In a July 24 speech in Alexandria, Egyptian military chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called on the public to hold rallies July 26 against terrorism and violence. Al-Sisi, defense minister and also first deputy prime minister, said that he sought a national mandate to confront "terrorism and violence."
The military is well aware that the interim government is short on legitimacy since it came into being after the July 3 coup, and it does not want to take on either the Muslim Brotherhood unrest or the Sinai-based jihadist insurgency without strong public backing. After all, the army toppled Morsi after massive demonstrations across the country called for his resignation. Likewise, the army ousted former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 after the outbreak of the Arab Spring protests. The army is going to be extremely careful to maintain public support, which it feels it will be able to secure in the light of the massive size of the June 30 demonstrations.
Al-Sisi's choice of words is also very telling. By distinguishing between terrorism and violence, Egypt's top military officer is also distinguishing between the violence stemming from the Brotherhood's clashes with its political opponents and security forces and the armed attacks of the jihadists. By doing this he is saying that both are intolerable.
This is the military's dilemma. The line between the two can easily be blurred for a number of reasons.
On the same day that al-Sisi sought public backing for a major security crackdown, a crude bomb went off at a police headquarters in the city of Mansoura, north of the capital. There have been no claims of responsibility and it is unclear who was behind the rare attack against a state facility in the mainland; usually such attacks take place in the Sinai Peninsula. Since the attack was simple, using a small explosive device against a soft target, almost anyone could be responsible for it. In recent days there have been similar incidents. Another crude improvised explosive device exploded July 20 in the parking area of Abu Soweir police station in the canal city of Ismailia, destroying three police vehicles. Also last week, the Interior Ministry announced it had detected and defused a bomb placed below Gamaa Bridge near Cairo University. These incidents come amid a string of allegations that the Brotherhood and Hamas are plotting attacks and storing arms. The allegations are intended to create the perception that mainstream Islamists are radicalizing and resorting to violent means following the military's coup.
Thus, due to the attack's timing and this context, many will likely blame the Brotherhood for the bomb — or at least Brotherhood elements angry over the Morsi overthrow, which has led to their disillusionment with the leadership of the movement and caused them to move toward militancy. There is no shortage of groups within the state and society who favor a more hardline approach toward the Brotherhood and Islamists in general. Well aware of this situation, the Brotherhood was quick to issue a statement condemning the attack. The statement comes on the heels of other similar statements from Muslim Brotherhood leaders opposing any violent confrontation with the state.
Given the current political climate, Egypt is rife with suspicions on all sides. The Brotherhood is likely viewing the bombing (in the light of the military seeking mass support for a crackdown) as the work of "deep state" elements attempting to create the conditions for suppression. The Brotherhood leadership remembers former President Gamal Abdel Nasser's crackdown on the Islamist movement in 1954 following an assassination attempt on the founder of the Egyptian republic for which the Brotherhood was held responsible.
The Brotherhood's fears aside, the situation today is very different from what it was in the 1950s, and the army has not demonstrated any willingness to engage in a wholesale marginalization of the movement. However, the uncertain conditions coupled with political and military pressures are likely to shape perceptions on all sides, and the government's attempts to deal with the Brotherhood and the jihadists at the same time are likely to exacerbate the security situation. Violence will not reach the scale of that in Algeria in the 1990s; however, the military's attempts to push its post-Morsi political roadmap are unlikely to succeed anytime soon.
