U.N. Security Council Resolution Bolsters Morocco's Claims to Disputed Western Sahara

(ABDEL MAJID BZIOUAT/AFP via Getty Images)

A man rides past a roundabout adorned with Moroccan national flags in Laayoune, the main city of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, on Nov. 7, 2025.

A recent U.N. Security Council resolution expands the growing momentum for Morocco's sovereignty claims over Western Sahara, but the continued dispute over the territory will obstruct any Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement and will limit Morocco's ability to develop some industries there because of EU trade restrictions. On Oct. 31, the U.N. Security Council approved a resolution stating that "genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty could constitute a most feasible solution" for the dispute over Western Sahara, which pits Rabat's claims of sovereignty against a low-level local insurgency. The resolution passed with 11 votes in favor, including the United States. Russia, China and Pakistan abstained, while Algeria — the main backer of the Polisario Front (PF), the militant group which claims to represent the indigenous Sahrawi people of Western Sahara — did not vote in protest. In response to the passage of the resolution, the PF ambassador to the United Nations said the resolution "does not imply recognition of Morocco's illegal military occupation of Western Sahara." Algeria criticized the resolution for allegedly favoring one proposal over others and not including a reference to a referendum vote for self-determination of the Sahrawis, which has been an unfulfilled part of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, or MINURSO, since it was established in 1991. Days after the vote, the PF claimed responsibility for Nov. 4 and 6 attacks against Moroccan troops, signaling that the militant group would continue armed resistance against the Moroccan military.

Morocco first unveiled its sovereignty plan in 2007, according to which the indigenous Sahrawis would be granted some autonomy under Moroccan rule, though Rabat would control foreign policy and defense. Morocco controls around two-thirds of the territory in Western Sahara, including most of the major population centers in the territory and the capital Dakhla, while the PF controls the remaining third.
In 1973, the PF initially began an armed conflict against Spain, the colonial power. After Spain withdrew from Western Sahara in 1975, both Morocco and Mauritania claimed portions of Western Sahara. As a result, the PF turned its armed resistance against Morocco and Mauritania through the 16-year Western Sahara war. The United Nations brokered a ceasefire in the conflict in 1991. Since then, the Moroccan army and the PF have sporadically clashed, especially around the sand berm that divides Moroccan-controlled and PF-controlled territory.

The passage of the U.N. resolution comes after growing Western support for the Moroccan sovereignty plan in recent years and as the United States has reignited efforts to try to broker a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. After Morocco joined the Abraham Accords in 2020 and normalized relations with Israel, the United States backed Morocco's sovereignty plan. Spain and France also backed Morocco's plan in 2022 and 2024, respectively. But since then, there has been mounting frustration, especially from President Donald Trump's administration, over the stalemate and lack of progress. Even though MINURSO's mandate was renewed through October 2026, critics have lamented that the mission has not been able to fulfill one of the key objectives of its mandate: organizing a referendum in Western Sahara. In addition, the United States is reportedly trying to achieve a deal between Algeria and Morocco to normalize relations after Algeria severed ties with the kingdom in 2021 over Morocco's alleged support for the Kabylie separatist movement, which seeks independence for the Kabyle minority in northern Algeria.

MINURSO was first established to facilitate a path toward a political resolution for Western Sahara with a referendum. However, MINURSO officials have alleged that disagreements between Moroccan authorities and the PF on electoral issues — including voter criteria — have prevented them from doing so.
In October, the PF said that the group would acknowledge Morocco's sovereignty claim if determined by referendum.
Although Algeria and Morocco severed bilateral relations in 2021, ties between them had already been strained over Western Sahara. Their border has been closed since the 1990s. Algeria ended gas exports to Morocco in November 2021 after the 25-year contract on the Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline expired. Other incidents, such as a 2023 fatal altercation between the Algerian coast guard and Moroccan tourists, have compounded existing grievances. In late October, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff said that he believed a "peace deal" between Morocco and Algeria was feasible within 60 days.

The resolution will expand on growing momentum backing Morocco's plan, but the festering dispute will remain a stumbling block to normalization between Morocco and Algeria, obstruct the development of economically important industries in Western Sahara and fuel sporadic clashes in the territory. The adoption of the resolution expands on the growing Western momentum to recognize Morocco's sovereignty claims, but it is unlikely to alter entrenched regional dynamics. Even though tensions between Algeria and the PF have recently grown — largely because of reports of violence and kidnappings around the Tindouf refugee camps in southwestern Algeria, where around 173,000 Sahrawi refugees live — Algiers will continue to back the Sahrawis both because of its rivalry with Rabat and because Algeria has long positioned itself as a champion of decolonization. So long as the question of Western Saharan sovereignty remains, Witkoff's aims to normalize relations between Morocco and Algeria will remain aspirational because relations remain tense for reasons beyond the Western Sahara dispute, including regional power dynamics and security incidents. While Morocco will further entrench its foothold in the portion of Western Sahara it controls by increasing investment, building up infrastructure, investing in green energy projects and courting foreign investment, the lack of formal recognition of Morocco's sovereignty claims will still impede some development plans, particularly of the crucial fishing industry. Around 73% of Morocco's fish comes from waters off the Western Sahara coast and Morocco has aspirations to expand the industry over the next decade. However, the territorial dispute poses legal challenges for the export of fish and permits to enable European vessels to fish in Moroccan-controlled waters. Even though the European Commission has approved a proposal to resume negotiations for a new fishing agreement, Morocco will likely continue to face legal challenges over the trade of products from Western Sahara because of an October 2024 European Court of Justice ruling that obligated Morocco to include Sahrawi representation and agreement in trade deals involving Western Sahara, such as the EU-Morocco trade agreement. Finally, sporadic clashes between the Moroccan military and the PF will persist and will largely be confined to the area around the sand berm, but could also extend to cities like Esmara in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara and toward Mauritania if Nouakchott pursues infrastructure projects with Morocco linking to Western Sahara. Additional attacks in Western Sahara are more likely to increase in frequency if other nations recognize Morocco's Western Sahara plan or if prominent officials from those countries visit Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, in a mostly symbolic demonstration that the PF has not relinquished its claims over the territory.

In late September, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau encouraged U.S. companies to invest in Morocco and Western Sahara. Much like Morocco, Western Sahara has significant phosphate reserves. Combined, Morocco and Western Sahara have around 70% of the world's phosphate reserves.
In October 2025, the European Union and Morocco approved a revised version of the EU-Morocco trade agreement that made limited revisions to the previous version to comply with the October 2024 ruling. However, a combination of vague guidelines regarding compliance in the court's ruling, as well as the Moroccan government's refusal to make concessions to the Sahrawis, means that this version will likely face additional legal challenges. The impacts of this decision are most notable on the fishing industry off the coast of Western Sahara since Morocco had pursued agricultural and fishing liberalization efforts with Europe under the trade agreement.
Despite U.S. pressure for normalization, Morocco and Algeria are very unlikely to normalize ties in the near term. The Algerian public would likely oppose improving relations with Morocco as that would suggest reducing support for the PF and broader decolonization efforts, especially ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Even so, there is likely some space for cooperation in the margins, such as in the event of a natural disaster. Algeria offered support after the 2023 Moroccan earthquake.