Summary
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif may be siding with the military in an effort to preserve his hold on power. Last week saw a surge in political activity, with all indications pointing to a shift in Pakistani civil-military relations. Now with an ever-increasing hard-line Muslim opposition agitating for Sharif's removal and coup rumors flying, an alliance between Sharif and the military might be his best chance.
Analysis
Following coup rumors, an unnamed U.S. official, on Sept. 20, intimated U.S. opposition to "interrupted democracy" in Pakistan. The comment signaled to the Pakistani military that the United States would not support such a move. Although the army claims to be committed to Pakistani democracy, it has controlled the country three times in the past and would be capable of doing so again.
The statement ignited a storm of speculation about the stability of Sharif's government. Ever since the troop withdrawal in the Kargil conflict, cries for his removal have abounded. The withdrawal of troops was seen by many as a defeat for Pakistan and Sharif.
On the same day the U.S. official made his comment, Sharif met with Chief of the Army Staff and part-time Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. While details of the meeting are unknown, there is much speculation that Sharif may appoint Musharraf full-time chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, effectively promoting a greater military role in Pakistani politics, which would help appease military factions and could prevent a possible coup.
All events indicate the real possibility of a deal between Sharif and the military. While Sharif met with the army chief in Islamabad, the head of Pakistan's Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Ziauddin, arrived in Washington. This visit, while touted as routine, could easily have been used to shore up Washington support for Sharif. Two days after the visit, the United States waived some minor sanctions against Pakistan and provided a grant of $330,000 for "law enforcement, area development, and demand reduction."
These acts could be seen as symbolic U.S. gestures of support for Sharif. The United States has made it clear that although it officially acknowledges no threat from the Pakistani military, it would not support "extra-constitutional measures." The United States, albeit not thrilled with Sharif or his government, does not want religious fundamentalists to gain control. All this leads us to believe that the United States hopes to encourage the continuation of Sharif's government.
Sharif could be using the oblique U.S. support as a bargaining tool in his dealings with the military. It would seem that with U.S. support and Sharif's apparent indecision concerning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Sharif has yet to lose control. Until he signs the CTBT, which the military likely oppose, he could use the issue as a bargaining chip. By attempting to work out a deal with the military, he could secure his hold on power.
The meetings between the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee today and the army commanders tomorrow, Sept. 24, suggest that heavy questions are at hand. If the military decide to work with Sharif, they would immediately gain a greater role in Pakistani politics. By cooperating, he maintains his tenuous hold on power while appeasing the United States. However, in the long term Sharif could be saddled with the military and its growing forces - forces that could easily prove his downfall.
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif may be siding with the military in an effort to preserve his hold on power. Last week saw a surge in political activity, with all indications pointing to a shift in Pakistani civil-military relations. Now with an ever-increasing hard-line Muslim opposition agitating for Sharif's removal and coup rumors flying, an alliance between Sharif and the military might be his best chance.
Analysis
Following coup rumors, an unnamed U.S. official, on Sept. 20, intimated U.S. opposition to "interrupted democracy" in Pakistan. The comment signaled to the Pakistani military that the United States would not support such a move. Although the army claims to be committed to Pakistani democracy, it has controlled the country three times in the past and would be capable of doing so again.
The statement ignited a storm of speculation about the stability of Sharif's government. Ever since the troop withdrawal in the Kargil conflict, cries for his removal have abounded. The withdrawal of troops was seen by many as a defeat for Pakistan and Sharif.
On the same day the U.S. official made his comment, Sharif met with Chief of the Army Staff and part-time Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. While details of the meeting are unknown, there is much speculation that Sharif may appoint Musharraf full-time chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, effectively promoting a greater military role in Pakistani politics, which would help appease military factions and could prevent a possible coup.
All events indicate the real possibility of a deal between Sharif and the military. While Sharif met with the army chief in Islamabad, the head of Pakistan's Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Ziauddin, arrived in Washington. This visit, while touted as routine, could easily have been used to shore up Washington support for Sharif. Two days after the visit, the United States waived some minor sanctions against Pakistan and provided a grant of $330,000 for "law enforcement, area development, and demand reduction."
These acts could be seen as symbolic U.S. gestures of support for Sharif. The United States has made it clear that although it officially acknowledges no threat from the Pakistani military, it would not support "extra-constitutional measures." The United States, albeit not thrilled with Sharif or his government, does not want religious fundamentalists to gain control. All this leads us to believe that the United States hopes to encourage the continuation of Sharif's government.
Sharif could be using the oblique U.S. support as a bargaining tool in his dealings with the military. It would seem that with U.S. support and Sharif's apparent indecision concerning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Sharif has yet to lose control. Until he signs the CTBT, which the military likely oppose, he could use the issue as a bargaining chip. By attempting to work out a deal with the military, he could secure his hold on power.
The meetings between the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee today and the army commanders tomorrow, Sept. 24, suggest that heavy questions are at hand. If the military decide to work with Sharif, they would immediately gain a greater role in Pakistani politics. By cooperating, he maintains his tenuous hold on power while appeasing the United States. However, in the long term Sharif could be saddled with the military and its growing forces - forces that could easily prove his downfall.
