Despite the two countries' mutual defense agreement, Pakistan will likely avoid direct military intervention in support of Saudi Arabia against Iranian strikes and instead limit its role to defensive and technical support given the risk of Iranian retaliation, domestic sectarian tensions, economic pressures and Pakistan's ongoing conflict with the Afghan Taliban; yet a more active role from Islamabad remains possible if Iranian attacks were to seriously threaten Saudi energy infrastructure or the kingdom's broader stability. Following Iran's recent missile and drone strikes on Saudi territory, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been coordinating closely in the context of their new mutual defense agreement, signed in September. On March 7, Pakistan's army chief, Gen. Asim Munir, met with Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh to discuss potential joint actions under the agreement, which stipulates that an attack on one country is considered an attack on both. Days later, on March 12, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif also traveled to Saudi Arabia for a brief visit, where he met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the meeting, Sharif reaffirmed Pakistan's unwavering support for the kingdom amid the ongoing Middle East conflict and discussed ongoing bilateral coordination on regional stability. The two high-level visits highlighted Pakistan's role as a potential defense backer for Saudi Arabia, signaling that Riyadh retains credible security partnerships while also warning Tehran that further escalation against the kingdom could risk drawing a nuclear-armed state into the conflict. However, the Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact remains ambiguous, as it does not clearly define what type of attack would trigger a response and includes no automatic deployment mechanisms, mandated force contributions or specified timeline for military assistance. 

• On Feb. 28, the United States and Israel began launching joint strikes against Iran, targeting the country's military infrastructure and leadership. In retaliation, Iran has launched thousands of ballistic missiles and armed drones, striking Israeli and U.S. military positions across the region. Iran has also launched strikes against Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, many of which host Western forces or have strategic ties with the United States and Israel. 
• In Saudi Arabia, Iran's retaliatory strikes have targeted the Prince Sultan Air Base, the Ras Tanura oil terminal and the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, placing the many Pakistani migrant workers and civilians in the kingdom at heightened risk. On March 6, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, where he expressed concern over the escalating conflict and urged Iran to cease attacks on Gulf states. Dar also reportedly reminded Araghchi of Pakistan's mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia, and the two sides agreed to stay in close contact. 

Saudi Arabia is a key partner for Pakistan, underpinned by deep economic, energy, and security ties. In contrast, Pakistan's relationship with Iran is more limited and complicated, primarily due to concerns related to sectarian issues and border security. Saudi Arabia has been a crucial source of financial support for Pakistan, providing infrastructure investment and backing in International Monetary Fund programs that reduce fiscal vulnerability and stabilize the balance of payments. Saudi Arabia also provides Pakistan with preferential oil supplies, forming a strategic energy partnership that secures long-term fuel stability. Additionally, millions of Pakistani migrant workers in Saudi Arabia generate remittances that are vital for Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves and domestic consumption. In exchange, Pakistan has helped strengthen Saudi Arabia's defense capacity with military training, advisory support and personnel. Pakistan's relationship with neighboring Iran, by contrast, is much more limited. While the two countries maintain diplomatic ties and some cross-border trade and energy cooperation, sanctions on Iran and political pressures in each nation have constrained the scale and reliability of these exchanges. The relationship is further complicated by sectarian differences, as Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, while Iran is predominantly Shiite. Pakistan's marginalized Shiite minority has historically sought guidance from Iran, which has periodically fostered mistrust between Tehran and Islamabad, while also fueling social tensions within Pakistan. Ongoing security concerns along the Pakistan-Iran border, including militant incursions, separatist activity in the Balochistan/Sistan-Balochistan region and periodic clashes, have also strained diplomatic relations. 

Due to a combination of geopolitical, domestic, operational and economic constraints, Pakistan will likely limit its support to Saudi Arabia to low-level coordination and intelligence sharing. Pakistan faces multiple constraints that limit its ability to participate directly in a conflict alongside Saudi Arabia. Its shared border and ongoing diplomatic engagement with Iran create strong incentives for restraint, as any escalation could destabilize the wider region and complicate Islamabad's role as a regional mediator. Domestically, Pakistan's minority Shiite community, comprising roughly 15-20% of the population, is particularly sensitive to developments involving Iran, and any perception of Pakistani military action against the country could spark sectarian tensions and internal unrest. At the same time, Pakistan's military is already stretched by its ongoing conflict with the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, limiting available manpower, resources and political bandwidth for additional commitments. On the economic side, Pakistan faces persistent fiscal pressures, high public debt and elevated inflation, which also limit its ability to absorb the additional costs of a regional military engagement. Taken together, these geopolitical, domestic, operational and economic factors suggest that Pakistan will likely pursue a cautious, measured approach in helping Saudi Arabia defend against Iran's ongoing retaliatory strikes. Its assistance will thus probably be limited to low-level support, intelligence sharing and defensive coordination, rather than direct offensive action — particularly given Iran's demonstrated willingness and capacity to retaliate, coupled with Pakistan's geographic proximity and vulnerability to potential Iranian missile or drone strikes.

