Since the Egyptian military deposed President Mohammed Morsi on July 3, the U.S. government has sought to characterize the events as anything but a coup d'etat. The reason is simple: Egypt is a key American strategic partner in the Middle East by virtue of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which was in part cemented by the United States' agreement to provide $1.3 billion in military aid annually to Egypt (equating to roughly 20 percent of the Egyptian military budget). However, the 2012 U.S. House Appropriations Act explicitly prohibits the delivery of U.S. funds to any country "whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat."

What happened in Egypt, and what words are used to describe it, is ultimately immaterial to Washington so long as it does not interfere with American political considerations: The United States does not want to deal with the implications of restricting aid to Egypt. As long as the United States considers Egypt an important ally and its aid an important part of that relationship, Washington will be deliberate about the language it employs around events in Cairo.

U.S. President Barack Obama's decision today to suspend the delivery of four F-16 multirole fighter jets to Egypt is an excellent example. The administration wants to demonstrate its commitment to the ideal of democracy and does not want to be seen as completely endorsing the Egyptian military's actions, but only to a point.

Recent events in Egypt have also forced the U.S. administration to not assume that the military can actually control those events. The situation since Morsi's removal has not stabilized; pro-Morsi Muslim Brotherhood protesters remain in the streets, and a variety of Egyptian Islamist groups have refused cooperation with the interim government, save for the second-largest Islamist (Salafist) party, al-Nour, and its initial cooperation before pulling back fairly quickly after supporting the coup. There have been several security incidents in Sinai that have begun to inch closer to Egypt's core. The legitimacy of the interim civilian government is tenuous at best given the way it was installed by the military and the Islamists' general rejection of it. And though the Egyptian military remains in control, the United States is beginning to contemplate its response should the military prove incapable of restoring stability.

This is not the first time there have been bumps in the relationship between Washington and Cairo. In his 2005 State of the Union address, U.S. President George W. Bush called for Egypt and Saudi Arabia to make political reforms as part of his vision for the democratization of the Middle East, much to the chagrin of then-Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. When the Egyptian military eventually utilized protests in January 2011 to remove Mubarak, the United States was at first extremely cautious; instead of publicly backing protester demands from the beginning, it took a week for Washington to make its move, and that move was merely to send word via envoys that Mubarak should not run for re-election. It was only after popular pressure intensified that the administration hardened its stance.

Moreover, the United States was not exactly satisfied with the progress Egypt was making toward democratic, civilian rule under Morsi either. The aforementioned House Appropriations Act also has specific language for Egypt itself: The U.S. secretary of state is supposed to "certify" that Egypt is making progress in implementing freedom of expression and due process before aid can be disbursed. But both former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and current Secretary of State John Kerry did not do that, instead relying on a clause in the bill that allows the government to waive those requirements if it is in the "national security interest of the United States."

This is not specific to Egypt; one need only look at U.S. policy toward Pakistan and Thailand to see that. Often the language of law and politics clashes with geopolitical considerations. The United States has relied on Egypt as a regional ally since 1979. The ending of hostilities between Israel and Egypt completely altered the geopolitics of the region and has defined regional alignments in the Middle East for the past 30 years. The United States has recently extricated itself from Iraq and is in the process of doing so from Afghanistan, and it is striving to shift its focus from the Middle East to other important strategic areas, specifically China and the greater Asia-Pacific region. Yet with civil war raging in Syria and so many other volatile variables in play, the United States cannot afford to see its relationship with Egypt deteriorate.

But neither can Washington afford to see Egypt devolve into an anarchy fraught with militant Islamist violence, ineffective direct military rule and illegitimate civilian governance. The U.S. relationship with Egypt is worthless if the governing forces in Cairo cannot control the country. The Egyptian military for its part has tried to be considerate of U.S. sensitivities and laws. The roadmap the military laid out for the interim government is an ambitious one; it plans for Egypt’s constitutional problems to be solved within months and for both parliamentary and presidential elections to happen within a year. The military also deployed significant forces to the Sinai Peninsula concurrent with the removal of Morsi, and with Israeli permission, in an attempt to stabilize the security situation there and prevent militants in the Gaza Strip from infiltrating Egypt.

And though it has only been three weeks, the security situation has not stabilized; in fact, it has gotten worse. There have been security incidents in Cairo, Mansoura and Ismailia in the last weeks alone, including the detonation of crude bombs aimed at police stations in the latter two cities. In response, military chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called today for rallies against "terrorism and violence," in effect asking for a tangible popular mandate for the military to take action. And as Stratfor wrote earlier, al-Sisi's choice of words shows that he is equating armed jihadist attacks with violence stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood's clashes with its political opponents.

For Washington, that is a distressing hint of aggressiveness. The United States ultimately understands why the Egyptian military removed Morsi. The military did not want to reinsert itself directly into Egyptian politics and did so only when Morsi's legitimacy and capacity to govern had disintegrated to the point that it had no other choice. But the United States also knows, as the Egyptian military learned during its 18 months ruling the country directly through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces after Mubarak's removal, that Egypt needs a legitimate civilian veneer to rule in Cairo in order for the military to be able to retreat back into the shadows and from there rule the country.

For all the steps the Egyptian military has taken to try to show that it is moving as fast as it can toward a civilian government, there are also indicators to the contrary. Al-Sisi was installed as deputy prime minister July 16 — and he already holds the defense minister’s post — a contradictory position for a general professing to have instituted the will of the masses for popular civilian rule. On July 24, in the first meeting of a conference of national reconciliation chaired by interim President Adly Mansour, there were no Islamist representatives in attendance, not from the Muslim Brotherhood and, more important, not from the Salafist al-Nour party, which originally backed the military when it removed Morsi. And the interim Egyptian state has continued to crack down on the Islamist opposition forces: Morsi is still in custody at an unknown location, and also today an Egyptian prosecutor general issued arrest warrants for nine more members of the Muslim Brotherhood. When these are taken into consideration with the security incidents and the Brotherhood’s continued presence in the streets and unwillingness to cooperate with the interim government as currently constituted, it appears doubtful that the military is in control of the situation.

The United States has few options. It does not want to cut aid to Egypt and risk undermining its strategic relationship with Cairo. But al-Sisi is a new figure. The U.S. relationship with Mubarak was decades-strong, and al-Sisi has been in his position for less than a year. The U.S. relationship is with the overall military structure, but because of its lack of familiarity with him, Washington cannot simply take al-Sisi at his word. Furthermore, the United States does not want to be seen as blindly backing the actions of the Egyptian military. U.S. laws and popular opinion demand that Washington at least superficially support democratic ideals.

Therefore, the U.S. administration delayed delivery of the F-16s to Egypt. It's a message with multiple subtexts. It recognizes that the administration is well aware of the illiberal character of the Egyptian military's actions. It is an indication that the United States still deeply values its strategic relationship with Egypt. And it is a warning to al-Sisi that U.S. support is not unconditional and that the Egyptian military must demonstrate that it can control the country. For the United States, that control is what ultimately makes the relationship worthwhile.