three Baltic countries will discuss at a ministerial meeting in Warsaw on Aug. 28 in response to the low-likelihood event of a major provocation along NATO borders. Closures would significantly hinder the imports, exports and cross-border trade on which the Belarusian economy still relies. 

• Minsk is deliberately degrading Belarus' once vaunted IT sector in order to reorient its activities away from Western clients and towards software for the Belarusian government and to the markets of "friendly" states. The government is also moving to hide the detrimental effects that its reorientation policy has had on workers in the IT sector, as Belarus' statistics agency, Belstat, continues to block the publication of information about the IT sector and IT specialists, for example, by ceasing to publish data on the median salary among IT workers. 
• Moscow and Minsk likely hoped to use the threat of Wagner's presence in Belarus — and erroneous perceptions in the West that the group is not actually under the Kremlin's firm control — to reduce Western willingness to maintain or increase support for Ukraine by fabricating threats to Poland and the Baltic states. Poland and the Baltic states' preemptive preparation measures, including Poland's Aug. 10 announcement that it would deploy thousands of new troops and border personnel, as well as Lithuania's Aug. 16 preemptive closure of two of its six border crossings, demonstrate that any significant provocation would be met with a serious response, thereby decreasing the likelihood of success and therefore impeding any attempts. 
• The Belarusian government is likely to disapprove of budget expenditures to support  Wagner forces' presence in the country, meaning that Wagner's 4000-6000 fighters could eventually be pushed out of the country once Moscow determines their future. Further, Moscow will likely see value in recommitting Wagner's manpower and fighting experience to more useful theaters, such as in the war in Ukraine or in Africa, reducing the risk of a complete closure of EU borders with Belarus. 

The Belarusian opposition movement will remain marginalized despite the appearance of potential triggers of unrest and further integration with Russia over the next year. Belarus' tentative economic recovery will not significantly bolster Minsk's negotiating position vis-a-vis Moscow, as Lukashenko already lacks leverage to resist Russia's efforts to use union-state integration to take ''full control'' of the country over the coming years and decades. In what will likely be the country's most significant electoral and political event since 2020, on Feb. 25, 2024, Belarus will hold the first-ever elections (in addition to parliamentary and local elections) to the All-Belarusian People's Assembly — an extra-parliamentary body that received new constitutional powers following a 2022 referendum. However, these elections will be of little consequence because ongoing repressions have almost entirely forced the opposition movement underground or into exile. There is little reason to believe Belarus' fragile economy can rekindle the mass protests that swept the country in 2020. Therefore, the Belarusian opposition is more likely to position itself to influence Lukashenko's eventual succession process, which could take place as soon as the next presidential election in 2025. The dependence of the regime's stability on him individually — and growing evidence of his deteriorating health — will reinforce their view that mass protests are not worth the risk unless related to his efforts to stay in the presidency or continue to run the country after leaving it.