• On March 1, Shiite groups in Pakistan staged nationwide protests in response to the killing of Iran's supreme leader by U.S./Israeli airstrikes. Violent clashes broke out near the U.S. consulate in Karachi after hundreds of demonstrators tried to breach the compound. The unrest highlighted how events in Iran can easily aggravate sectarian tensions in Pakistan. 
• On Feb. 26, after repeated cross‑border attacks by the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani security posts, Pakistan responded with airstrikes and artillery against Taliban positions along the Afghanistan border. Fighting remains ongoing, with both sides still trading fire as of March 13.
• On March 9, Pakistan's navy launched a maritime security operation to protect shipping lanes and energy supplies amid escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf. Coming shortly after high-level discussions on the Pakistan-Saudi security pact, this action suggests Pakistan will likely continue to avoid direct military engagement in the Iran conflict, instead relying on low-level, non-invasive measures and posturing, such as maritime security and monitoring operations.

However, Pakistan could provide deeper military support if Iran's attacks start to seriously threaten Saudi Arabia's security, energy exports and/or the safety of millions of Pakistani workers. In the near term, Pakistan will likely limit its role to low-level support, including intelligence sharing and technical assistance, while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Iran to discourage further attacks. However, deeper involvement could emerge if the conflict intensifies, particularly if Saudi Arabia were to face an existential threat, such as sustained Iranian strikes that severely damage energy infrastructure, trigger internal instability or threaten the monarchy's survival. Additionally, Saudi Arabia supplies roughly 25-30% of Pakistan's crude oil. Before the conflict, much of that oil transited the Strait of Hormuz. But with Iranian attacks now diverting traffic from the strait, Pakistan has been receiving Saudi crude via alternative routes, including Red Sea ports. If these channels face logistical or security disruptions — or if sustained attacks significantly affect Saudi energy production or exports — it could severely strain Pakistan's fuel supplies, worsening inflation and broader economic instability, thereby increasing pressure on Islamabad to act. The over two million Pakistani citizens working in Saudi Arabia also provide Pakistan's largest source of remittances, accounting for about 24-25% of total inflows. A prolonged or intensified Gulf conflict could sharply reduce these remittances, weakening foreign reserves, straining the rupee, and heightening poverty and macroeconomic instability. More broadly, even limited support for Saudi Arabia could help preserve the credibility of the bilateral defense agreement, signaling Pakistan's reliability as a security partner and reinforcing expectations of reciprocal assistance from Riyadh should Islamabad face a future crisis.

• Remittances account for roughly 6-8% of Pakistan's GDP, with inflows from Saudi Arabia alone contributing roughly 1.5-2% of GDP.
• Amid the ongoing Iran conflict, Saudi Arabia's state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco, has increased its reliance on alternative export routes, diverting crude through the East-West pipeline to Red Sea ports such as Yanbu to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. This has led to a surge in Red Sea shipments as the company works to sustain exports. However, the Red Sea corridor cannot fully replace the volumes normally shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning Saudi export capacity will likely remain constrained if disruptions persist.

In the unlikely event that it directly intervenes in the conflict, Pakistan could bolster Saudi Arabia's defenses by deploying experienced personnel, enhancing air defense coordination and leveraging its geographic proximity for potential aerial operations against Iran. Pakistan could strengthen Saudi Arabia's defenses by providing experienced personnel and reinforcing areas where Riyadh faces operational gaps. While Saudi Arabia maintains advanced air defense capabilities, it has faced challenges countering sustained missile and drone attacks and remains partly dependent on Western technical support to maintain and operate these systems. The Pakistan Air Force has significant experience managing integrated air defense networks, radar systems and electronic warfare capabilities, which it could leverage to provide technical advice, coordination support and threat monitoring guidance to Saudi Arabia. However, much of Saudi Arabia's air defense infrastructure relies on Western-supplied systems, and Pakistan may not have direct familiarity with all platforms or the capacity to fully substitute for Western technical assistance. In addition, while Pakistan can offer expertise and coordination, air defense also requires sufficient manpower and interceptors, so its role would likely remain advisory rather than operational. However, Pakistani fighter aircraft could operate from Saudi bases to support airspace security and intercept incoming threats, expanding Riyadh's defensive coverage. In a less likely, more escalatory scenario, Pakistan may also provide additional strategic depth along its western frontier with Iran. This could see Pakistani aircraft, operating from bases in Balochistan near the border with Iran, conduct aerial sorties against Iranian missile launch sites or other military infrastructure, leveraging Pakistan's geographic proximity and existing fighter fleet. Such operations would pressure Iran from both Pakistan-based positions in the east and Saudi-based positions in the west, thereby widening the defensive options available to Riyadh. However, direct military strikes would carry severe diplomatic, security and long-term strategic consequences for Pakistan due to its shared border with Iran and Iran's proven retaliatory capabilities. Islamabad thus remains most likely to confine its role in the conflict to advisory and supportive measures, rather than offensive involvement. 

• In January 2024, Pakistan conducted air and missile strikes against militant bases in Sistan and Baluchestan in response to cross‑border attacks on its security forces, indicating that it has the capability to project force across its western border into Iranian territory.