Ethiopia Discreetly Dips Into Sudan's Civil War

(Ebrahim HAMID / AFP via Getty Images)

Destroyed vehicles are strewn outside Sudan's finance ministry building in the capital Khartoum on Jan. 17, 2026, after nearly three years of devastating war in the country.

If confirmed, Ethiopia's apparent support to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which comes as the Sudanese Armed Forces are increasingly leaning toward Egypt and Eritrea, would portend an intensifying RSF offensive in Sudan's Blue Nile state that could result in potentially severe clashes along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border and would likely prompt the SAF to lean closer to the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front in Ethiopia. On Feb. 10, Reuters published an investigation detailing the construction of a large logistics and training camp of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, in Ethiopia's western Benishangul-Gumuz region using satellite imagery and conversations with 15 different sources, including senior Ethiopian security officials. The news agency reported that the training camp is located approximately 32 kilometers (20 miles) from the border with Sudan's Blue Nile state, in the region's Menge district, adding that it had seen a diplomatic cable claiming the camp has a capacity of up to 10,000 military personnel. Reuters also claimed to have seen a note from Ethiopian security services stating that an estimated 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training at the facility as of late January. Eight separate sources told Reuters that the camp's construction and logistics had been financed by the United Arab Emirates, the RSF's main foreign patron. Meanwhile, Reuters also forwarded satellite imagery showing expansion work at the neighbouring Assossa airport, which a senior Ethiopian security official reportedly told the news agency would become a major drone operating center. While the Ethiopian government rejected the Reuters report, the investigation nonetheless provides compelling evidence of Ethiopian logistical support to the RSF. Meanwhile, SAF officials have accused Ethiopia of hosting RSF fighters for the last few months, while flight-tracking data show multiple Emirati heavy-lift aircraft landing in Ethiopia since late 2025. These developments came as the RSF launched offensive operations against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Blue Nile state from South Sudanese territory in late January, advancing toward the locality of Al-Silak, as well as Deim Mansour, which is situated about 17 kilometers from the strategic border crossing of Kurmuk on the Ethiopia-Sudan border.

Following the takeover of Deim Mansour by the RSF and its allies, SAF officials accused Ethiopia of facilitating the infiltration of RSF fighters from its territory and said that drone strikes were conducted on SAF positions from Ethiopian territory. These claims have not been independently verified by third parties.

Ethiopia's apparent support for the RSF comes as the SAF's ever-growing tilt toward Egypt and Eritrea has triggered concerns in Addis Ababa that a decisive SAF victory in the civil war would lock Sudan into close alignment with Ethiopia's main regional adversaries. Despite the RSF's victory in El-Fasher in late October 2025, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has maintained a maximalist position against the paramilitary group and repeatedly rejected U.S.-backed proposals for a temporary humanitarian truce, insisting that the RSF should be eradicated. This has been partly driven by strengthening foreign support from Egypt and Eritrea — Ethiopia's two main regional adversaries — as well as from Saudi Arabia, which sees the SAF as an essential bulwark against Emirati influence in northeast Africa. Although Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has until recently largely maintained neutrality in Sudan's civil war, al-Burhan's ever-closer ties with Cairo and Asmara represent a major threat to Addis-Ababa's geostrategic interest, as a decisive SAF victory in the war would likely lock Sudan into close alignment with Ethiopia's two main regional adversaries. Further reinforcing this view are allegations that the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front, or TPLF, has set up a military camp near the SAF-held city of El Gedaref. Meanwhile, the SAF has delivered a series of blows to the RSF in Sudan's central Kordofan region since the start of 2026 by lifting the sieges on the cities of Diling and Kadugli. This creates strong incentives for Ethiopia to support the RSF, with the goal of averting a decisive defeat of the paramilitary group and ensuring that a political settlement is reached between the two warring parties that mitigates Khartoum's alignment with Cairo and Asmara following the tentative end of the civil war. For Abiy, tilting toward the RSF in such a way would have the added benefit of strengthening his partnership with the United Arab Emirates, which could deliver tangible economic and military benefits to Ethiopia, such as new Emirati investments, fresh credit lines and the provision of advanced military equipment.

The New York Times reported on Feb. 1 that Egypt was hosting a covert drone base near its East Oweinat irrigation project that was used by the SAF to conduct drone strikes against the RSF, showcasing Cairo's growing involvement in the civil war.
In November 2025, Eritrean President Isaia Afwerki conducted a highly publicized visit to Port Sudan, during which he met with al-Burhan and vowed to strengthen military and economic cooperation with the SAF. Open source intelligence indicates that several heavy-lift IL-76 aircraft departing from Iran, which has been providing military support to the SAF in the civil war since at least late 2023, landed in Eritrea in late 2025, indicating that the country could be serving as a logistics hub for the SAF.

The RSF will likely use its facility in Ethiopia to support its ongoing offensive in Sudan's Blue Nile state, which will increase the risk of SAF aerial strikes against it that could trigger severe clashes along the Ethiopia-Sudan border, as well as prompt the SAF to allow the TPLF to use its territory for attacks against Ethiopian security forces in the event of a new military escalation in Tigray. Several sources quoted by Reuters, including Ethiopian security officials, said that RSF fighters at the Menge camp were due to join the paramilitary group's military campaign in Sudan. Given the camp's geography, these forces are most likely to be deployed to the neighbouring Blue Nile state, which would pressure the SAF to redeploy resources from Kordofan. If reports of an RSF facility in Benishangul-Gumuz are accurate, it suggests that Ethiopia-based RSF fighters will likely be dispatched to Blue Nile state in the coming months in the absence of a truce — if they have not been deployed already. However, Ethiopia's Abiy will likely resist plans for the RSF to launch a full-blown offensive on SAF positions directly from Ethiopian territory due to the risk of international backlash, favoring instead more limited infiltrations. This indicates that the RSF will likely intensify its efforts to capture Kurmuk from the SAF from its current positions in Blue Nile state, which would enable the paramilitary group to secure the entry of thousands of fighters, as well as supplies and military equipment from Ethiopia via the town's border crossing. Given the threat this would pose to the SAF's war effort, the RSF's capture of Kurmuk would raise the likelihood of SAF aerial strikes on the Menge camp — especially since SAF officials have repeatedly claimed that RSF military facilities in neighboring countries are legitimate military targets. While Abiy would likely favor military restraint against the SAF due to Ethiopia's internal security challenges and the rising risk of war with Eritrea and/or the TPLF, he would still face significant domestic pressure for a proportionate response. Moreover, escalating tensions with the SAF could reactivate Sudan and Ethiopia's long-standing border dispute over the al-Fashaga region, which would likely result in deadly clashes. Even if the SAF does not conduct kinetic action into Ethiopian territory, Addis Ababa's apparent tilt toward the RSF would portend — if confirmed — a severe downturn in ties between Abiy and al-Burhan. This could notably see the SAF allow the TPLF to use territory under its control to attack Ethiopian security forces in the event of a new military escalation between Abiy's government and Tigrayan forces, which is becoming increasingly likely amid Ethiopia's military buildup near the Tigray region.

Two sources quoted by Reuters claimed that hundreds of RSF fighters had already crossed the Ethiopia-Sudan border in recent weeks to support the paramilitary group's offensive in Blue Nile state.
Following a meeting with al-Burhan in December 2025, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi referred to Egypt's 1976 mutual defense agreement with Sudan. This suggests that in a less likely but higher-impact scenario, severe clashes between Ethiopian security forces and SAF could prompt Egypt to launch airstrikes against Ethiopian troops. However, aerial or missile strikes on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remain highly unlikely, as a breach of the reservoir would cause a massive humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan.