How Kazakhstan's Proposed Reforms Will Impact the Question of Succession

In Kazakhstan, proposed institutional reforms are meant to tighten the regime's hold on power, but they will not guarantee a smooth transition or prevent Russian attempts to manipulate political events once President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev steps down. On Sept. 8, President Tokayev used his annual State of the Nation address to the Parliament to propose constitutional changes that would abolish Kazakhstan's upper chamber, the Senate, and create a unicameral legislature. Framed as the next phase of political reform, Tokayev's proposal calls for at least a year of public debate followed by a nationwide referendum in 2027. In a separate but related step, Tokayev also proposed an electoral change: shifting back to elections conducted exclusively by party lists. Together, these moves mark Kazakhstan's most significant political reform since the January 2022 protests, which triggered constitutional amendments that altered the composition of the Mazhilis, the lower chamber, by reintroducing a mixed electoral system with 70% of deputies elected by party lists and 30% through single-seat constituencies. The amendments briefly allowed independents and non-party candidates to run in single-mandate districts for the first time in nearly two decades, but almost all failed to win seats. Tokayev's new plan would reverse even this modest opening, consolidating control under party leadership in a unicameral parliament.

Kazakhstan created a bicameral parliament in 1995 after the country's first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, clashed with the Supreme Council in the early 1990s, where a vocal minority of independent and opposition deputies favored a parliamentary republic. The Senate was designed to be detached from day-to-day politics through its indirect election mechanism. Under the current constitution, the Senate speaker is first in the line of succession should the presidency fall vacant. Tokayev himself chaired the Senate for a decade. The current national legislature consists of a 98-seat Mazhilis and a 50-seat Senate.
Senators are chosen partly through elections by local representative bodies, the Maslikhats, a design meant to embody regional input in the national legislature. The chamber also plays a role in confirming senior appointments, including the prosecutor general, the chief of the National Security Committee (KNB), and Supreme Court judges, meaning these powers would have to be reassigned (almost certainly to Tokayev's allies) under a unicameral system. This change would make it harder for rivals to block key appointments or the government's agenda.

Tokayev's constitutional reform proposal is an effort to shape the political landscape ahead of a potentially destabilizing succession process. Speculation about who will replace the 72-year-old president if he decides not to run again in 2029 or if he becomes seriously ill has intensified in recent months, fueled by visible signs of aging and rumors of his ill health. That uncertainty was compounded days before the State of the Nation address, when independent outlet Orda.kz reported on Sept. 4 that Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, a close ally of Tokayev's and a potential successor, and current and former senior KNB officers had been detained. The government denied this claim, and Orda.kz later walked it back. Nurtleu remained in his position throughout that time, and the government has dismissed the episode as a baseless media rumor. However, several of the figures initially reported to have been detained were alleged to be linked to the July 2024 assassination of exiled journalist Aidos Sadykov in Kyiv, a case widely seen as — but never confirmed to be — a KNB-organized extrajudicial hit. As a result, the episode amplified perceptions of a political crisis and reinforced the sense that no one is safe from character assassinations. Moreover, the reports of the arrests coincided with the online circulation of an alleged draft constitution, reinforcing rumors of a looming institutional change. The draft's subsequent launch as an online petition pushed debate around sensitive issues into the public sphere, including the status of the Russian language.

Nurtleu, Kazakhstan's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, built his career as a long-time confidant of Tokayev, rising through senior strategic posts including deputy chair of the KNB. With substantial informal influence, he is widely seen as a potential successor to Tokayev. Rumors about his detention may have been the result of a politically motivated leak timed to his and Tokayev's absence on a trip to China, possibly intended to discredit a potential successor. Though false, they also fueled perceptions of instability, creating uncertainty over whether he remains under Tokayev's protection or is politically weakened and vulnerable to rivals. It also revived memories of how, in the wake of the January 2022 unrest, even the most entrenched security insiders could be abruptly sidelined, underscoring both the volatility of elite politics and the risks Tokayev faces in keeping his government unified as succession pressures mount.
Sadykov, a Kazakh opposition journalist living in exile in Ukraine, was assassinated in Kyiv in July 2024. Ukrainian law enforcement identified two Kazakh nationals as suspects, one of whom Kazakh authorities later confirmed was in their custody but would not be extradited. Because the Sadykov case raises doubts over whether Kazakhstan's security services acted on their own or with high-level approval, and gives rival factions a tool to smear succession contenders, the continued opacity around it risks further eroding public trust, fueling elite infighting and destabilizing the transition.
On Aug. 20, a draft constitution authored by a jurist, Zhumageldy Yelyubayev, was circulated online. The document proposed abolishing the Senate, replacing the office of prime minister with a vice president, and reducing the presidential term to five years with the possibility of two consecutive terms. Yelyubayev later announced the launch of a petition on the official government portal calling for a new constitution, though the link has since been inaccessible. The Kazakh government has not said anything about this draft or whether it is similar to its own constitutional proposal.
Under Article 7 of the current constitution, Kazakh is the state language, while in state organizations and local self-government bodies, Russian may be officially used on equal grounds. The leaked draft, authored by Yelyubayev, proposed removing this provision, thereby ending the Russian language's equal status in official use. Because language is a sensitive issue in Kazakhstan, tied to identity, nationhood and the balance between Kazakh and Russian speakers, such a change would risk inflaming cultural politics. Beyond the domestic dimension, it also carries geopolitical implications, since Moscow has often invoked the need to protect Russian speakers to justify pressure or intervention in the post-Soviet space.

