It is spring in Kashmir. The snows have melted. Fighting has broken out. To that extent it is almost a tradition. During the winter months, Moslem guerrillas move forward in the mountainous terrain, taking advantage of cloud and snows and the fact that Indian forces are in winter quarters to gain some territory. As the snows melt, Indian forces deploy and push the guerrillas back. This has been going on now for decades. On rare occasion, the rites of spring turn into a major, pitched battle. Sometimes it is intended. Sometimes it just happens. Each time it is different.
This year, it turned into a major pitched battle. According to the Indians, Moslem infiltration is much greater than in previous years. It is the Indian view that this year, rather than the normal infiltration, the Moslems, backed by Pakistan, planned their military actions in order to change definitively the demarcation lines in Kashmir. Indeed, the Indians are claiming that they were completely taken by surprise by the extent of the Moslem action that they regard as an invasion rather than an infiltration. According to retired Air Marshall M.M. Singh, writing in the Times of India, "It appears to be a major failure of our military intelligence...that they did not anticipate the massive infiltration in the Kargil-Drass sector."
In response, India has reported that it has launched a massive air-land operation designed to drive the Moslems back. Pakistan claims to have shot down two Migs and a helicopter in Pakistani territory. India claims that one Mig was shot down and claims that the Pakistanis deliberately murdered its pilot. The Indians also claim that they are making steady progress in recovering their territory. The other side of course, disputes this claim. According to Reuters, a spokesman for the Muttahida Jihad Council, an umbrella group of 13 independent organizations, claimed today that it had not given back any territory at all. India admits that the going has been tough and it is clear that it has suffered losses, which is to be expected when conducting offensive operations in this terrain. Nevertheless, in spite of having to engage in hand-to-hand combat, the Indians are claiming slow progress.
At this point, the diplomatic track is cutting in. Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz has offered to meet with his Indian counterpart in an attempt to defuse the crisis and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has reportedly accepted the offer. It is significant that the Pakistanis offered to negotiate without demanding a prior cease-fire and that the Indians agreed to talks without demanding a prior pullout by the Moslems. Both sides appear to be concerned that the situation is getting out of hand.
Indeed, the question that is most important, in some senses much more important than the details of the fighting, is what exactly went wrong this time. This is apparently the worst combat between the two countries since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Until this year, both countries have kept the situation under control, indeed, created a ritual of the conflict. Thus, the question is what happened in the spring of 1999?
One clear variable is the domestic political situation in Pakistan. It is too much to say that Pakistan is destabilizing. However, it is fair to say that the ability of the central government to control both outlying regions and outlying political movements has declined. Moslem fundamentalists in Kashmir are particularly difficult to control given the dynamics of Pakistani politics. These Moslems, supported by Islamic militancy throughout the region, have an ideological reason to challenge India and a political motive as well. They want to create a reality on the ground that will compel the Pakistani government to commit itself on their behalf. In addition, they have strong supporters inside Pakistan as well.
It appears to us that these forces were interested in triggering a confrontation with India by dramatically increasing the magnitude of their infiltration. The issue is not to unilaterally redefine the border. Rather, the goal is to draw Indian forces into sustained combat. The more reinforcements the Indians send to the border, the greater the pressure on the Pakistani government to respond. Whether Pakistan responds or not, the guerrillas are winners. If the Pakistanis throw forces into a pitched battle in Kashmir, the guerrillas will have won. If they do not, the guerillas increase their ideological leverage and embarrass the more moderate elements in the government.
Looked at in terms of internal Pakistani politics, the forward deployment of the guerrillas makes a good deal of sense. The rapid desire of both Pakistanis and Indians to quickly defuse the situation, even while the fighting continues, also makes sense. The problem is this. Pakistan is in no position to compel a withdrawal. India cannot accept a cease-fire with the redefined frontier. The danger is that barring a quick Indian victory, which does not appear to be happening, neither country will be in a position to place controls on the crisis. The longer the combat lasts, the greater the pressure on Pakistan to send regular forces en masse to the frontier. Once that happens, and regular forces are engaged in brigade and division level combat, the difficulty of capping off the conflict becomes orders of magnitude greater. It appears to us that both sides are terribly aware of the danger. Both sides are hoping that the guerrillas will be pushed back by the Indians very quickly. The guerrillas, however, seem to be holding out nicely. Time is on their side.
There is, of course, another side to this: the broader geopolitical configuration. India has always been close to Russia. Of late, it has also had an interesting, halting flirtation with, if not China, then the Sino-Russian alliance. The normal counterbalance to all of this would be Pakistan's main ally, the United States. However, with Washington on complete overload, its ability to focus its interests and energies on controlling events on the subcontinent is limited. This means that should India break the guerrillas quickly, it might well be tempted to turn a retreat into a rout, confronting Pakistan directly. Given nuclear weapons on both sides, we doubt that either side is quite that adventurous. It is, however, a dangerous situation for which neither government was actually prepared.
