The military's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the last week has had its intended effect: The group's leadership is imprisoned, and the specter of deadly military tactics has inhibited the group's ability to mobilize large numbers in the street. The protest culture that has defined Egypt since January 2011 is suffering from temporary fatigue.
Muslim Brotherhood supporters had called for protests in 28 locations. Many Cairo suburbs saw demonstrations, including Ain Shams, Abbassiya, Ramsis and Shubra. In addition, there have been demonstrations around the country in Giza, Alexandria, Ismailia, Port Said and Tanta. Minor clashes between pro-Brotherhood protesters and both security forces and local Brotherhood opponents have been reported. Security forces used tear gas to control protesters in Tanta, and there have been small clashes reported in Zagazig, Giza and Dakahlia. MENA reported that some protesters at a pro-Morsi rally in Suez carried weapons.
Both military and security forces pre-emptively deployed in the vicinity of the Rabaa Al-Adawiya mosque in Nasr City, which has been a focal point of Muslim Brotherhood support since Morsi's removal. In addition, Al-Ahram reported that the military has closed off all entrances to Tahrir Square with tanks and barbed wire in an attempt to limit the potential for clashes between pro-Brotherhood protesters and the anti-Brotherhood demonstrators who have made Tahrir their home.
Despite the geographic breadth of the Brotherhood's marches, the numbers have been tellingly small. Local media sources such as Nile News TV report that many of the demonstrations number in the hundreds, and Reuters reported that some mosques had even canceled midday prayers, notable for the fact that in the past the group has typically launched protests after Friday prayers. Al-Ahram reported that thousands of Brotherhood supporters were demonstrating across Egypt but arrived at that figure only by adding together small protests numbering in the hundreds scattered around the country — a far cry from the social unrest that has punctuated Egyptian politics in the last two years.
Even more underwhelming has been the overall reaction to Mubarak's release to house arrest Aug. 22. The April 6 Movement, which had originally called for demonstrations against Mubarak's release, canceled its protests. And although the Tamarod opposition group condemned the release yesterday, thus far it has not done more than express its displeasure in statements. The Revolutionary Socialists movement is one of the few groups to actually follow through on its call for protests, but the group lacks the ability to mobilize meaningful numbers in the streets. Small protests in Cairo numbering in the low hundreds against Mubarak, the Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are taking place around Cairo, but they are relatively tame and there have been no reports of the military or security forces intervening to stop them. More important is that there has been no indication that these anti-Mubarak protesters have found common cause with the Islamists; indeed, their protests do not significantly distinguish between being critical of Mubarak and Morsi.
The weak showing of today's demonstrations indicates that Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the military's aggressive moves to assert authority in the last week have been successful. The Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters has been curtailed, and Al-Ahram reported late Aug. 22 that both the second-largest Islamist party, al-Nour, which initially supported the coup, and the leftist Popular Alliance Party had both responded with cautious optimism to a proposal by Deputy Prime Minister Ziad Bahaa-Eldin meant to end the cycle of violence. That such groups are openly negotiating with the government further establishes that many of the groups that would oppose the military in the end lack the will and capability to challenge its power and instead prefer to work within the context of the stability that the military can enforce in the street.
With its integrity reinforced, the military will move forward with its political roadmap. It will strongly influence the writing of a new constitution that will enshrine its economic and political advantages in constitutional law, and it will focus on reviving economic activity and containing jihadist threats in Sinai. There will continue to be protests, sectarian violence and political conflicts. And the crackdown on Islamists may have the unintended consequence of leading to more jihadism. But these facts of Egyptian culture should not obfuscate the fact that has prevented the United States and other powers from breaking ties with the Egyptian military: In ruling Cairo, the military is peerless.
