As fighting rages between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, a much higher level competition for regional influence in the Southern Caucasus is taking place. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has its own distinct origins, is just a piece of the broader geopolitical competition between Russia and Turkey as a more ambitious Turkey challenges the status quo in it and Russia's overlapping peripheries. 

The Southern Caucasus is a highly complex environment for such competition given its numerous peoples and rivalries. This dynamic has led Russia to approach the crisis cautiously, with Moscow's role centered on attempts to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But as long as Azerbaijan, enjoying Turkish military support, sees opportunities for battlefield gains, mediation is unlikely to prove fruitful. Eventually, the conflict will produce renewed negotiations that will shape the fate not only of Nagorno-Karabakh, but that will determine the balance between Russian and Turkish influence in the Southern Caucasus.

Russia's Struggles in the Caucasus, Turkey's Opportunities

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to maintain dominance and stability on both sides of the Caucasus Mountains. In the Northern Caucasus, part of the Russian Federation, Moscow has struggled to tamp down separatism and terrorism in Chechnya and Dagestan, particularly in the 1990s. In the Southern Caucasus, it has struggled to maintain friendly ties with former Soviet Republics turned independent states. Complicating its efforts and the regional dynamic, growing Turkish foreign policy ambitions stretching from the Middle East to Europe and now the Caucasus are giving rise to a potentially significant challenge to Russia's long-term strategy for the region.

The linchpin of Russia's strategy in the Southern Caucasus has been the delicate balancing act of keeping good diplomatic and economic ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though the situation is often simplified as Russia siding with Armenia, in reality, Russia balances its military presence and interactions with Armenia through arms sales and trade with Azerbaijan. Avoiding antagonizing Azerbaijan has been key to Russia's efforts not to be locked out of the Southern Caucasus entirely, or with nothing more than an Armenian ally in a hostile environment. Azerbaijan’s divided external allegiances between Russia on the one hand and its ties to Turkey and NATO on the other, however, force Russia to also try to limit Azerbaijan's interactions with Turkey or NATO, adding another layer of complexity to Russian relations with Azerbaijan.

This situation provides opportunities for Turkey. Turkish geopolitical ambitions have been on the rise since the country's failed 2016 coup and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's subsequent consolidation of power. Given the natural competition between Russia and Turkey when both seek to assert influence beyond their borders, standoffs between the two have been seen in Syria, Libya and to a lesser degree even in places like Ukraine and Georgia. An earlier escalation in the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia in July 2020 likely provided the perfect opportunity for Turkey to ramp up its efforts in the region. Supporting Azerbaijan allows Turkey to challenge the effectiveness of Russia's management strategy in the Southern Caucasus and by extension to challenge the geopolitical status quo along Moscow's vulnerable southern periphery. 

Turkey has historically competed with Russia for hegemony in this neighborhood, something on display in the Ottoman Empire's northward efforts in the 17th century and more recently in Turkey's Cold War role as NATO's bulwark along the Soviet Union's southern front. Given Ankara's current swelling geopolitical ambitions, a result of Erdogan's nationalist support base, these two nations are once again butting heads in the Caucasus. Competition with Russia has been central to Turkey's "Neo-Ottoman" ambition of expanding its geopolitical influence and military presence farther into the Middle East and North Africa or even of challenging European powers. Syrian and Libyan adventures by both Russia and Turkey have brought them on the verge of conflict, but apparently have not discouraged Turkey, which is now taking the competition into Russia's backyard.

Nagorno-Karabakh Flares up

Prior to the breakout of hostilities on Sept. 27, several months of intense high-level military contacts, joint military exercises and a sudden surge in Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan helped Turkey prep Azerbaijan to significantly challenge Russia's ability to maintain its spread between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This Turkish activity followed a July escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which likely provided an opportunity for Turkey to convince the Azerbaijani leadership of Ankara's greater bid to reshape the status quo in the region. Turkey has directly supported the ongoing combat by facilitating the presence of Syrian fighters among Azerbaijani forces, and even by deploying its own F-16 fighter aircraft in Azerbaijan during the opening phases of the conflict.

The competition between Russia and Turkey is unlikely to lead to an all-out conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and not just because Moscow and Ankara fear a destructive fight. Despite Turkey's clear role in facilitating or even instigating this challenge to Russia's position in the Southern Caucasus, it does not want full-on competition with Russia at this early stage of its geopolitical resurgence. And for each player, an all-out conflict would hurt already-shaky financial situations at home, and could have serious follow-on effects in the other theaters where they are facing off. Turkey has demonstrated its willingness and ability to compete with Russia in measured ways in Syria and Libya, where active deconfliction and cease-fire agreements have prevented major military standoffs.

So far, Turkish and Russian forces have not directly faced each other in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey and Azerbaijan likely are working to keep this the case, since such a standoff would almost certainly end any Azerbaijani battlefield gains: More Turkish military support that resulted in a Russian deployment would stall the Azerbaijani advance. But for Turkey, triggering a Russian intervention to back Armenia could eventually prove beneficial. This is because Russian involvement on Armenia's behalf could well wreck the Russia-Azerbaijan relationship. Russia recognizes what Turkey also sees, and so has not played a direct military role in the conflict for now. 

Faced with the choice between halting Azerbaijani and Turkish military ambitions and sustaining its influence in the Southern Caucasus beyond Armenia, Russia has sought to stop the former and protect the latter via a diplomatic solution to the current fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. But reaching a negotiated outcome will be difficult, especially while Azerbaijan sees opportunities for more territorial gains. Russia and other international mediators such as the United States and France, which together head the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group that leads Nagorno-Karabakh mediation efforts, has managed to organize separated mediation sessions up to the foreign ministerial level. Direct talks between the two belligerents, however, have not happened amid the intense fighting.

Broader Russian Goals

Countries like Georgia and Iran have played a secondary yet critical role in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, further limiting Russia's desire for an escalation there. Both countries have served as logistical connections to the different actors in the conflict, with Georgia providing a direct air connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan and Iran providing a connection between Russia and Armenia. Though Georgia and Russia have long had an antagonistic relationship given Russia's support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia does not want the relationship to worsen. A greater Russian military presence in Armenia certainly would alarm Georgia, potentially triggering closer cooperation between Turkey and Georgia. As for Iran, Moscow has enjoyed fairly positive ties with Tehran, which continues to allow deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia. The Iranian people, however, have less clear-cut views about the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with protests in support of the latter having erupted across Iran during the current crisis. Continued fighting or escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh will strain Iranian cooperation with Russia, reinforcing Russia's imperative to stabilize the conflict in the Southern Caucasus.

Though the Turkish challenge in the Southern Caucasus may have initially had Russia on the back foot, the outcome of the current crisis could still see Russia maintain or even strengthen its position in the Southern Caucasus. If a mediated settlement is indeed reached, the shape and form of this agreement will define the potential for future escalations and further challenges to Russia's role in the region. Russia and OSCE, for example, have broached the idea of a Russian peacekeeping force separating Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. Azerbaijan could see the prospect of such a deployment as erecting a permanent block against ejecting Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia will still try to persuade Azerbaijan to accept one, perhaps in exchange for a number of complex guarantees and procedures. If it can pull off such a deal, and if it lasts, Russia would have achieved its goal of keeping its relationship with Azerbaijan — and might become an even more important broker in the Southern Caucasus despite Turkish efforts to block it.