"It is only those countries having adequate resources of men and materials which can exercise a direct influence on the peaceful organization of international society."
Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (1944)
A multipolar world system creates both greater opportunity and greater incentive for middle powers to assert their interests and seek to influence global norms and developments. Middle powers will be courted by big powers, giving them more room to maneuver. They will be critical components of any balance of power in the international system.
The Difficulty of Defining Middle Powers
In international relations and geopolitics, the idea of middle powers is admittedly a bit fuzzy. At times, they are defined in a geographic sense, as countries caught physically between large powers — such as Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, or Korea between China and imperial Japan. At other times, they are defined in terms of economic or military strength — not as powerful as the great powers, but more powerful than their neighbors. South Africa, Egypt or Iran during the Cold War were at times important middle powers in this sense.
Middle powers may be defined by the role they play, such as serving as intermediaries between larger powers like Canada and India did during the Cold War. Or they may be countries sitting astride two worlds or civilizations, such as Turkey, which bridges Europe and the Islamic world, or Japan and Australia, one an Asian nation considered part of the West, the other a Western nation located in the Asia-Pacific region.
The flexibility of the term "middle power" also reflects the changing position of nations within an international context. The designation is often transitory, based on rising or falling economic, political or military fortunes or changing priorities of the big powers. Mainland China emerged as a middle power during the Cold War, while Venezuela's internal economic and political dynamics have seen that country lose its status as a middle power in northern South America and the Caribbean.
Reemergence of Middle Powers
For our purposes, we will consider the middle powers those countries that do not reach the combined power and influence of the big powers, but nonetheless remain influential in their region or even beyond in select thematic areas. The reemergence of a multipolar world system opens new opportunities for middle powers, either alone or collectively, to balance competition among the big powers, and to try and shape the evolution of global norms and standards. We can already see examples today of middle powers seeking to shape their environment and refusing to lock themselves into any singular big power camp. Three prime examples are Japan, Turkey and India, each of which pursues a different path with differing levels of success, but all of which have found ways to enhance their respective national interests while maneuvering among the big powers.
Japan
After decades of economic malaise, Japan has reasserted itself through economic and security means as an important regional middle power. Following the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, for example, Tokyo played a key role in reinvigorating and pressing forward with the revised Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. At the same time, Japan is a signatory of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, seen at one time as a counter to the U.S.-backed TPP. By being a founding member of both, Japan reinforces its position as a central economic partner in the Asia-Pacific region, and keeps its trade options open.
Japan has stepped up its regional defense ties in Southeast Asia; with the United States and Australia; and into the Indian Ocean basin, partnering with India in the maritime space and establishing an overseas presence in Djibouti. Japan serves as a critical base for U.S. forces, and is an important component of the U.S. intelligence and missile defense architecture. But despite its increased defense activities and its strong alliance with the United States, Tokyo continues to resist Washington's efforts to force a decoupling with China, or even with Russia. Without a doubt, Japan sees China as a strategic threat. But it also sees China as an economic opportunity it can use to break free from its longtime stagnation. Japan's rivalry with China stretches back centuries, but Tokyo wants to avoid forcing a confrontation with Beijing. Instead, Tokyo competes along the periphery, from Southeast Asia to the South Pacific, and serves as an alternative in the region to Chinese infrastructure development funds.
Turkey
Turkey is another middle power active in expanding its sphere of activity and reshaping its relations with its neighbors and the big powers. Despite being a NATO member, Turkey is seeking to expand its security relations beyond just the North Atlantic, and has purchased S-400 air defense missiles from Russia. Ankara has stepped up activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, challenging its neighbor and fellow NATO member Greece and triggering a European response, and continues to play a role in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars. Yet while potentially risking its NATO relationships (including with the United States), Turkey is also challenging Russian interests in Syria and the South Caucasus, most recently intervening on the side of Azerbaijan in its confrontation with Armenia.
Despite economic difficulties at home, Ankara continues to pursue an ambitious foreign policy initiative driven by dreams of Pan-Turkic power reaching into Central Asia, Neo-Ottoman influence pressing down into the Middle East and North Africa, and leadership in the Islamic world as a primary Sunni power. The still-unbalanced nature of the multipolar world system gives Turkey more room for maneuver as U.S. and European interests often diverge, Cold War rivalries have softened with the rise of nonstate threats, and China has emerged as its own pole of power. None of the big powers wants to completely alienate Turkey, despite Ankara's contrary actions, and none has the strength or interest to force Turkey down a single path.
India
Nearly since independence from the British in 1947, India has asserted its nonaligned position as a middle power, with strategic autonomy a key policy priority. New Delhi's arms purchases straddle Russia and the United States (and Europe). Despite increasing U.S. pressure, that pattern is unlikely to change anytime soon. By dint of location and size, India was long the main center of power in the Indian Ocean region, but in recent years China's expanded economic, political and defense activities have challenged its central role. India is pushing back, and is expanding its defense cooperation with Australia, Japan and the United States, among others. Still, New Delhi is adamant that these relations are not about building a bloc against China, something that would violate the country's desire to remain nonaligned.
While Turkey is taking advantage of security and political weakness to expand its influence, and Japan laid the defense foundation for its reemergence for decades, India is responding to a fairly dramatic shift in the regional balance of power that has created a host of simultaneous defense, political and economic challenges. Nepal and Bhutan are no longer reliable buffer states; China has stepped up relations, investment and infrastructure development with Pakistan and Myanmar along the land frontiers and with Sri Lanka on the maritime front; and the Chinese navy now operates regularly from the Horn of Africa through the Indian Ocean. India is feeling pressure to break from its strategic autonomy and side with the United States to counter China, but continues to resist, hoping to exploit underlying tensions between Beijing and Moscow as much as it exploits U.S.-China tensions.
Managing the Balance of Power
As we look out over the next several decades, the multipolar structure of the world system will create opportunities and incentives for other middle powers to assert themselves. Despite Europe serving as one big power pole, individual European nations are likely to increasingly assert their national interests. France has historic and strategic interests from West Africa through the South Pacific, for example, that do not necessarily align with overall European priorities. South Korea is seeking to assert itself as a middle power through international institutions, actively campaigning to head the World Trade Organization but also working with several international regulatory and standards bodies, trying to straddle the U.S.-China divide. Among the others to watch are the likes of Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Australia, and Mexico — some of which already are taking steps to play a stronger regional role, others of which are still dealing with internal dynamics.
As the middle powers attempt to balance or exploit the geopolitical space shaped by the great powers, we can expect false starts, overreach and miscalculation. We will also see the United States, China, Russia and Europe shifting and adjusting their behaviors and focusing on efforts to entice and redirect the middle powers. In many ways, then, middle powers will be the focus and lever of managing the global balance of power, retaining more flexibility of relations than during the Cold War, and more significance than during the post-Cold War period of U.S. hegemony. Amid multipolar great power competition, middle powers will become more significant, and perhaps less predictable.
