Saudi Arabia and the UAE Pursue Divergent Paths in a Multipolar World

(AFP via Getty Images)

Saudi-backed forces are seen on the outskirts of Yemen's Hadramawt province, where the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) recently launched an offensive, on Jan. 3, 2026.

The growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will likely increasingly strain bilateral relations, raising the risk of escalations and conflicts — both directly and through their proxies — in places like Yemen, Sudan and Syria, as well as disruptions within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has increased in recent weeks, evident in their diverging strategies across several regional flashpoints and their direct economic rivalry. In Yemen, tensions have sharply escalated after Saudi-backed government troops on Jan. 2 launched an offensive in Hadramaut province to recapture territory from the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), highlighting the continued divergence of Saudi and Emirati strategic imperatives in the country. Similarly, in Sudan, the two Gulf states are backing rival factions in that country's ongoing civil war. And in Syria, while both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi support the new provisional government, they have differing visions for the type of government they want to see control the country in the long term. This geopolitical competition also extends to the Saudis and Emiratis' immediate neighborhood, as within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the two countries are engaged in a direct economic competition for investment, tourists, businesses and technology. More broadly, their visions for the evolving multipolar world order also differ significantly: the Saudis favor gradual, status quo-friendly change, whereas the Emiratis are more willing to support significant alterations in alignments and even borders.

In early December, the STC launched "Operation Promising Future," seizing control of oil-rich areas in Yemen's Hadramaut province. By Dec. 8, the southern secessionists had extended their reach to the Omani-influenced al-Mahra governorate, effectively consolidating much of southern Yemen under their authority. In January, the Saudi-backed PLC began an offensive to retake this territory.
The Saudis have long backed the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the executive body of Yemen's internationally recognized government, preferring a coalition government to control the country and suppress the Iran-backed Houthi movement and other extremists. However, the Emiratis have prioritized other objectives, backing the STC as a proxy to consolidate control over southern Yemen's infrastructure and suppress Emirati rivals, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, whose al-Islah branch in Yemen is part of the Saudi-backed PLC.
Saudi-UAE tensions in Yemen date back to 2018, when the STC fought government forces for control of Aden, the largest city in southern Yemen. These tensions intensified when the United Arab Emirates withdrew most of its forces from Yemen and left much of the anti-Houthi military burden on the Saudis, an act that caused quiet consternation in Riyadh.

Not Always Brotherly: Historical Shifts and Divergent Paths in Saudi-UAE Relations

Saudi-UAE relations have multiple ups and downs, marked by border disputes, cooperation against mutual rivals and divergences over the political path of the Arab and Muslim world. In 1952, the Saudis attempted to take control of the Buraimi Oasis, now home to the Emirati city of Al Ain, but were rebuffed by British military intervention. The border dispute lingered until the Treaty of Jeddah, in which Saudi Arabia recognized Emirati control of Al Ain in exchange for the United Arab Emirates' land corridor to Qatar. The two countries rallied against revolutionary Iran in 1979, backing Saddam Hussein in the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War, and then backing the United States when Saddam turned on fellow Gulf state Kuwait in 1991. But as the Cold War ended, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also began to diverge in their worldviews: the Saudis favored a slower-moving status quo guaranteed by the United States, while the Emiratis, particularly under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed after 2004, favored adaptation and geopolitical experimentation. Although Riyadh briefly embraced Abu Dhabi's approach, diplomatic blowback from the blockade of Qatar, Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019, and concern about Saudi domestic stability eventually convinced Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to return to the kingdom's traditional foreign policy approach by 2021.

While bilateral relations will remain tense in the coming years, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will compartmentalize their rivalry and avoid any escalation that could negatively impact their economies. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have continued to prioritize their national development strategies over their foreign policies, as evidenced by their efforts to seek detente with regional rival Iran and maintain strict neutrality in both the U.S.-China competition and the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. Even when their proxies clash in Yemen and Sudan, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are thus unlikely to take major diplomatic or security actions against each other along their shared border in eastern Arabia, as such escalatory moves would risk jeopardizing their economic development models and triggering capital or business flight. Furthermore, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are unlikely to launch an overt "maximum pressure" campaign against one another, akin to the Qatar blockade, because their current rivalry for influence in Sudan and Yemen does not fundamentally threaten their political systems or development models. This is in contrast to their post-Arab Spring dispute with Qatar, which stemmed from Doha backing political movements that threatened the Saudi and Emirati monarchies. As a result, the Saudi-Emirati competition will remain compartmentalized in specific geographies where their imperatives clash. In the course of their economic competition, they are likely to focus on developing comparative advantages against one another, rather than employing economic heft or security measures to undermine each other's development models.

In Sudan's civil war, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have limited interests that curtail interest in maximalist escalation against one another. The Emiratis are seeking to curb Islamism, extract resources like gold, and invest in ports and other infrastructure there, while the Saudis are seeking overall stability in the African country that prevents the return of rivals like Iran, the growth of extremism, and the security of Saudi investments in Sudanese agriculture. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia back the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), respectively, in pursuit of these goals.
After the Arab Spring, Qatar publicly backed Islamist movements in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Syria, Egypt and Bahrain, in part through Al Jazeera's expansive media coverage of the uprisings. Coverage of Bahrain alarmed Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who saw political contagion in the Shiite uprising there, and which eventually helped propel the Saudis, Emiratis, Bahrainis, and Egyptians to launch their Qatar blockade in 2017.

