Two major developments out of the Middle East captured the headlines Wednesday. An Egyptian court ruled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak could be released from prison and placed under house arrest as early as Thursday, setting off speculation that the military-backed regime could be risking another wave of backlash from a broadened opposition. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition made new claims that the regime had carried out a chemical weapons attack on civilians near Damascus, leading many to wonder yet again whether a foreign military will intervene in Syria.
On the surface, both developments raise the same question: Are these regimes really feeling that confident? They do, after all, seem to be engaging in seemingly unnecessary actions that could risk an intolerable level of backlash. But a less cursory assessment found much more logic in the Egyptian situation than the Syrian one.
The Egyptian military is trying to rapidly and intensely demonstrate a show of force against any Egyptian protesters. The goal is to stamp out the protest culture that was so effectively contained during the Mubarak era but has been so destabilizing in the post-Mubarak era. The strategy may be risky, but it is essential to the military's ability to maintain its own coherence and integrity, revive economic activity and contain jihadist activity.
The campaign began with the Muslim Brotherhood and is now moving to the wider opposition. After removing Morsi, the military could carry out arrests and bend the rules in an ambiguous interregnum but went ahead and resurrected a politically contentious state of emergency. The military then opted for a massive, deadly crackdown as opposed to allowing Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins in the Cairo outskirts to languish on their own. The non-Muslim Brotherhood opposition — a fragmented group of mostly pro-democracy secularists under the banner of Tamarrod and the National Salvation Front — was happy to see the Muslim Brotherhood go, but it quickly grew weary by the military's heavy-handed tactics once it realized that it, too, could soon be branded an enemy of the state.
Even before Morsi's ouster, Tamarrod and the National Salvation Front openly discussed their strategy, which consisted of creating enough chaos through street demonstrations to first compel the military to intervene. They would use their influence, specifically through street demonstrations, again if needed, to pressure the military to hand power back to the civilian secular, liberal elite. However, the ambition of this plan has surpassed the opposition's capability. On the heels of the military's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, the military-backed regime laid treason charges against recently resigned Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei, who despite being the most prominent leader of the secular opposition is not popular enough to rally thousands in the streets over his cause.
Then came a much bigger provocation: a court decision to release Mubarak from prison. Mubarak still faces a retrial Aug. 25 over complicity in deadly crackdowns before his downfall. He could be released from prison, but he will be transferred to house arrest pending his retrial. An aging and ill Mubarak does not pose a political threat to anyone, but his "release" would be considered an affront by those who believed their demonstrations brought about real political change in Egypt. The message behind the Mubarak prison release is the same as the one behind the state of emergency, the arrests and the crackdowns: The military is the final authority of the state and the time to protest is over, regardless of one's political preference.
Of course, we will have to see whether the military, under a challenged authority like Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will be successful in this strategy. But it does appear to be the military's intent to strike with an iron fist before the rest of the opposition has a chance to organize. So far, the groups (besides the Muslim Brotherhood) from which we would expect the most backlash to the Mubarak release appear to be disorganized and intimidated. Military officers have meanwhile received a salary raise to help ensure their loyalty in further crackdowns that might ensue.
The Syrian situation is far less clear. There is no confirmation yet that the regime carried out a chemical weapons attack. The timing of the opposition claims is also curious, given that a U.N. weapons inspection team was already in Damascus. It would seem irrationally overconfident of the al Assad regime to carry out chemical weapons attacks when the United States and its allies in the Syrian conflict have treated the chemical weapons threat as a potential cause for military intervention. However, the United States and European countries have been moving away from red line rhetoric and have instead emphasized their concerns over the blowback that would come from arming Syrian rebels.
It could be argued that the Syrian regime is trying to call the United States' bluff on military intervention. Doing so could convince the Syrian opposition that they are on their own and thus better off capitulating to the regime. But it is questionable to perform a show of force with chemical weapons. Whereas the Egyptian military is sending a message by showing it will no longer tolerate protests. The Egyptian situation represents a clear shift from relative tolerance of protests to zero tolerance. The Syrian regime has already demonstrated it will go to great lengths to crack down on its opposition. The shock and awe of a Syrian chemical weapons attack carries far more significance for rebel sponsors, who may consider a military intervention, than it does for the demoralization of rebels already committed to the fight. Any uncertainty by the Syrian regime over the level of potential U.S. intervention would detract from the focus on its military campaign against the rebels. And we have not yet seen any indication that the regime's command and control over its chemical weapons arsenal has broken down to raise the possibility of renegade chemical weapons deployments.
We can understand the calculations of the Egyptian military, whose strategy will be tested in the coming days. But several aspects of the Syrian situation simply do not add up yet.
