Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf spent Monday trying to put a positive spin on what has widely been viewed as a less-than-stellar visit by U.S. President George W. Bush. Two points stood out from Bush's 24-hour stopover in Islamabad (which followed his highly publicized and extended visit to India): First, he stated yet again that Musharraf's government needs to do more as a U.S. ally in the war against al Qaeda. And second, he pointed out that Pakistan still has much ground to cover on the path to democracy. The lectures by Washington, couched though they may have been, were not lost on Pakistan, particularly since they came on the heels of a landmark nuclear agreement with arch-rival India. The lack of parity in the way Washington deals with Islamabad versus New Delhi has long been keenly felt by Pakistanis. But the tenor of Bush's recent visit also casts Musharraf personally in a bad light, since he has long portrayed himself as the navigator who could steer his country out of the mess created by civilian leaders in the 1990s. The chastisement will do nothing to ease challenges Musharraf is facing at home. With al Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in Pakistan's hinterlands, there is no question that the United States needs the country as a dependable ally in its war against jihadists, and the firmness of Musharraf's grip on power is a key concern. But as domestic problems for his administration multiply and the political returns from Islamabad's alliance with Washington dwindle, questions are surfacing in both Pakistan and the United States about his continued ability to govern. Even in smooth democratic transitions, there are always concerns about continuity in policies. The biggest concern in (and about) Pakistan, however, is the delicacy of the political system, which revolves around Musharraf — a military leader who seized power in 1999 and has slowly been edging toward a limited form of democracy since then. The problem for Islamabad is that, should Musharraf's government fall, no one can be very sure what its successor might look like. Only one thing is clear: Whoever succeeds Musharraf will, by definition, have to behave in a very different way. This is particularly true in the case of U.S. policy, given the popular discontent over Pakistan's current "junior ally" status and perceptions of the partnership from a Muslim standpoint. To put it bluntly, it would be extremely difficult for a new president to strike a balance between popular demands and those of Washington — but pursuing an anti-U.S. course is not really a viable option either, and following in Musharraf's steps would only prolong the current dilemma. The coup de grace would be for the administration to somehow rally the nation in the fight against radical Islamism without appearing to be doing so under U.S. pressure. So far, that's not something Musharraf has managed to do. Thus, caught between U.S. demands and those of his political opposition, Musharraf is fast running out of options. It's not beyond the realm of possibility, of course, that he will get a handle on matters and continue to preside over the government for several years to come, but as things stand today, it's equally likely that he could be backed into a corner and forced to make concessions to opposition groups in order to survive politically. Even if Musharraf was not being pressed to the wall, the hybrid civil-military political system he has established has no clear succession strategy — or, in other words, there are no rules in place to ensure the continuity of that system. Uncertainty is hard-wired into the Musharrafian system.