In most countries, the appointment of new military commanders is routine and would not make headlines, but not in Pakistan, where the armed forces have governed the country for more than 30 of Pakistan's 66 years of existence. Even in times of civilian rule the army-intelligence establishment has ruled from behind the scenes. It has only been in the past seven years, since former military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf stepped down as army chief, that the country has seen a steady growth of civilian governance. Earlier this year the process of democratization gained more ground when one elected government transferred power to another — the first time this has happened since the country's founding in 1947.
Civilian Supremacy Over the Military
Raheel Sharif is the first new Pakistani army chief appointed by a civilian government since the end of the Musharraf era. Musharraf appointed Kayani, the outgoing army chief, to be his successor almost exactly seven years ago. After completing his first three-year assignment, Kayani was granted an extension in 2010 by the previous civilian government, led by the Pakistan People's Party.
Aside from the announcement of a new chief justice of the supreme court, the appointment of a new army chief is the most important naming decision that Nawaz Sharif will make in his five-year term, which ends in mid-2018. Though himself a protege of Pakistan's longest-serving military dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), Nawaz Sharif has had a long and checkered history of power struggles with the military since he first became prime minister in 1990. After uneasy relations with two consecutive army chiefs, his own appointee in 1993, Gen. Waheed Kakar, forced the prime minister out of office that same year.
During his second government, in 1998, Nawaz Sharif forced then army chief, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, to resign after Karamat proposed the establishment of a national security council that would give the army a formal role in policymaking. The prime minister appointed Musharraf as the new army chief above several more senior generals in the hope that Musharraf would be subordinate to him. The plan failed, and Nawaz Sharif fired Musharraf after the Kargil miniwar with India, replacing him with then Inter-Services Intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Ziauddin Butt. That decision triggered the Oct. 12, 1999, coup that ushered in the country's fourth military regime.
Nawaz Sharif is hoping that this time will be different. And it could be: The Pakistan of today is very different from the one that existed during his last stint as premier. The military's hold on power has weakened and there has been a significant degree of democratization due to the rise of civil society, private media and an independent judiciary. Alongside this democratization has been the rise of jihadism, however, which has preoccupied the armed forces, further limiting the military's role in politics.
In fact, Nawaz Sharif was inspired by Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party, particularly its success in establishing civilian supremacy over the Turkish military. There are significant differences in the circumstances of the two countries, as well as in the nature of the two ruling parties, that place serious limits on the prime minister's efforts to replicate the achievements in Turkey. But should he succeed in improving the economy (even modestly) by addressing the country's power crisis, it would give him considerable leverage on the civil-military front.
It is notable that alongside the appointment of the new commander, Sharif also gave the portfolio of defense to his close associate, Khawaja Asif, who had previously been running the ministry in charge of dealing with the power crisis. Making Asif, an outspoken critic of the military's involvement in politics during the Musharraf era, defense minister suggests that the post is unlikely to be merely ceremonial as it has been in the past.
For Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League party, the attempt to bring the military under civilian control is not limited to the current term in government; rather, it is a long-term effort. Even a moderate amount of economic progress would enable the party to build upon its status as the single largest party that has been able to form a government on its own. This means that Nawaz Sharif is looking at a gradual process of enhancing civilian control over the armed forces that is spread across two election cycles.
By this time next year, four of the remaining senior commanders — including intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Zaheerul Islam — are due to retire, giving the prime minister another opportunity to shape the military's leadership. The appointment of a new chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency would represent the next major milestone in the process. By late 2015 another four three-star generals will have retired, providing for an almost totally new leadership that would owe its promotions to the new army chief and, by extension, the prime minister.
The Other Sharif
Nawaz Sharif's efforts depend on his relationship with Raheel Sharif, who will be army chief until November 2017, the bulk of the prime minister's current term. Several factors suggest that the two men could forge a decent working relationship: their common ethnic Kashmiri-Punjabi background, Raheel's past relations with Nawaz's inner circle, and the fact that Raheel comes from a family of professional soldiers, which makes him reportedly uninterested in politics.
Still, the prime minister's agenda of greater civilian control of the state, if not carefully managed, could become a problem for Raheel Sharif. The military establishment would want the army chief to retain control over policymaking, especially on strategic matters. Kayani had a tough time balancing the need to steer the military away from politics while maintaining the army's influence over national security matters. Unlike his predecessor — who served closely with Musharraf, especially in his role as chief of the Pakistani intelligence agency — Raheel Sharif does not have much experience in political matters and will need to assert himself if he is to continue Kayani's policy of balance.
As the first new army chief appointed by a civilian government in 15 years, this balancing act becomes even more significant. For the most part, Nawaz Sharif is unlikely to run into any major resistance from his army chief. Even on the issue of India, the prime minister's desire to revive the process he began in 1999 syncs with Raheel Sharif's outlook. India was a sore spot between Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf at the end of the last century, when the prime minister's major peace initiative with his Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, caused significant internal friction. The new army chief has played a leading role in orienting the army away from the idea that India represents the principal threat to the country, instead emphasizing that jihadists inside Pakistan are the new priority.
It is in this area that civil-military relations could fray. Although the prime minister is pursuing negotiations with the Taliban rebels, the new army chief is unlikely to be happy with the idea, primarily because the army has been moving toward a more hard-line approach to the jihadist insurgents.
Raheel Sharif also takes the helm a year before the planned NATO drawdown from Afghanistan is scheduled to take place, as well as the fast-approaching end of the Karzai era. Islamabad is bracing for the fallout, considering that talks with the Afghan Taliban are likely to continue long after most or all U.S. forces have left Afghanistan. The cross-border Talibanization phenomenon has the potential to become an issue between the Sharif government and the new military leadership under Raheel Sharif, who has been playing a leading role in developing new counterterrorism strategies.
There is also the contentious matter of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistani soil. During the week of Nov. 25, the U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle campaign escalated when the first ever drone strike took place well beyond the tribal belt in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Nawaz Sharif is under popular pressure to bring an end to the UAV attacks, especially since his main rival, Imran Khan, whose party rules Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, has been trying to force another blockade of the NATO land supply route. While Sharif is trying to avoid alienating his political base, the military seems to be quietly cooperating with the United States as far as the UAV strikes are concerned. This fact is evident in the recent killing of Pakistani Taliban rebel chief Hakeemullah Mehsud and the sequential eradication of members of the Haqqani wing of the Afghan Taliban.
Further augmenting the complexity of the situation, on Pakistan's western periphery the U.S.-Iranian nuclear deal gathers momentum, which could turn the Afghanistan-Pakistan region into a major sectarian battleground as Saudi Arabia prepares to counter an increasingly unencumbered Iran. Ultimately, the prime minister and army chief have many reasons to be able to work together effectively, but there also exists considerable room for disagreement.