If implemented, Tokayev's proposed reforms will not settle the succession question but will reshape it in ways that intensify elite rivalries and raise the risk of instability. Tokayev's proposal matters most because it reshapes the succession question, which is already the central uncertainty hanging over Kazakhstan's political future, as in other systems where power is highly personalized and institutions offer little guidance for leadership transitions. The events of the past few days suggest that Tokayev's transition may be more contested than he planned. A 2027 constitutional referendum will almost certainly pass, paving the way for a unicameral parliament dominated by party lists, with the speaker of the chamber first in the succession line. This scenario would heighten uncertainty since the speaker position is weak and can potentially be contested by lawmakers. Uncertainty would be reduced if a new constitution reintroduces the post of vice president, abolished in 1995, which would supersede the speaker in the succession order and give Tokayev a direct mechanism to designate or groom a successor before 2029. A third possibility is that Tokayev amends the constitution to allow himself to run again, removing the current constraint on another mandate. However, this, too, would leave succession unresolved if he were to die or become incapacitated in office. In all three cases, the result would be a political environment where elite maneuvering over succession, security portfolios and policy rents intensifies, narrowing representation and increasing the risks of instability. The risk of widespread violence will remain low in all scenarios, given the regime's strong coercive capacity and the weakness of organized opposition, but the degree of volatility will differ. For instance, if succession falls to a weak speaker or is triggered abruptly by Tokayev's health issues, elite rivalries and the absence of institutional channels could fuel localized protests or elite-backed mobilization, especially in regions where grievances already run deep. By contrast, creating a vice presidency would reduce uncertainty by offering a clearer line of succession, though tensions could still emerge if the appointee lacks legitimacy. If Tokayev seeks another term, protests would be likely, since the move would break his pledge of a single-term mandate and be seen as a betrayal of public trust and a return to the practices he once condemned.

Kazakhstan's narrowing political space will also heighten its external exposure, making succession not only a domestic challenge but a test of Moscow's leverage and Beijing's growing influence amid Western disengagement. Any institutional changes will carry broader weight because Kazakhstan's resource wealth and its role on the Middle Corridor make it central to the Europe-China trade route, the global energy transition and the competition for influence between Russia, China and the West. In the short and medium term, any successor to Tokayev will almost certainly require tacit approval from the Kremlin, which retains ample leverage through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, customs and information pressure and security networks. However, for now, Russia is unlikely to severely coerce Kazakhstan to manipulate the upcoming institutional reforms, as recent setbacks in Armenia and Azerbaijan and the demands of the Ukraine war are limiting Moscow's appetite for heavy-handed political engineering in Astana. In 2025-26, Russia will likely stick to low-cost levers such as disrupting oil exports through the CPC pipeline, customs and sanitary bans, information campaigns, cyber operations, and quiet cultivation of security and party networks, with the goal to shape outcomes at the margin. If the war in Ukraine subsides, whether via a proper peace deal or by becoming a frozen conflict, Russia will have more strategic room to act and could escalate hybrid pressure on Kazakhstan to prevent a pronounced tilt toward the West or China. Even then, a military move would remain a last resort, plausible only under a January 2022-style regime crisis, and would be further checked by China's preference for stability given its trade, corridor and investment exposure in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan, a major producer of hydrocarbons and uranium, is also a pivotal link in the Middle Corridor trade route connecting China and Europe. Additionally, the country holds vast reserves of rare-earth metals — nearly half of those deemed critical by the United States and 21 of the 34 essential for the European Union's green transition. A newly announced 20-million-ton deposit, if confirmed, would make Kazakhstan the world's third-largest source of critical minerals.
China has invested in numerous Belt and Road Initiative-linked projects in the country and, in recent years, has imported the majority of Kazakhstan's critical minerals output. Its trade with Kazakhstan climbed to $44 billion in 2024, and total investment now tops $26 billion. Tokayev's Sept. 2 visit to China culminated in Kazakhstan signing over 70 commercial agreements with Chinese businesses, securing more than $15 billion in new economic deals. The projects span a wide range of sectors beyond traditional energy, including manufacturing, green energy, agriculture, high-tech and metallurgy.
Although economically and militarily stretched by its war in Ukraine, Russia has reasserted itself as Kazakhstan's top net investor since 2022, with inflows rising from $159 million in 2022 to a record $1.74 billion in 2024. Additionally, Russia has repeatedly weaponized its leverage over the CPC pipeline, which transports roughly 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports. This sector accounts for about 25% of Kazakhstan's gross domestic product and generates around 35% of state revenue. By contrast, U.S. influence is shrinking: net foreign direct investment from the United States has collapsed from a peak inflow of $4.46 billion in 2019 to a negative $2.3 billion in 2024, reflecting large-scale capital withdrawal.