Strategic calculations are driving India to preserve its close economic and security ties with Russia while also avoiding a major escalation of tensions with the West. On Dec. 2, an official from the Indian oil ministry recently announced that India would continue buying Russian oil, even after the Group of 7 (G-7) price cap on Russian crude shipments went into effect (which it did on Dec. 5). India — which has emerged as a major buyer of Russian oil over the past year — has opted not to support the price cap mechanism, despite U.S. and European efforts to convince the South Asian giant to join them in imposing more pressure on Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. 

• India has become the second-largest importer of Russian crude oil after China due to discounted prices offered by Moscow. Russian oil only made up 0.2% of India's total oil imports before March, but reached more than 20% in November. About one-third of this discounted Russian oil has been imported by private players in India. However, state-run Indian agencies have also taken advantage of the lower prices. India's access to cheap Russian oil has been critical in preventing fuel price hikes in India, which has helped mitigate inflation in the country. 
• India has resisted calls from the United States to join the G-7 oil price cap, arguing it will maintain its neutral stance on Russia-West tensions in order to preserve India's strategic autonomy. 

India's neutral position on the war in Ukraine reflects New Delhi's foreign policy of strategic autonomy, which seeks to keep balanced political, economic and security partnerships in a multipolar world. India's long strategic, defense and growing energy partnership with Russia, as well as its shift from traditional non-aligned foreign policy to self-serving strategic autonomy, explain New Delhi's stance in the conflict between the West and Russia. Since the outset of the war in Ukraine, India has maintained a neutral position and refused to directly denounce Russia's actions, both in public and through votes in the United Nations. At the same time, India has also been careful not to breach any Western sanctions on Russia, which has prevented a conflict with the West. India took the opportunity to source discounted oil from Russia as such oil exports are not yet sanctioned. New Delhi is also exploring measures like trading in rupees and rubles with Russia to bypass the international system of financial payments (SWIFT) that many Russian entities are currently banned from using. 

• Russia and India have enjoyed close strategic, military and economic relations since the Cold War period. Although India maintained a non-aligned position through the Cold War, a close relationship between the United States and Pakistan (India's rival) brought the former Soviet Union and India closer together. The Soviet Union was the biggest arms exporter to India, and supported the development of India's public sector-led economy before liberalization reforms in the 1990s. When the West imposed sanctions on India after its nuclear tests in 1974, the Soviet Union assisted India's civil nuclear program. The Soviet Union also supported India's war to liberate Bangladesh in the 1970s and India tacitly supported Russia's occupation of Afghanistan. More recently, India has tried to prevent a close relationship between Russia and China to balance its interests in the continent, though this objective remains mostly out of India's control. 
• Since the start of the war in Ukraine, India has called for the cessation of hostilities and diplomatic talks on multiple occasions. India has also abstained from many U.N. resolutions against Russia.
• Despite its close ties with Russia, India also seeks to have cordial relations with the West in general and the United States in particular as a part of its balanced foreign policy. The strategic convergence to deter China's rise and influence (especially in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct) has resulted in strong alignment in recent years.For example, India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the ''Quad''), which also includes the United States, Japan and Australia. This group has met increasingly in recent years, with India's participation. More recently, India has also increased cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States on food and energy security. U.S-India bilateral ties have grown through a close defense partnership that includes military exercises, growing arms trade, information sharing and operational cooperation, as well as growing cooperation in trade and technology.

India's balanced foreign policy is also meant to somewhat shield its economy at a time of a generalized slowdown of global economic activity. New Delhi's neutrality on the conflict in Ukraine opens opportunities for Indian businesses to expand trade ties with Russia and reduce the country's high trade deficit, as well as incentivize the use of the rupee for international trade. Not being a party to Western sanctions also ensures a regular supply of critical inputs like fertilizers and coal, which is necessary to ensure domestic food and energy security. If India eventually cannot import Russian oil due to difficulties in getting ships or insurance because of the G-7 price cap, India's strong macroeconomic fundamentals (including high foreign exchange reserves) should enable it to purchase oil at international prices. In addition to oil, India imports fertilizers and coal from Russia as well. If India manages to avoid meaningful disruptions in those imports in the coming months, its food or energy supplies will remain secure.

• Between February and November 2022, Russian exports to India totaled about $29 billion, whereas Indian exports totaled only $1.9 billion. According to media reports, in November Moscow sent New Delhi a list of 500 items that Russia would want to import from India, which included various raw materials (like paper and metals). India and Russia have been working to finalize a rupee-ruble trade mechanism for a few months. Russia's Sberbank and VTB Bank have opened special ''vostro'' accounts in India (foreign bank accounts in domestic banks in domestic currency) in India. The rupee-ruble trade mechanism is not yet operational, but it will reportedly target non-oil trade between the two states. 
• Indian energy companies — including ONGC-Videsh Ltd, Indian Oil and Oil India are — reportedly interested in participating in Russian upstream oil projects. The exodus of Western companies in Russian energy projects is creating opportunities for India to increase its presence in hydrocarbon exploration in Russia.

In the medium-to-long term, India will seek to preserve its role as a major middle power that keeps cordial ties with the United States while also retaining a strong relationship with Russia. India's push to preserve its strategic autonomy, however, may get tricky. An overt Russian escalation in Ukraine, for example, could make New Delhi reconsider its response to Moscow's aggression against Kyiv — especially if such an escalation involves the use of nuclear weapons. India's reliance on U.S. dollar-denominated systems for financial transactions could also complicate its ability to balance between the United States and Russia, while U.S. sanctions could restrict India's access to sophisticated military technology from Russia. But absent these scenarios, New Delhi's broader relationship with Moscow will likely endure, given India's dependence on Russia for weapons and protection against national security threats (like those posed by neighboring Pakistan and China).