This year, it turned into a major pitched battle. According to the Indians, Moslem infiltration is much greater than in previous years. It is the Indian view that this year, rather than the normal infiltration, the Moslems, backed by Pakistan, planned their military actions in order to change definitively the demarcation lines in Kashmir. Indeed, the Indians are claiming that they were completely taken by surprise by the extent of the Moslem action that they regard as an invasion rather than an infiltration. According to retired Air Marshall M.M. Singh, writing in the Times of India, "It appears to be a major failure of our military intelligence...that they did not anticipate the massive infiltration in the Kargil-Drass sector."
In response, India has reported that it has launched a massive air-land operation designed to drive the Moslems back. Pakistan claims to have shot down two Migs and a helicopter in Pakistani territory. India claims that one Mig was shot down and claims that the Pakistanis deliberately murdered its pilot. The Indians also claim that they are making steady progress in recovering their territory. The other side of course, disputes this claim. According to Reuters, a spokesman for the Muttahida Jihad Council, an umbrella group of 13 independent organizations, claimed today that it had not given back any territory at all. India admits that the going has been tough and it is clear that it has suffered losses, which is to be expected when conducting offensive operations in this terrain. Nevertheless, in spite of having to engage in hand-to-hand combat, the Indians are claiming slow progress.
At this point, the diplomatic track is cutting in. Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz has offered to meet with his Indian counterpart in an attempt to defuse the crisis and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has reportedly accepted the offer. It is significant that the Pakistanis offered to negotiate without demanding a prior cease-fire and that the Indians agreed to talks without demanding a prior pullout by the Moslems. Both sides appear to be concerned that the situation is getting out of hand.
Indeed, the question that is most important, in some senses much more important than the details of the fighting, is what exactly went wrong this time. This is apparently the worst combat between the two countries since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Until this year, both countries have kept the situation under control, indeed, created a ritual of the conflict. Thus, the question is what happened in the spring of 1999?
One clear variable is the domestic political situation in Pakistan. It is too much to say that Pakistan is destabilizing. However, it is fair to say that the ability of the central government to control both outlying regions and outlying political movements has declined. Moslem fundamentalists in Kashmir are particularly difficult to control given the dynamics of Pakistani politics. These Moslems, supported by Islamic militancy throughout the region, have an ideological reason to challenge India and a political motive as well. They want to create a reality on the ground that will compel the Pakistani government to commit itself on their behalf. In addition, they have strong supporters inside Pakistan as well.
It appears to us that these forces were interested in triggering a confrontation with India by dramatically increasing the magnitude of their infiltration. The issue is not to unilaterally redefine the border. Rather, the goal is to draw Indian forces into sustained combat. The more reinforcements the Indians send to the border, the greater the pressure on the Pakistani government to respond. Whether Pakistan responds or not, the guerrillas are winners. If the Pakistanis throw forces into a pitched battle in Kashmir, the guerrillas will have won. If they do not, the guerillas increase their ideological leverage and embarrass the more moderate elements in the government.
Looked at in terms of internal Pakistani politics, the forward deployment of the guerrillas makes a good deal of sense. The rapid desire of both Pakistanis and Indians to quickly defuse the situation, even while the fighting continues, also makes sense. The problem is this. Pakistan is in no position to compel a withdrawal. India cannot accept a cease-fire with the redefined frontier. The danger is that barring a quick Indian victory, which does not appear to be happening, neither country will be in a position to place controls on the crisis. The longer the combat lasts, the greater the pressure on Pakistan to send regular forces en masse to the frontier. Once that happens, and regular forces are engaged in brigade and division level combat, the difficulty of capping off the conflict becomes orders of magnitude greater. It appears to us that both sides are terribly aware of the danger. Both sides are hoping that the guerrillas will be pushed back by the Indians very quickly. The guerrillas, however, seem to be holding out nicely. Time is on their side.
There is, of course, another side to this: the broader geopolitical configuration. India has always been close to Russia. Of late, it has also had an interesting, halting flirtation with, if not China, then the Sino-Russian alliance. The normal counterbalance to all of this would be Pakistan's main ally, the United States. However, with Washington on complete overload, its ability to focus its interests and energies on controlling events on the subcontinent is limited. This means that should India break the guerrillas quickly, it might well be tempted to turn a retreat into a rout, confronting Pakistan directly. Given nuclear weapons on both sides, we doubt that either side is quite that adventurous. It is, however, a dangerous situation for which neither government was actually prepared.