Even with compartmentalization, the Saudi-Emirati rivalry may worsen security and economic conditions in Sudan, Yemen and other places like Syria that are reliant on Saudi and Emirati aid. With fewer implicit diplomatic and political red lines to escalation, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh will both become increasingly assertive in backing their proxies in regional conflicts, as they try to reshape the balance of power between them. To deter the Saudi-backed SAF in Sudan, the Emiratis may expand military support to the RSF, offering the paramilitary group more advanced arms, drones and anti-air defenses. The Emiratis may also encourage the RSF to conduct more significant offensives toward strategically important regions, like the Blue Nile state, while lobbying countries like Ethiopia to be more supportive of RSF actions. The Saudis, meanwhile, may offer direct military aid to the SAF and enhanced financing for more arms purchases, while also leaning on the Egyptians to increase their support for the SAF. In Yemen, the Emiratis will try to appease the Saudis with symbolic moves to slow the STC's progress toward declaring an independent southern state, while functionally undermining the internationally recognized government's position in the country — a strategy that will likely result in increased tensions and potential military clashes. In Syria, the United Arab Emirates will likely use aid to coerce Ahmad al-Sharaa's new government into becoming more explicitly anti-Islamist, which will risk fragmenting al-Sharaa's current coalition. This will also embolden minorities like the Druze, Kurds, and Alawites to push back against centralization, even violently at times. In contrast, Saudi Arabia will favor a more unified Syria whose interests align with Turkey's.

The United Arab Emirates has already provided the RSF with anti-air systems, including MANPADS and FK-2000 missile gun systems, which have been effective in shooting down a handful of SAF warplanes and transports. Meanwhile, the Saudis have reportedly helped finance Sudanese arms purchases from Pakistan, another key Saudi ally.
In Yemen, the United Arab Emirates has implicitly backed a PLC takeover of much of the country without much fighting from the STC. But it has not backed the dissolution of the STC and appears to be changing tack towards a diplomatic and political appeasement strategy to end the crisis and prevent the STC and PLC from engaging in fighting that would weaken their ability to hold off the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia has provided financial backstops for Syria's new government, even as the United Arab Emirates has tried to use its influence to shift al-Sharaa's government towards a more anti-Islamist position.

Finally, even with little interest in direct escalation in the Gulf itself, both the Saudis and Emiratis are likely to develop policies designed to deepen their comparative advantages against one another's economic models, some policies of which might be deliberately disruptive or obstructive at times. Both countries have a long history of subtle economic boycotts, disruptions and direct policy changes designed to undermine nearby rivals. For example, in 2021, Saudi Arabia announced that companies with significant Saudi government contracts had to establish their headquarters in Riyadh to maintain these contracts, a move widely seen as an attempt to lure major companies away from Dubai, where they had previously preferred to set up due to lifestyle and development considerations. Saudi Arabia also treats Emirati-made goods in free trade zones as foreign goods rather than GCC ones, imposing tariffs on them, to undermine the effectiveness of free trade zones for the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remain in competition for tourism and airlines, as each side tries to gain international landing rights and market share, occasionally at the other's expense. The United Arab Emirates has a history of using airlines as a means to push back on geopolitical competition, limiting Turkish and Canadian landing rights at times for its state airlines, while also making it harder for residents from countries with disputes with the Emiratis to gain visas or set up businesses. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are also in a lifestyle and tax competition, with the United Arab Emirates leveraging its own more liberal social model to set up casinos and offer alcohol in ways that the more conservative Saudi Arabia currently cannot. In the lifestyle competition, escalation could lead to mutual tourist boycotts, while also sparking criticism of one another's social mores, with the Saudis favoring religious criticism of the United Arab Emirates and the United Arab Emirates focusing on Saudi Arabia's still-strict conservative values toward women and non-Muslims. Meanwhile, the Saudis are offering tax reforms aggressively targeted at wealthy investors and major companies, while the United Arab Emirates has tried to align with international tax standards to deepen its comparative advantage over its neighbors. This tax competition could result in shifting policies and standards that make long-term planning more difficult as the two seek to undermine one another's attractiveness.

Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 borrows heavily from the United Arab Emirates' own development plans, especially Dubai's, but is unable to replicate the strategy due to Saudi Arabia's larger population and religious orientation. At the same time, the United Arab Emirates, with its smaller population, fewer mineral resources and federal political structure that favors local independence on the economy, cannot compete with Saudi Arabia's centralized, resource and population-rich advantages.
To gain more landing rights for its state airlines in 2010-11 , the United Arab Emirates enacted a series of escalatory policy moves against Canada, including imposing high visa fees on citizens, which eventually culminated in earning said landing rights over a decade later in 2025.